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ABSTRACT 
Illegal corporate activity, including the price fixing activity of two or more firms 
through cartels, costs the global economy billions of dollars a year, yet its causes 
are neither well studied nor well understood in organizational literature.  This 
thesis explores possible external and internal antecedents of illegal cartel activity 
through the management lenses of resource dependency theory and agency theory 
and the criminological theory of strain theory in the examination of the research 
question “Why do corporations engage in illegal activity?”  I posit that illegal 
international cartel activity is influenced by the environment in which the 
organization finds itself, moderated by corporate governance mechanisms of the 
firm, namely board scanning.  In tandem, I consider potential internal drivers of 
illicit corporate behaviour, suggesting that illegal activity, undertaken as a result of 
a gap between organizational goals and the inability to achieve them through legal 
means (strain theory), is impacted by the control mechanisms that the owners of 
corporations and their agents impose on the CEO and managers of the 
organization.   
I explore these proposed antecedents of illegal cartel activity both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.  For the quantitative analysis, I create a matched sample of 296 
observations of international firms, covering illegal cartel activity that spans 40 
years drawn from a proprietary database containing information on all known 
international cartels from 1970 to 2008.  The qualitative analysis includes first-
person, semi-structured interviews with international experts in the area of illegal 
cartel activity. I take a realist approach, comparing the interview data obtained 
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from each individual with responses elicited from other interviewees, linking the 
qualitative data directly to the constructs used in the quantitative data analysis.   
I find support in the environmental analysis for the board scanning moderated 
effects of industry profits and dynamism on illegal cartel activity. The analysis of 
the internal variables demonstrate that while board level variables such as control 
method and percentage of outside directors predict illegal corporate activity and 
CEO control methods, CEO level variables do not predict illegal corporate activity, 
nor do they mediate board control as it pertains to illegal corporate activity.   
My research highlights the impact of the scanning and control mechanisms at the 
highest levels of the organization on illegal corporate behaviour.  In so doing, I 
find that the influence of the board on the organization’s environment is subtle, yet 
palpable and produces within the organization the conditions where innovation to 
achieve the perceived wants of the shareholders is implicitly encouraged.  I put 
forward this research as a first step in considering illegal corporate activity in a 
way that encompasses external influences and internal organizational control 
mechanisms in a new and innovative manner and as a tool to help both researchers 
and practitioners better understand how organizational deviance, as manifested 
through illegal corporate activity, can be prevented.   
 
Keywords:  Corporate governance, cartels, illegal activity, CEO control, board 
control, strain theory, resource dependency theory (RDT), agency theory, logistic 
regression 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 60 years ago, the Tennessee Valley Authority (a federally owned 
corporation in the United States) was surprised to discover that the bids they received 
from a number of companies for a project they had tendered were essentially all the 
same.  This included everything from a $3 insulator to a $17 million steam turbine 
generator.  The Tennessee Valley Authority was puzzled by this.  The process had been 
fair, with no one firm having an advantage over the other.  The bidding firms 
themselves were some of the biggest and most trustworthy names in the United States, 
including Westinghouse and General Electric.  There had been no leaks of the bids 
beforehand and no manipulation of the bids afterwards.     
So why were all of the bids the same? 
What the authorities eventually discovered has become one of the most famous and 
studied cartels in North America: the heavy electrical equipment price fixing cartel of 
the 1950s.  Their investigation showed a far reaching, pervasive scheme that involved 
dozens of some of the United States’ largest corporations all working to drive up the 
profits of the participants by engaging in widespread price fixing.  The consequences 
were significant; not only did the conspirators have to pay healthy fines, a number of 
individuals went to jail.  More fundamentally, it sent shock waves through the business 
community and regulatory authorities who had believed that the days of illegal price 
fixing in the United States were long behind them.   
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In looking to the past to understand the present, it cannot be denied that society was 
different in the 1950s.  As we examine the current state of affairs in the 21st century, the 
environment for business is greatly changed from over a half century ago.  The global 
marketplace has transformed with the implementation of industry-wide codes of 
conduct and the articulation of corporate ethical guidelines that can be found in almost 
every annual report.  Organizations such as the Department of Justice in the United 
States, the Competition Bureau in Canada and the European Commission in the 
European Union have committed substantial amounts of time and resources to ensure 
illegal corporate activity such as that perpetrated by the heavy electrical equipment 
pricing cartel never happens again.  Sophisticated regulatory schemes have been 
designed in most developed nations to act as an early warning sign for price fixing and 
antitrust behaviour, catching it in its infancy.  
However, one need only open a newspaper or turn on the television to recognize that 
illegal corporate activity – including cartels - still occurs; indeed, there seems to be no 
end to the creativeness and breadth of crimes committed by corporations (Geis, 2007). 
Some corporations appear to view the legal and regulatory rules to which they are 
subject as nothing more than suggestions and recommendations on how to conduct 
business (Box, 1983:351).  In fact, the evidence shows that many corporations reoffend 
even after being sanctioned for a first conviction of corporate crime (Clinard & Yeager, 
1980). This suggests that either the sanctions have a limited deterrent effect in general, 
or that some risk factors increase the probability of recidivism even if the previous 
sanction did have a deterrent effect for some corporations.  
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My thesis is inspired by the frequency of illegal corporate activity in our society and 
how it may be mitigated.  This area of study has wide applicability and is of interest to 
shareholders, boards of directors, management, regulators and legislators, and, at its 
core, the public at large.  I also believe that my research will be useful as a guide to 
assist corporations in the development of internal board policies and procedures, 
providing them with precautionary steps they can take to help them avoid the precursors 
of illegal activity (Coleman, 1987; Datta & Narayanan, 1989). 
My research will attempt to place the commission of white collar crimes within a 
unique theoretical framework that utilizes organizational and criminological theories.  
Both the organizational and criminological approaches have struggled to adequately 
describe the theoretical foundation of these corporate behaviours. The management 
literature speaks to corporate structural and industry level environmental conditions that 
may lead to or counteract illegal corporate activity (Baucus & Near, 1991; Hill, Kelley, 
Agle, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005).  The criminology 
literature speaks to the reasons why corporations, and the people in them, may commit 
illegal acts on behalf of these corporations (Cohen, 1995; Merton, 1968; Saini & Krush, 
2008).  However, in both instances, illegal corporate activity is vastly understudied, 
particularly at the corporate level (Langton & Piquero, 2007) and there is very little 
research that examines the organizational and criminological aspects of illegal corporate 
activity in tandem so as to better address the phenomenon.  By bridging the 
management and criminology literatures, I aim to address the research gaps in these 
fields to help us better understand the causes of illegal corporate activity.   
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1.1 Overview 
Notwithstanding the billions of dollars of impact that white collar crime broadly and 
illegal corporate cartel activity in particular have on the global economy, their causes are 
neither well understood nor well researched in management literature.   This thesis aims 
to explore possible external and internal antecedents of illegal cartel activity through the 
theoretical lenses of resource dependency theory, agency theory and strain theory in the 
examination of the research question “Why do corporations engage in illegal activity?”   
My research posits that illegal cartel activity is influenced by both the environment that 
the organization finds itself in and the control mechanisms that the owners of 
corporations and their agents impose on the CEO and managers of the organization.   
The environment influences the actions of an organization, particularly when the 
organization is faced with a scarcity of resources and an inability to control those 
resources required to fulfill its purposes and survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  I argue 
that environmental conditions impact the propensity of an organization to commit illegal 
activity.  As the environment becomes more hostile and it is more challenging for the 
organization’s management to meet shareholders’ profit expectations, the incentive to 
engage in illegal activities increases.   However, I suggest that the relationship between 
the environment and illegal activity is impacted by the functions of the board of directors 
(“board”) of a firm.  This is due to the responsibility of the board to scan the 
organization’s external environment to determine if the existing strategy and actions of 
the firm are appropriate for the environment within which they find themselves.  I 
propose that the more effective the environmental scanning ability of the board, the more 
they will be able to assist the management of the organization in dealing with a hostile 
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environment.  Thus, the effectiveness of the scanning of the board moderates the impact 
of the environment on the propensity of the organization to commit illegal activities. Not 
only has this moderating relationship not been previously examined,  this thesis presents 
the first time I am aware of the concept of  board scanning has been applied to illegal 
organizational activity.  
In tandem, this research means to examine internal organizational characteristics, namely 
the control methods (behavioural or output based) that exist within the organization, to 
determine their impact on illegal cartel activity.  While some research has been 
performed in this field (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009; Pinto, Leana, 
& Pil, 2008; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004; Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, 1978),  I 
present the unique argument that the use of output based control mechanisms increases 
the incidence of illegal activity as viewed through the criminological lens of strain theory 
(Agnew, 1992, 2001, Merton, 1938, 1968).  The control methods of the organization are 
such that they flow down from the shareholders to the board to the CEO to the top 
managers (Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006; Wade, O'Reilly, & Pollock, 2006; 
Werner & Tosi, 1995). I suggest that the control method that is used on the board 
influences the control method that is used for the CEO which in turn cascades down the 
organization to the managers who generally are the ones responsible for the direct actions 
leading to illegal activity.  I provide a conceptual model for the entire framework in 
Figure 1 below. 
  
 6 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
 
1.1.1 Level of Analysis 
Organizations are the actors in the model I utilize.  It is organizations that are exposed 
to the environment and take actions based upon that environment.  It is for the 
organization that boards scan the environment then translate that scanning into action. It 
is organizations that have their own unique control structure and utilize control 
mechanisms.  And, it is the organization’s board that has its own unique characteristics 
that will impact the relationship between attributes of the environment and illegal cartel 
activity.  Thus, appropriately, the unit of analysis will be that of the organization.   
Industry 
Concentration 
Board 
Scanning 
Industry Profits 
Munificence 
Dynamism 
CEO Output
Control
Director 
Independence 
Board Output 
Control
Illegal Cartel
Activity 
Firm Profits 
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This choice makes sense from a theoretical perspective as well.  The definition of illegal 
activity is organizationally based (Slapper, 1999) and both the environment (Merton, 
1957; Murphy & Robinson, 2008) and antitrust activities (Simpson & Koper, 1992) 
have been studied at the organizational level.  In addition, cartels, which are part of this 
antitrust activity, are fundamentally made up of a group of organizations.  While the 
theory of strain theory has been generally used as an individual level theory (Passas, 
2001) it has also been linked to organizational and group study (Merton, 1968).  Finally 
the definition of illegal corporate activity recognizes that the organization provides the 
structures and positions that are necessary to commit illegal activities (Jamieson, 1994; 
Sutherland, 1940, 1949). 
Thus, consideration was given to selecting the proper levels of theory, measurement and 
analysis (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu, 2007, Rousseau, 1985).  The level of theory 
refers to the focal level to which generalizations are meant to apply.  While it is 
individuals that act and it is within industries that these organizations revolve, it is the 
organization from which I seek to make generalizations as it is the organization that will 
engage or not engage in illegal activity.  The level of measurement as alluded to is that of 
the organization and the level of analysis is likewise that of the organization.  I do not run 
into differences in level based upon these selections and analysis (Rousseau, 1985). 
Therefore, examining the phenomenon of illegal cartel activity from an organizational 
perspective is appropriate and is aligned with research to date in order to allow for 
comparisons across data. 
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1.1.2 Illegal Corporate Activity 
In order to understand how environmental and control behaviours are able to influence 
the likelihood of illegal cartel activity, it is important to first understand the concepts of 
white collar crime and the evolution of illegal corporate activity.  Chapter 2 presents the 
concept of illegal corporate activity and discusses the challenges with its 
operationalization and measurement in management research.  Part of this challenge 
rests in the difficulty in defining illegal corporate activity; each researcher seems to find 
a different definition to suit his or her own purpose. The definition is important as it 
informs this research, helps define the generalizability of the results, places boundaries 
around the research scope, and clearly encompasses the data that will be used.  Thus, I 
employ the following definition for illegal corporate activity: 
Criminal acts (by omission or commission) which are the result of 
deliberate decision-making (or culpable negligence) of those who occupy 
structural positions within the organization as corporate executives or 
managers.  These decisions are organizationally based - made in 
accordance with normative goals (primarily corporate profit), standard 
operating procedures, and cultural norms of the organization - and are 
intended to benefit the corporation itself. (Slapper, 1999:16) 
 
This research will specifically consider antitrust crimes which are crimes that are aimed 
at activities that are anti-competitive in nature or otherwise unfairly interfere with the 
level and quality of competition in the marketplace.  A number of developed nations have 
passed legislation that expressly forbids certain types of anticompetitive activity.  This 
includes price fixing which occurs when two or more competitors agree on list or 
transaction prices, delivery charges, discounts, rebates, premia, bid prices, exchange 
rates, and price protection clauses as well as any other activity that a court may feel 
unduly inhibits competition (Connor, 2001).  I define illegal cartel activity as:  
 9 
 
Illegal cartel activity is collaborative action with competitors aimed 
toward the purpose of price fixing which is the result of deliberate 
decision-making by those who occupy structural positions within the 
organization such as corporate executives and managers.  The decisions 
are organizationally based, made in accordance with the normative goals, 
standard operating procedures and cultural norms of the organization and 
are intended to benefit the organization itself. 
 
In addition, this thesis will look specifically at illegal international price fixing 
undertaken by cartels some of whose participants were headquartered in the United 
States.  The impact of this activity on the global economy cannot be understated.  Connor 
(2009) estimated that over an 18 year period, that the value of markets where illegal 
cartel activity has occurred is in the trillions of dollars.    
1.1.3 The Environment 
The environment can have a dramatic impact on an organization, affecting the decisions 
they take and the corporate strategy they adopt in order to compete.  But what elements 
inherent in the environmental condition are the strongest influencers on illegal cartel 
activity?  And do some of them even matter at all?  Chapter 3 sets out my arguments as to 
how elements of the environment cause illegal cartel activity and how the environmental 
scanning by boards moderates this relationship.  To do so, I use resource dependency 
theory to demonstrate that there are circumstances under which an organization will take 
illegal actions to acquire or control those resources in the environment that it depends 
upon to ensure its survival.   
While the environment has been described in management literature in a wide variety of 
ways, this research will focus on five key elements:  industry concentration; industry 
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profits; firm profits; munificence; and, dynamism.  I assert that these five environmental 
characteristics impact the illegal cartel activity of organizations. 
However, the relationship is potentially more complicated than just a direct causal link 
between the environment and illegal cartel activity.  Indeed, environmental phenomena, 
while important as drivers of organizational action, do not impact illegal cartel activity in 
an unfettered manner.  I suggest that two principal responsibilities of the board, namely 
acting as a buffer between the environment and the organization and assisting the 
organization in its endeavours to operate within their environment serve to dampen the 
effect that the environment has on illegal cartel activity. Accordingly, this thesis 
recommends the examination of the activity of board scanning as a moderator in 
influencing the relationship between the environment and illegal cartel activity.   
Thus, Chapter 3 sets out hypotheses that encapsulate the relationship between the 
environment, the scanning ability of the board and the commission of illegal cartel 
activity. 
1.1.4 Control 
While Chapter 3 considers the external environment, Chapter 4 focuses on the internal 
control mechanisms of the organization, specifically those employed by the board. 
Corporation governance is the method used in the administration of the corporation’s 
strategies and the actions taken to achieve the corporation’s goals.  Directors are charged 
by shareholders to ensure that managers act in the “best interests” of the corporation.  The 
best interests of the corporation are usually meant to be the best interests of shareholders 
which are conventionally held to be an obligation to maximize profits (Jamieson, 1994).   
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One of the fundamental ways that corporate governance is manifested within the structure 
of the corporation itself is through various control mechanisms for the board, the CEO 
and managers.  It is through these control mechanisms that the board can best ensure that 
the intentions of the shareholders are transmitted to managers and these actions are then 
monitored (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  There are two basic choices of control methods 
which can be used separately or in combination to motivate behaviour aligned with the 
interest of the shareholders: behavioural controls and output controls (Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Ouchi, 1977). 
Chapter 4 sets out the differences in the two control methods and details how they 
motivate particular behaviours at different levels of the organization.  As an example, 
output types of control methods result in there being an undue influence on short term 
firm outcomes, namely profits, and little supervision from above (Hill et al., 1992; 
Robertson & Anderson, 1993) including a lack of supervision of legal issues within the 
corporation (Jordan, 2010).  This short term focus also drives CEOs and managers to 
concentrate only on the goals and not the means to achieve them.  The corporate pressure 
to meet ever increasing shareholder profit expectations can drive organizations to 
consider turning to illegal means to achieve these ends, when they are blocked from using 
legal alternatives; this process is termed strain theory (Agnew, 1992, 2001, Merton, 1938, 
1968).  Strain theory is a theory often applied in the field of criminology, specifically 
when considering illegal activity (Agnew 1992, 2001).  To the best of my knowledge, the 
insights from strain theory have not yet been applied to strategic management research; 
this thesis will address that gap and use anomie to help understand illegal corporate 
behaviour from a management perspective. 
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While strain theory animates the goal seeking of the CEO and manager, agency theory 
informs the relationship between the board, the CEO and managers.  I posit a cascading 
effect whereby the control method (output or behavioural) that the board itself is 
measured against by shareholders is passed down to the CEO who then passes it down to 
the managers in charge of carrying out the strategy of the firm.  This chapter further 
hypothesizes that the control method used by the board will be associated with the control 
method used by the CEO. 
1.1.5 Data and Methodology  
The data for illegal cartel activity comes from a proprietary database that contains details 
of 174 cartels involving 848 separate firms.  Details on the cartel activities of the firms 
includes such things as participation, estimated market share, beginning and end dates of 
the cartels, levied penalties, fines and court settlements.  The data for the other constructs 
comes from archival sources. Chapter 5 provides a clear description of the source of the 
data for illegal cartel activity and gives examples of the companies that will be examined 
in this research. 
The hypotheses are complex and multi-faceted.  They encompass variables that do not fit 
into the same analytical scheme such as environmental and control variables and present 
complex theoretical concepts such as strain theory.  All of these elements are directed to 
the phenomenon of illegal cartel activity to answer a broad encompassing research 
question exploring what causes illegal corporate activity.  Therefore, a rigourous 
methodological approach was required.  It is outlined in Chapter 6.  
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The quantitative testing of the research relied on archival data for the independent 
variables.  For the dependent variable (illegal cartel activity), the previously mentioned 
proprietary database was used as it consists of data on international cartels from 1990 to 
2008.  As the dependent variable is binary, logistic regression was the statistical method 
employed to analyze the data. 
The qualitative research portion consisted of first person interviews with ten class action 
attorneys who are international experts in the area of illegal cartels and are intended to 
add colour and context to the quantitative research.  The attorneys are intimately involved 
in the history, causes and effects of illegal cartel activity and so provided useful 
information on the applicability of the model. 
1.1.6 Results 
The analysis of the hypotheses (1-5) was related to the impact of environmental variables 
on illegal cartel activity when moderating for board scanning.  I found that industry 
profits and dynamism had a significant and robust direct effect on illegal cartel activity, 
and a significant interaction with the board scanning moderator variable.  However, none 
of the other environmental variables tested were significant, either as a direct effect or 
when tested in the moderated model with all of the control variables.  I found that the 
board scanning variable received face validity and tentative support from practitioners 
and that it acted as a rather neutral moderator as evidenced in the small change to the 
direct effects of the environmental variables.  The idea of the effect of the board on 
illegal activity may be further explored by looking at other indices of the board’s 
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activities namely compliance regimes which were suggested by the attorneys as being the 
actual mechanism of how the board influences illegal activity, rather than board scanning. 
My testing of the hypotheses (6-10) related to governance and organizational control and 
their impact on illegal corporate activity resulted in mixed results.  I confirmed the 
cascading effect from the board compensation to the CEO compensation as statistically 
significant.  This lends support to the notion that compensation systems from the top of 
the hierarchy tend to flow down through the organization.  
I also found statistical support that an increase in independence of the board results in an 
increase in output controls for the CEO.  Again this offers validation for the thesis in that 
independent directors have less day to day knowledge of the actions within the 
organization and so rely on output controls to monitor the performance of the CEO.  
However, I was unable to find any statistical confirmation for the hypothesis that the 
CEO control method had any impact on illegal activity.  As a result, I was able to 
statistically support some of the constituent parts of the model but not the whole model 
itself.  While I did not find a link between CEO control and illegal corporate activity 
through my quantitative analysis, the attorneys I interviewed felt there was a causal link 
and emphatically stated that output based controls of the CEO did lead to an increase in 
illegal activity.  I believe this discrepancy to be an interesting area for future study.   
1.1.7 Discussion 
While we have come a long way from the 1950s, it is clear that illegal corporate activity 
still regularly occurs in global business.  This thesis aims to significantly contribute to the 
management literature by deconstructing the root causes of illegal cartel activity through 
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an examination of its external and internal antecedents.  I utilize an organizational 
approach that encompassed traditional antecedents such as the environment and new 
antecedents such as corporate control mechanisms.  Furthermore, I apply resource 
dependency theory to explain a new moderating mechanism for the environment’s impact 
on illegal cartel activity: board scanning.  Finally, the use of strain theory to explain an 
organizational outcome advances this theory’s usage and applies its insight to the field of 
management. 
In directly addressing the research question “Why do corporations engage in illegal 
activity”, the research adds to the management literature in a number of important and 
necessary ways.  First, there continues to be much ambiguity in understanding the effect 
of characteristics of the environment on illegal cartel activity.  The major characteristics 
include industry concentration, industry and firm profits, munificence, and dynamism, all 
of which have been studied with puzzling results.  My research helps to clarify the 
relationships these characteristics have with illegal cartel activity in order to inform the 
ongoing academic debate.  In addition, this research tests board scanning activity as a 
possible moderator of the environment’s causation of illegal cartel activity.  Board 
scanning has not been defined and it has not been tested in management literature to date, 
particularly as it pertains to illegal corporate activity.  While I found it only had a 
significant interaction with industry profits and dynamism, this construct potentially has a 
much broader applicability and generalizability to corporate governance research. 
Second, this research brought strain theory into an organizational context to explain 
illegal corporate activity.  Strain theory has not traditionally been used in management 
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research; as such, it provides exciting explanatory opportunities for organizational 
behaviour, especially in the area of corporate deviance.    
Finally, illegal corporate activity is an area that has been left virtually untouched by 
management researchers (Murphy & Robinson, 2008; Pinto et al., 2008), including very 
little research on illegal cartel activity (Geis, 2007).  Given the significant impact that 
illegal corporate activity has on the global economy, it is important, both at an academic 
and practitioner level to have a better understanding of the root causes of this corporate 
deviant behaviour.  I believe that the research undertaken for this thesis contributes 
towards that goal.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ILLEGAL CORPORATE ACTIVITY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines and explores the concept of white collar crime as manifested through 
the illegal corporate activity of cartels.  It is this illegal cartel activity, including price 
fixing and corporate collusion, that is framed as the dependent variable in later sections 
of this thesis; thus, it is important to have a clear understanding of these concepts 
including their evolution in the literature, and their application in a legal context.  I 
address how the literature has presented white collar crime.  I then define antitrust 
offenses and provide a clear description of how they are linked to the core activities of 
cartels. It is worth noting that this section is particularly important for its 
contextualization of illegal cartel activity within the broader subject of corporate 
deviance which allows for a discussion on the generalizability of my results, presented in 
the discussion of this thesis. 
As the concept of white collar crime has been approached from a variety of cross-
disciplinary perspectives, it is first important to resolve the inherent challenges posed by 
this multiplicity. Sutherland first brought this multidisciplinary approach to considering 
this type of crime (1940).  He further defined not only what is categorized as white collar 
crime (1940, 1941, 1945) but also argued that it is partially caused by a person’s 
exposure to criminals in business organizations (1940).  Additionally, white collar crime 
is not just that which is subject to criminal courts but also administrative tribunals and 
bodies (Sutherland 1940).  As noted by Slapper and Tombs (1999:1) “definitional issues 
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are crucial in the context of a discussion of corporate crime….Definitional questions raise 
substantive issues regarding extent, causation and regulation; they problematize the 
nature, and boundaries, of academic criminology; more generally they raise issues 
regarding the nature of academic work.”    
When considering white collar crime, the fundamental issue we must first consider is 
whether a corporation as an entity can commit a crime or whether a crime can only be 
committed by individuals (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995).  There is divided 
opinion in this regard.  It is human beings that act, not corporations; as such, it is through 
the behaviour of employees of an organization that crimes are enacted (Shover & 
Hochstetler, 2002).  However, it  is suggested that it is the positions in the organization 
not the people themselves that are responsible for the acts (Jamieson, 1994), that is 
something that is inherent in one’s position within the organization itself (Sutherland, 
1940).   
From a legal perspective, corporations now are seen by the law as having a separate 
personality from their employees and can commit crimes on their own behalf (Slapper, 
1999); organizations can take on humanistic qualities.  Furthermore, many statutes 
provide for corporations to sue and be sued on their own behalf, including the statutes 
that set out the corporations’ general powers.  Baucus and Near (1991) noted that 
Allegheny Bottling (at the time a Pepsi-Cola bottling franchise) was, as a corporation, 
sentenced to three years in jail. Therefore, organizations can exhibit human 
characteristics and act in an individualistic way, although they do so through the actions 
of people (Daboub et al., 1995).  Following this logic, corporations as organizations can 
commit crimes and act in a deviant manner and as a result, be held accountable for these 
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actions.  This recognition of the corporation as an actor is important as most of the 
analysis presented in this thesis, including the theoretical framework, the dependent 
variable (the construct of illegal cartel activity) and the majority of independent variables, 
are measured at the organizational level.    
2.2 Illegal Activity/White Collar Crime 
For the purposes of this research, a clear definition of illegal cartel activity is required in 
order to ensure the face validity of the dependent variable. An examination of the 
literature elicits a number of definitions of white collar crime and illegal corporate 
activity. I review the primary definitions of these two concepts, discuss their differences 
and provide a reconstructed definition of illegal cartel activity that is applicable to this 
thesis as well as to the generalizability of its results.  
There are a number of qualities that a definition of illegal cartel activity needs to 
encompass in order to exhibit the soundness required for the methodology for my thesis.   
First, as this thesis focuses on illegal international price fixing, a crime for which both 
individuals and corporations can be held accountable, the definition will need to 
appropriately capture this activity.  Second, the definition will need to reflect the criminal 
nature of the action in order to respond to the theory that there are base criminal drivers 
for this type of activity.  Third, the definition will also have to be able to accommodate 
the organizational aspects of the crime as detailed in my model; namely, there are 
corporate governance actions that speak to the incidence of this activity.  Finally, the 
definition cannot contradict previously proposed and accepted definitions to such an 
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extent as to fundamentally depart from or reject a solid basis of the definition in previous 
literature. 
The tracing of the evolution of the definitions of corporate illegal activity and white 
collar crime should begin with an examination of Sutherland’s seminal work in the 1940s 
(Sutherland, 1940, 1941, 1945, 1949).  Sutherland first defined what white collar crime 
was and subsequently looked at several limited and distinct industries including 
manufacturing, mining and mercantile organizations and several limited and distinct 
types of violations including restraint of trade, advertising, intellectual property, and 
labour practices to determine the context of corporate illegal activities (Slapper, 1999, 
Sutherland 1949).  Sutherland coined the term “white collar crime” (Sutherland 1940) to 
indicate the colour of the collars of those committing the crimes; he was the first 
researcher to differentiate white collar criminals by their societal status or occupation 
(Weisburd & Waring, 2001).  It is important to recognize that until this analysis, crime 
was viewed as a concept only applicable to immigrants and the poor (Coleman, 1987; 
Weisburd & Waring, 2001).  
While Sutherland’s dichotomization of crime into white collar crime and traditional 
crime created a new opportunity for the characterization of the construct of crime, the 
broadness of the term “white collar crime” led to confusion despite his best efforts to 
simplify its boundaries (Sutherland 1940).  Although Sutherland distinguished between 
the colour of collars he advocated a common cause for crime that was not dependent 
upon poverty, psychopathic or sociopathic causes (Sutherland 1940). Eventually more 
robust classifications were developed and adopted to more distinctly analyze the 
phenomenon by Clinard and Quinney (1967) and others (Coleman, 1987) including 
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corporate, occupational, governmental, enterprise, and state-corporate crime (Freidrichs, 
1996).  
Following Sutherland, the most influential researchers of corporate illegal activity were 
Clinard and Yeager (1980). In their breakthrough study of corporate illegal activity, 
corporate crime was, for the first time, classified according to the types of violations 
(administrative, environmental, financial, labour, manufacturing, and unfair trade 
practices) and matched against the number of violations.  They also attempted to link the 
number of crimes to each corporation, the type of victim and the type of legal response 
(administrative, civil or criminal) (Clinard & Yeager, 1980). This approach has been 
replicated in studies ranging from the specific such as automotive recalls (Bromiley & 
Marcus, 1989) and the electronics industry (Mitchell, Daniels, Hopper, George-Falvy, & 
Ferris, 1996)) to the very general (19 years of activity in the United States economy 
(Baucus & Near, 1991)).  Over the last 30 years, the study of illegal corporate activity has 
led researchers  to analyze the subject through a variety of  lenses, including an 
examination of the primary victims, the nature of the harmful activity, the size and scope 
of the corporation itself, the type of product or service involved, the primary corporate 
agent of the crime, the instrument or mechanism used to commit the crime, the type of 
law invoked, and the specific legal class involved (Freidrichs, 1996).   
Before one can adequately define illegal corporate activity, it is critical to understand the 
concept of illegality.  Illegality has traditionally been divided into two classes depending 
upon who is intended to benefit from the illegal activity (Daboub et al., 1995). The first 
class of illegal activity is personal crimes where the beneficiary of the activity is an 
individual.  While this class is responsible for a large portion of the incidences of white 
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collar crime, its consideration is outside the scope of this thesis.  This precludes the bad 
apple theory in criminology which has in any event been discredited.  The bad apple 
theory posits that corporate crime is simply the result of rogue individuals – bad apples 
such as Nick Leeson at Barings Bank – and not any systemic organizational reason. 
It is the second class of illegal activity where the beneficiary of the activity is the 
corporation that will occupy my focus.  This second class is termed illegal corporate 
crime and is an activity for which the corporation itself can be punished (Baucus & 
Dworkin, 1991; Daboub et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 1996; Szwajkowski, 1985). The 
primary distinction between the two classes might seem self-evident but it is worth 
reiterating as it is so fundamental to this thesis.  The difference between the two classes is 
that although there may be some residual benefit to individuals in the commission of 
illegal corporate activity, the primary beneficiary is the corporation.  In addition, the 
definition of illegal corporate activity recognizes that it is the organization and its 
structures that are necessary for the commission of illegal activities (Jamieson, 1994). 
Scholars in this area have actively considered what the illegal activities themselves 
should constitute.  It has been proposed that corporate illegal activity is not activity that is 
merely questionable, or unethical, or inadvertent behaviour later identified as illegal 
(Baucus & Dworkin, 1991), or corporate misconduct (Vaughan, 1999), or merely dubious  
(Bromiley & Marcus, 1989); it must constitute a breach of the law (Braithwaite, 1985).  
Further, Baucus and Baucus (1997) argue that these illegal activities could be the result 
of both intentional and unintentional acts.  This is supported by Box (1983) who noted it 
is very important to recognize both the intention to commit a crime and the indifference 
to the harm a crime may be causing.  It has been pointed out that the mere admission of 
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the commission of an illegal action does not necessarily mean that the corporation in fact 
committed an illegal act; the corporation’s plea bargain may actually be a conservation of 
resources with the corporation making a tactical decision to plead guilty rather than face a 
public, expensive and time consuming battle with the government (Baucus, 1994).   
Therefore, the theoretical development and analysis in this thesis is built upon the 
definition of illegal corporate activity suggested by Slapper: 
Criminal acts (by omission or commission) which are the result of 
deliberate decision making (or culpable negligence) of those who occupy 
structural positions within the organization as corporate executives or 
managers.  These decisions are organizationally based – made in 
accordance with normative goals (primarily corporate profit), standard 
operating procedures, and cultural norms of the organization - and are 
intended to benefit the corporation itself. (Slapper, 1999:16) 
 
This definition of illegal corporate activity achieves the four criteria outlined previously: 
it encompasses illegal international price fixing; it is criminological in nature; it is at the 
organizational level of analysis; and, it is grounded in previous literature.  Additionally, 
this definition is congruent with all of the constructs and theories germane to this thesis 
and is critical for discussing the generalizability of the results from this research. 
2.3 Illegal Cartel Activity 
2.3.1 Antitrust Crimes 
Antitrust crimes are a special subset of illegal corporate activity.  They are defined as 
crimes that reduce competitive behaviour, harm societal welfare and generally cause 
consumers to pay more for goods and services than they would ordinarily pay in a 
competitive environment (Jamieson, 1994).  Antitrust and anticompetitive behaviours are 
more common than many people realize with one study revealing that 18% of the 
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surveyed American working population has observed this type of behaviour in their 
careers (Kaptein & Avelino, 2005).  Unfortunately, antitrust activity is not easy to detect 
as its protagonists work hard to keep it a secret.  Its detection requires the dedicated and 
sophisticated resources of organizations such as the United States Department of Justice 
to identify and prosecute this type of activity (Baker & Faulkner, 1993).  To support these 
efforts, a number of countries have passed antitrust laws such as the Sherman Antitrust 
Act (1890) and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) in the United States and the Competition 
Act in Canada (1985).  These acts are aimed at prohibiting activities such as price fixing, 
bid rigging schemes, territory division, and price discrimination between customers and 
contain provisions to allow for the review of mergers and acquisitions to make sure they 
will not harm the competitive environment (Jamieson, 1994).  As the exact nature of 
these crimes is specified by each statute, I have provided the relevant sections from each 
of the three acts for context. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) states: 
Section 1:  
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall 
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of 
the court. (USC 15, Section 1) 
Section 2:  
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any 
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other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. (USC 15, Section 
2) 
The Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) reads (in regards to mergers and acquisitions): 
  
Section 18: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce 
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of 
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may 
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. (15 
USC, Section 18) 
 
Finally, the Canadian Competition Act (1985) defines illegal corporate activity as: 
 
45.   (1) Everyone who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with 
another person 
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, 
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product, 
(b)  to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or 
production of a product or to enhance unreasonably the price 
thereof, 
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, 
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation 
or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on persons or 
property, or 
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly  
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten million 
dollars or to both. (R.S.C. 1985, C-34) 
 
  
 26 
 
2.3.2 Price Fixing 
Restraint of trade has as its purpose the increasing of profits for the participating 
companies compared to that which they might normally gather in a competitive 
environment.  While this thesis uses the term “price fixing” it should be noted that price 
fixing is a subset of restraint of trade.   
Price fixing is a very complex, very expensive global issue.  It is estimated to have cost 
Americans over $60 billion annually in the early 1980s (Freidrichs, 1996).  Over the 
years, price fixing has occurred in many industries and for every imaginable product or 
service from airlines to infant formula to electrical equipment.  The purpose of price 
fixing schemes is to raise or maintain prices at a level that is above that which would 
occur under normal competition (Baker & Faulkner, 1993).  By definition, at least two 
participants are required to fix a price.  These participants conspire in secret in order to 
fix prices, quantities or otherwise manipulate what consumers may pay for the goods 
and services they seek in a given market (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Connor, 2006).  
Within the arrangement, competitors agree on list or transaction prices, delivery 
charges, discounts, rebates, premia, bid prices, exchange rates, and/or price protection 
clauses (Connor, 2001).  Ultimately, price fixing schemes are concluded in one of two 
ways:  either the colluders end the scheme on their own terms or they are caught.   
Price fixing as an antitrust crime is “per se illegal” meaning there is virtually no legal 
method, with one or two minor exceptions, of price fixing either domestically or 
internationally with respect to American companies.  The arrangement through which 
price fixing is accomplished through two or more firms is called a cartel.  The next 
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section defines cartels, provides an overview of their historical development and 
describes their activities.   
2.3.3 Cartels 
A cartel is a group of firms, either domestic or international that conspire together to 
engage in antitrust activity, primarily price fixing.  In any market firms have a goal to 
either increase revenues or decrease costs in order to maximize profits.  There is a built 
in structural incentive for firms in these markets to co-ordinate their actions to raise 
profits though the restriction in the supply of goods causing prices to rise or through 
collective pressure on suppliers to depress the costs of producing goods or materials.   
The effectiveness of collusion is dependent upon the collective action of these firms 
which limits the competition for the provision or the supply of goods and services 
(Porter, 2005; Stigler, 1964). While there are examples of cartels that are legally 
sanctioned by governments (e.g. OPEC), the vast majority of cartels through their 
purpose, actions and by definition are considered illegal in much of the industrialized 
world (Connor, 2006).  As described by Berzins and Sofo (2008:669) “a cartel is an 
illegal commercial agreement, practice or arrangement, and by definition involves a 
number of players and a variety of complex factors.”  The illegal nature of cartels is 
evidenced through the secrecy they maintain in order to hide their activity from the 
victims of their actions and from the authorities.  It is not uncommon for code names, 
clandestine meetings, evidence destruction, and false record keeping to be used in order 
to protect the secrecy of their operations (Berzins & Sofo 2008).  Perhaps the clearest 
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description of a cartel is provided by Connor, drawn from his research into a number of 
international cartels: 
The basic task of a cartel is to set a uniform market transaction price.  
Uncertainty about the costs of monitoring and policing the agreement will 
often imply that a cartel will start with a price well below the monopoly 
price.  As experience, discipline and trust grow, the price will ratchet 
towards that profit-maximizing monopoly price. Thus, a cartel must 
regularly meet to reset the price, particularly to take into account shifts in 
demand or supply conditions. If different grades exist, price discounts and 
premia must be established and adjusted over time.  The cartel must 
establish policies that discourage their members from expanding their 
sales through service differentiation.  All these tasks will be made more 
effective if the cartel can agree to set observable market shares for each 
participant or divide markets by geography, product form, or class of 
customer. Meeting-the-competition clauses in sales agreements are a 
simple method of detecting cheating.  All the cartel’s customers then have 
an incentive to expose below-price transactions. Another enforcement 
mechanism is the trigger-price agreement; in which cartel members agree 
to expand output by a prescribed amount should the market price fall 
below some critical level. (Connor, 2001:30) 
 
Cartels were first identified in the United States in the 1870s in industries including oil, 
sugar, tobacco, and railroads (Connor, 2001).  The history of this era is laden with 
examples of influential firms in industries colluding to create closed systems where they 
were able to reap huge profits at the expense of consumers and governments who were 
funding infrastructure expansions.  Due to public outrage at the actions of these various 
“trusts” as they were called at the time, the United States Congress passed the Sherman 
Act (1890) as a means to combat actions that restrained free market competition.  Due 
to the vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act (1890) most of the cartels in the United 
States were ended prior to World War I (Connor, 2001).   
Post World War I saw the rise of European cartels.  These cartels differed from the 
earlier American trusts in that a number of them took on an international flavour 
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(Connor, 2001).  For example, by 1940 the I.G. Farben company in Germany was very 
active in setting up cartels for pharmaceuticals, synthetic fibres and chemicals, 
ultimately running over 2,000 cartels in aid of the Axis war effort (Connor, 2001).  In 
an attempt to limit cartel activity after World War II, the United States used its power in 
post-war Europe and Japan to transplant and enforce anti-collusion structures.  As a 
result of their influence and actions, the next 50 years saw a reduced level of 
international cartels (Connor, 2001).   
It is felt that the increasing internationalization of markets, the globalization of 
countries and increased competition in what had previously been fairly protected and 
isolated national and regional markets allowed for a resurgence of international cartel 
activity in the late 1980s (Connor, 2001).  But what magnitude of economic impact does 
this cartel resurgence have on the global economy? And as cartel activity has been 
increasingly pervasive and fines and imprisonments are seemingly having little effect 
on the number and scope of violations, is it actually an impediment to international 
commerce?  We can gather a rough estimate of the impact by examining the incidence 
of cartel activity internationally as measured by the amount of commerce that is 
affected by such schemes.  As an example, recently accumulated data (Connor, 2009) 
has quantified the incidence and size of private international cartels.  These are cartels 
where the participants are in more than one country, do not include intranational cartels, 
and are not sanctioned by the home government. From January 1990 to December 2008, 
a period of 18 years, there were 516 private international cartels that were the subject of 
governmental, regulatory or private legal actions. To fully understand the potential 
impact of these 516 cartels, one can look at the size of the market that they affect.  Since 
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these cartels are aimed at influencing prices within a market, the total affected market 
size has been used as a measure of the potential disruption in the competitive 
environment.  This measure is obtained by examining the unreported sales using the 
expected value method (Connor & Helmers, 2007).  Connor discovered that illegal 
cartel activity disrupted markets totalling over $16 trillion USD over the 18 years, on 
average over $800 billion per year (Connor, 2009).  Thus, the illegal corporate activity 
of cartels clearly has an extremely significant impact on global commerce and is worth 
exploring further. 
Combining the definition of illegal corporate activity with the nature of cartels, I 
propose the following as a definition of illegal cartel activity: 
Illegal cartel activity is collaborative action with competitors aimed 
toward the purpose of price fixing which is the result of deliberate 
decision making by those who occupy structural positions within the 
organization such as corporate executives and managers.  The decisions 
are organizationally based, made in accordance with the normative goals, 
standard operating procedures and cultural norms of the organization and 
are intended to benefit the organization itself. 
It is also appropriate at this juncture to make mention of the similarity between the cartel 
and the joint venture, alliance or other cross border arrangement between firms which is 
common (and legal) in today's economy.  One of the ways to view this situation is 
through the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988). In this paradigm the “O” stands for 
Ownership advantages of why a firm would rather own assets in another country than just 
buying the products.  The “L” stands for Locational advantages or where exactly a firm 
should invest to maximize the return on its ownership of foreign assets. The “I” stands for 
Internalization advantages of how a firm can capture the advantages of ownership of 
foreign assets. 
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Dunning felt that under the “I” portion of the paradigm these organizations could offer 
greater organizational efficacy than more traditional structures or hierarchies and were 
interested in exercising monopoly power over assets under their governance.  In 
particular and regarding cartels, Dunning states (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 288), 
“[Cartels] are less likely to flourish where there are distinct and substantial differences 
between the O-specific advantages of the participating firms and where, in order to 
exploit these advantages, firms need to internalize the markets for them.  In particular, 
there is sometimes a trade-off between the gains of the common governance of intra- firm 
integration and those arising from inter-firm cooperation.  As with any grouping of 
institutions or countries, much depends on the gains anticipated from cooperative action, 
and the ways in which these gains are distributed among its members compared with 
some other modality of achieving the same result.”  This area is another perspective that 
merits further attention in the future as there is clearly another international business 
perspective that can be brought to bear on analyzing how international cartels operate in 
today’s global economy. 
2.4 Summary 
 
Illegal corporate activity, as articulated in this thesis has foundational elements drawn 
from previous cross-disciplinary work on illegal corporate activity that stretches back 
almost 70 years.  I am building on this past research by adding the specific characteristics 
of price fixing and the unique qualities of cartels.  This creates a robust definition for the 
dependent variable in this thesis that is at the organizational level, recognizes the impact 
of the actions of individuals and captures the phenomenon of interest.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined the relationship between illegal corporate activity and cartels.  It is 
important to now consider the theoretical framework underpinning the relationship 
between the external environment and illegal cartel activity.  In particular, I use resource 
dependency theory (RDT) to explore the environmental conditions that I believe are 
antecedents to cartel establishment and activity.  This chapter sets out my arguments as to 
how the organization’s environment impacts illegal cartel activity and describes how the 
environmental scanning of the firm’s board of directors moderates this relationship.  
Through the lens of RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), I assert that an organization will 
take illegal actions as a means of acquiring or controlling those resources in the 
environment upon which it depends to create a temporary or sustained competitive 
advantage.  RDT also supports the interaction of the board with the environment as one 
of the board’s roles is to act in a manner that moderates the relationship between the 
environment and the organization in addition to assisting the organization in its 
endeavours to operate within its environment.   
I describe the environment that impacts an organization through the use of four major 
categories: industry concentration (Datta & Narayanan, 1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Zahra et al., 2005); profits (Baucus, 1994; Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975); munificence 
(Baucus & Near, 1991; Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 2005); and dynamism 
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988).   I then turn to an analysis of the construct of 
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board scanning, suggesting it moderates the impact of the environmental phenomena on 
illegal cartel activity.  I posit that board scanning serves as a brake in many instances, 
dampening the effect that the environment has on illegal cartel activity.  
Thus, this chapter will outline hypotheses that encapsulate the relationships among the 
environment, the scanning ability of the board and the commission of illegal cartel 
activity. 
3.2 Resource Dependency Theory 
While resource dependency theory (RDT) was originally developed to provide an 
alternative perspective to economic theories of mergers and board interlocks, it can also 
provide insight into precisely the type of inter-organizational relations that have played 
such a large role in the recent corporate scandals of the 21st century (Scott & Davis, 
2007).  RDT suggests that in order to survive, organizations must seek out and maintain 
resources that can only be obtained from other firms;  therefore, the main driver of 
interfirm relationships is to allow an organization to gain the resources it requires from its 
broader environment to achieve a competitive advantage (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  As 
noted by Glasberg and Schwartz (1983:314), “since needed resources are controlled by 
other large (managerially directed) firms, resource dependency leads to complex 
structural relationships among firms.”  The underlying tenets of RDT are best explained 
by Pfeffer, who describes the foundations of RDT in the following way: 
1) The fundamental units for understanding intercorporate relations and 
society are organizations; 2) These organizations are not autonomous, but 
rather are constrained by a network of interdependencies with other 
organizations; 3) Interdependence, when coupled with uncertainty about 
what the actions will be of those with which the organization is 
interdependent, leads to a situation in which the survival and continued 
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success are uncertain; therefore  4) Organizations take actions to manage 
external interdependencies, although such actions are inevitably never 
completely successful and produce new patterns of dependence and 
interdependence; and 5) These patterns of dependence produce 
interorganizational as well as intraorganizational power, where such 
power has some effect on organizational behaviour.  (Pfeffer, 1987:26) 
Fundamentally, there are three conditions the RDT framework considers when explaining 
an organization’s relationship with the external environment.  First, organizations take 
their external environment into account when determining their actions.  Second, 
organizations have at their disposal various strategies they can use to respond to the 
environment and these strategies differ across organizations.  Finally, power – not 
efficiency as in transaction cost economics or rationality as in economics – helps to 
explain what actions an organization may take in order to respond to the environment 
(Scott & Davis, 2007). 
Historically, much of RDT has been used to explain how organizations use mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) as a way to reduce uncertainty.  However, its applicability began to 
diminish as M&As lost favour in the 1990s as corporations started to divest themselves of 
these horizontally attached units.  The M&A activity was also reversed with respect to 
vertical integration as firms began to outsource all but a few core functions.  In addition, 
by the late 1990s the incidence of board interlocks had greatly decreased (Scott & Davis, 
2007).  As recognized by Scott and Davis (2007:243)  “changes in economic times and 
regulatory regimes, in short lead to changes in the repertoires that organizations used to 
manage their interdependence.” 
RDT, however, has been experiencing a resurgence with several recent studies enriching 
the discussion around this theory by applying it in new, innovative ways.  Casciaro and 
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Piskorski (2005) introduced the concept of differential power imbalances between 
organizations that are co-operating with each other, examining the level of their mutual 
dependence to assess how an organization deals with trying to absorb resources that are 
providing a constraint and hence uncertainty in the organization’s operations.  Katila, 
Rosenberger and Eisenhardt (2008) looked at the competitive aspects of the interfirm 
interaction including the potential for resource misappropriation between firms. Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt (2009) used RDT to theorize that the interrelationship of organizations 
can be socially constructed and multilateral, especially in a networked industry.  These 
research directions move the field forward by addressing the reduction in environmental 
uncertainty through a diminution in the dependence that RDT asserts organizations strive 
for. 
RDT has been criticized for being unable to explain how organizational competencies are 
developed, and for its seeming inability to adequately answer whether variables such as 
transaction costs, learning and legitimacy factor into an organization’s decisions to 
pursue actions to reduce uncertainty in the environment (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).  In 
addition, the avoidance of uncertainty through a decrease in resource dependency was 
questioned by Gulati and Sytch (2007) who demonstrated that uncertainty could be 
reduced through joint dependence between firms.    
RDT then has seen the subject matter of its initial uses wane only to have researchers in 
the last few years use the theory to look at different phenomena such as manufacturers 
performance in procurement relationships (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), alliance network 
structure (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004), alliance portfolios (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009), and 
corporate investment in entrepreneurial partnerships (Katila et al., 2008).  The theory, 
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while it has some limitations, has proven to be adaptable and relevant in today’s 
technology, alliance rich, networked world. 
3.2.1 Resource Dependency Theory and Cartels 
Cartels and the illegal activities they undertake (particularly price fixing) fit very well 
within the purview of RDT.  In their original conceptualization of RDT, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) suggested that mergers and acquisitions and alliances would allow an 
organization to reduce environmental uncertainty through encapsulating, procuring or 
utilizing resources that would not have been otherwise available (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 
1993).  This same logic can be extended to other inter-organizational arrangements 
including cartels.  In fact, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:179) considered cartels, calling 
them “overt attempts to organize a set of interdependent organizations, represent[ing] 
coalitions of organizations with typically at least normative sanctions applied to members 
who deviate from the proscribed cartel practices.”  Unfortunately, while the actions taken 
by organizations involved in M&As are often a matter of public record, those undertaken 
by cartels, namely illegal price fixing, are hidden from the view of the regulatory 
authorities, the public and often the large majority of the employees at the cartel firms 
themselves.  The collusion between firms takes place at the highest levels of the 
organization, and this coordination is not publicly visible.  Indeed, it is “the relative 
invisibility of behavior, the reliance on ambiguous effects for determining whether or not 
behavior has occurred, and the historical precedents of economic theory which argued 
that cartel activity has the single goal of maximizing joint income, [that] have all served 
to impede the progress of understanding cartel and coalition behaviour” (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978:181).  Thus, while cartels may be an important form of interorganizational 
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behaviour that reduces the dependency of an organization on others and hence reduces 
uncertainty, it has seldom been studied. 
3.3 Board Scanning 
As board scanning is a construct that I assert will moderate the effect of the environment 
on illegal cartel activity, I provide its description prior to the discussion of the 
independent variables for ease of comprehension for the reader.  I then define each 
environmental construct (concentration, profits, munificence, and dynamism) and 
sequentially provide the moderating hypothesis that is aligned with each independent 
variable. 
A Corporate board of directors has a general internal and external monitoring function, 
working to ensure the organization is operating in an efficient manner and pursuing 
activities which are in the best interests of the corporation. This monitoring function 
serves a number of purposes.   First, the board has a mandate to ensure that the top 
management team is acting in accordance with the owners’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b).  This responsibility, a fundamental tenet of agency theory, recognizes that 
the board has a monitoring role with respect to top management’s activities focused on 
uncovering any discrepancies between the goals of management and the owners of the 
corporation (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The board is seen as the “ultimate monitor responsible 
for the scrutiny of the actions of the highest managers of the firm, assuring that top 
managers are directing the firm in directions that are consistent with established mission 
and strategic plans” (Fields, 2007:335).  Second, the board has a duty to review the firm’s 
strategy as developed by management and then to monitor the execution of the strategy as 
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it is carried out by the organization (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).  Finally, the monitoring 
function of the board assists the organization in adjusting and responding to 
environmental changes (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).  One of the ways that the 
board can accomplish these goals is by scanning the environment (Pearce & Zahra, 
1991).  I define board scanning in this research as the potential ability of the board to 
assess the environment for strategic and operating uncertainties that may affect the 
operation and survival of the organization.  
The role of the board as interpreted through RDT differs from that presented in agency 
theory.  RDT does not recognize the board’s role in setting and influencing strategy.  
Rather, in RDT the board is seen as a co-optive mechanism that interacts with the 
external environment to both access important resources and buffer the organization 
against adverse environmental change (Goodstein et al., 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  While it has been argued that in exercising their role boards 
contribute to the strategy process by assessing new external information in a strategic 
context (Hendry & Kiel, 2004), others present the board solely as a strategic consultant 
not exercising any real control over the strategy of the organization (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001).  However, it is the dual ability of boards to access and assess the 
external environment that serves as an invaluable asset in shaping the strategy of the firm 
and its operation.  This board scanning function generates advice and counsel from the 
board, provides a buffer for the organization (assessing new information) and can even 
elicit external resources.    
Both RDT and agency theory agree that the board has a primary responsibility to assess 
external environmental information which then has an impact on the strategy and actions 
 39 
 
of the firm.  The board performs this function through monitoring its performance and 
providing oversight (agency theory) as well as providing advice and counsel, bolstering 
the public image, creating channels of communication, and providing access to resources 
and stakeholders (RDT) (Stavish, 2007).  
While RDT has been used to describe the influence that the external environment has on 
the firm it has also been used in a corporate governance role mainly by indicating that the 
board brings resources to the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Agency theory has also 
been used extensively in understanding the board’s monitoring role (Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996).  It should be noted that there has been an attempt to link agency theory, 
(the monitoring function) and RDT (board attributes namely human and relational 
capital) to firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Hillman and Dalziel (2003) also 
proposed that the external nature of the board would moderate the monitoring of the 
board.  This is noted as there has been some attempt to marry these two theories although 
it has not been successfully empirically tested to the best of my knowledge.  There is 
therefore some work that has been done to marry this monitoring function which is part 
of scanning to the performance of the firm. 
The board’s scanning of the external environment to better assess the firm’s strategy and 
actions should not be undervalued (Ritvo, Salipante, & Notz, 1979).  In order to influence 
organizational processes, the board will need to gather and prioritize data from the 
environment to form appropriate judgements about key variables and causal connections 
(Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003).  Therefore, scanning is the initial step in the process of 
organizational adaptation (Hambrick, 1981).  
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The board’s assessment role, operationalized through its scanning function influences the 
strategy and actions of the organization (Hambrick, 1981).  The better a board scans the 
external environment, the better they are able to prioritize and collect data from this 
environment (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).  The better they are able to collect data, the better 
informed their judgements will be when exercising their role as advisors and consultants 
to the top management team (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).  The better the board is at its 
environmental scanning function, the better it will be in fulfilling its buffering role by 
assessing those aspects of the environment that will impact the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).   
The assumption implicit in this line of logic is that the board is less likely to want the 
firm to engage in illegal cartel activity than the CEO and the management team does.  
According to agency theory, the interests of the owners of the firm are most closely 
guarded by the board whereas the CEO and Management team may have a misalignment 
between their personal interests and that of the organization.  I therefore, for the purposes 
of this thesis, make the assumption that illegal cartel activity is not in the best long term 
interests of the organization and will at all times be shunned by the board as contrary to 
the purposes and goals of the organization whereas the CEO and management team may 
prioritize their personal interests ahead of the firm’s interests and engage in illegal cartel 
activity. 
The board’s monitoring role is heightened when its environmental assessment is related 
to legal issues.  Indeed, it has been suggested that the monitoring level of the board is 
greater when legal actions of the organization are in question (Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 
1986).  This may be because “although directors might not know about a firm’s 
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involvement in illegal actions, ignorance of such matters places them in very precarious, 
and possible severely damaging, legal position” (Kesner et al., 1986:792).   
Therefore, the efficacy of the board’s monitoring function is particularly important in 
regards to legal issues and I assert that there is a very direct connection between data 
gathering, judgement forming and action in these matters.  I suggest that the effectiveness 
of the board’s scanning function will influence the strategic choices the management of 
the firm will take in response to its external environment.  As the board more effectively 
monitors the external environment and detects the potential for illegal activity within the 
industry, it will be more apt to motivate the firm to take action that avoids illegal 
activities.  Conversely, if the board is ineffective in monitoring the external environment, 
they will be unaware of the potential for illegal activity and will not take action to 
forestall it from occurring at their organization.  This will result in an increased incidence 
of this type of activity as firms move in the absence of board direction to achieve greater 
environmental stability.  
3.4 The Environment 
Although organizations largely have the ability to control and shape their internal 
situation, the external environment presents an organization with factors that are 
generally beyond its ability to manage; this lack of control leads to uncertainty (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  The environment encompasses resources that influence the organization 
and upon which the organization is dependent.  If an organization is able to determine a 
mechanism by which to control these external resources, it is able to decrease the threat 
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of uncertainty and thereby increase the chance of the organization’s long term survival 
(Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987). 
One of the uncertainties that organizations are exposed to in the competitive environment 
is that of price fluctuation, particularly downward pressure on prices as competitors 
constantly try to outbid each other.  This uncertainty impacts the organization in two 
ways.  First, their revenue stream and hence their resource accumulation is unpredictable.  
Second, the revenue stream is less robust than they would desire.  A method for 
organizations to reduce the uncertainty related to these dependent resources is to attempt 
to control them.  However, the organization is legally and logistically constrained from 
directly eliminating price fluctuations and unilaterally setting price levels (Baucus, 1994; 
Vaughan, 1983). An organization can remove or avoid these constraints through a co-
operative association with their competitors either directly through a cartel (Gulati & 
Sytch, 2007) or indirectly through tacit collusion  (Barney, 2007).  A cartel provides the 
opportunity for an organization to reduce uncertainty and remove these environmental 
constraints through collusion with industry peers.  This illegal activity allows the 
organization to predictably accumulate resources that then can be utilized in furthering its 
goals, including survival.  In short, one of the ways that an organization can respond to 
environmental uncertainty is through participation in an illegal cartel. 
Research into the interaction of the environment and the organization has generated a 
broad range of characteristics used to describe this relationship which can be divided into 
three main categories.  Historically, the first category used industry structure, type and 
concentration as important indicators of the environment within which an organization 
operates (Asch & Seneca, 1975; Coleman, 1987; Jamieson, 1994; Zahra et al., 2005).   
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The second category looked toward firm and industry profits as mechanisms to measure 
environmental and organizational dependency (Connor, 2001; McKendall & Wagner, 
1997; Ornstein, 1972; Simpson, 1986).  The final category contained somewhat more 
sophisticated and theoretically complex measures to delineate the relationship between an 
organization and its environment.  These have included attributes such as munificence 
and dynamism (Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 2005; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Staw & 
Szwajkowski, 1975). 
I review each of these categories below. 
3.4.1 Industry Concentration 
Industry concentration analysis is a common mechanism that has been used to assess the 
environment within which an organization operates.  In particular, industry concentration 
figures prominently in the assessment of the underlying motivation for antitrust or illegal 
collusion activities; as the industry becomes more concentrated, the opportunity or at 
least the probability of collusion increases (Zahra et al., 2005).  The structure of the 
industry, and specifically the number of firms within the industry environment, affects 
the opportunities that a single organization within the industry may have to engage in 
collusive conduct.  The fewer dominant firms there are (high concentration), the fewer 
the number of participants required to influence the price (or another aspect of the market 
such as supply) and the more potentially successful the collusive activity will be (Clinard 
& Meier, 1979; Coleman, 1987).  A low industry concentration requires many industry 
participants to be involved in antitrust activities.  This would not only lower the success 
rate of any antitrust attempt, it would make it more difficult to conceal from detection 
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(Coleman, 1987).  Most industry concentration research has focused on antitrust 
violations (McKendall & Wagner, 1997).  It is important to recognize that although most 
of the convicted private international price fixing cartels had fewer than eight members, 
there have been convictions of cartels of up to 30 members (Connor, 2001). 
One of the first studies on concentration and collusive behaviour was Ornstein (1972) 
who hypothesized that the cost of collusion decreased as the number of industry 
participants decreased due to lower costs of negotiation, coordination and enforcement, 
while the degree of dependency between participants increased. Through an examination 
of 131 non-randomly chosen industrial firms between 1947 and 1960 he found that 
“concentration displayed no independent relation to profit rates in both producer and 
consumer goods industries” (1972:537).  Therefore, Ornstein advocated that industry 
concentration not be used as a policy tool to reduce the incidence of cartel activity. 
Other researchers have continued the examination of the relationship between industry 
concentration and collusive activity, achieving conflicting results.  Asch and Seneca 
(1975) studied 51 firms that had been convicted by the courts of collusive behaviour and 
50 randomly selected firms that had not and found that no significant difference existed 
in the industry concentration ratio between the firms that had been convicted and those 
that had not.  In a seeming contradiction of Ornstein (1972) and Asch and Seneca (1975), 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) found that industries with intermediate levels of industry 
concentration exhibited the highest levels of antitrust violations.  
Perhaps the most positive relationship was found by Datta and Narayanan (1989) who 
compiled a meta-analysis of 22 studies that had up until that time looked at the 
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concentration-performance relationship and found (using four and eight firm 
concentration ratios) that while there was a positive correlation, industry concentration 
explained less than 10% of the performance of the firm.  They cautioned that public 
policy and strategic research should not place much emphasis on the concentration 
variable as its explanatory power was low and that strategy researchers need to include 
other relevant structural factors to account for industry attractiveness.  Jamieson (1994) 
summarized the research done in the area of industry concentration and illegal activity 
and concluded that “at this point, empirical observations have been unable to uncover a 
causal relationship although theoretical explanations have supported both views [that 
high concentration does or does not lead to more antitrust activities], perhaps 
engendering more confusion than coherence surrounding these issues” (Jamieson, 
1994:25).  Or, in the words of Zahra et al. (2005:810), “To summarize, the preceding 
discussion highlights the difficulty that researchers encounter in linking industry 
concentration to corporate commission of illegal acts.”1  
Given the diverse results regarding the relationship between industry concentration and 
illegal cartel activity, I do consider it in this study and examine whether any such 
relationship might be moderated by the board’s scanning activity.  To the extent that 
industry concentration is a cause for illegal cartel activity the board can, through its 
scanning of the industry structure and the organization’s main competitors, raise 
suspicions and therefore provide cautionary advice to the CEO and management if there 
appears to be an opportunity to engage in illegal cartel activity.  The board therefore 
                                                            
1 Moderation can be used to help explain competing or otherwise non harmonious results and/or establish    
boundary conditions (Aiken & West, 2001; Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
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plays a preventative role in dampening the probability of illegal cartel activity taking 
place.  As the amount of the board’s scanning activity increases, the preventative role the 
board plays becomes more effective.  Based upon the foregoing I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of industry concentration on illegal cartel activity is 
moderated by the amount of board scanning of the external environment such that 
for a given level of industry concentration, less scanning by a board will result in 
a greater probability of illegal cartel activity in industries that are more 
concentrated. 
3.4.2. Profits 
Profits are defined as the residual income when all expenditures and taxes have been 
accounted for; firms and organizations attempt to maximize profit and, by extension, 
shareholder value.  While they are a primary environmental driver associated with illegal 
activity, there is some debate within the literature as to which level of profits, industry or 
firm, should be studied in order to best understand the relationship.  I choose to examine 
both in this research. Through an industry lens, RDT would suggest that if resources in 
the form of profits are constrained in the industry environment then these resources are 
providing a source of uncertainty which firms will seek to reduce through removing or 
controlling the constraints.  Firms within the industry can elect to exercise control though 
entering into a cartel to fix prices to either stabilize or artificially increase industry 
profits.  Additionally, RDT would also advocate that if profits at the firm level are scarce 
or otherwise constrained a firm would then look to the outside environment to remove 
and control these constraints, possibly through the auspices of forming or joining a cartel.   
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The research examining firm and industry profitability and illegal corporate activity 
demonstrates a pattern similar to that previously discussed for industry concentration.  
Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) found that firms whose profits were below average 
engaged in antitrust violations more frequently.  However, when the firm’s profits were 
less than their industry average, they did not engage in antitrust violations more 
frequently.  This can be explained if one considers that antitrust or price fixing violations 
are in many respects intraindustry phenomena; while at least two firms from an industry 
are technically required to fix prices, it is more likely that a majority of the top firms are 
involved.  This activity is reasonably more frequent when all the firms in the industry (as 
opposed to just one or two) are suffering from a profit level that is below that of other 
industries (possibly because these firms are in competition for capital with other firms in 
the open market or internally in a diversified conglomerate).   
Other researchers have found a variety of other linkages.  Asch and Seneca (1975) 
discovered that both declining firm profitability and low growth led to increased antitrust 
violations. Simpson (1986) studied firms that were convicted of antitrust behaviour, 
blending her theorizing and analysis at both the firm and industry levels into a theory of 
profit squeeze. Since corporations are economic creatures whose main goal is profit 
generation, as profits are squeezed there is a greater propensity for firms to commit 
antitrust activity to remedy this situation in order to stabilize profits or protect the growth 
of the firm (Simpson, 1986).  While Simpson found that firm level profitability was 
unrelated to antitrust activity, industry level profitability (as measured by net income) 
was negatively and significantly related to antitrust activity in most of her selected 
industries (chemical, oil, steel, and motor vehicle).  These findings indicate that as profits 
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decline in the industry as a whole, the antitrust violations of the industry increases while 
there is no significant effect at the firm level (Simpson, 1986).   
Simpson’s result was contradicted by McKendall and Wagner (1997) who also studied 
industry profitability as a variable that impacted the levels of illegal activity of 
corporations. McKendall and Wagner (1997) hypothesized that firms in industries with 
low profitability have more difficulty meeting performance goals and have fewer slack 
resources to meet regulatory obligations.  Their study of 80 firms found that while 
industry profitability was not significantly related to illegal activity, it did have an impact 
on firm level profitability. 
The results once again are mixed with respect to the impact of profitability on the 
incidence of illegal antitrust activity at both the firm and industry levels of analysis.  I 
adopt the research perspective that has demonstrated a negative relationship between 
profits and illegal activity.  As profits at the industry level decrease, stress is placed on 
the industry.  Firms within the industry react to this increased stress, possibly considering 
illegal activity as a remedy.  The boards of these firms, if they have a sophisticated 
scanning ability, will be more sensitive to this stress, its possible impact on the firm and 
the potential for illegal cartel activity to be suggested as a solution.  The board will be 
able to use its formal role as firm advisor and its mandate to review strategic plans to 
influence the organization away from any contemplation of engaging in illegal cartel 
activity.  The same logic applies to the consideration of profits at a firm level; the board 
recognizes that when a firm’s profits are declining, management is likely to consider 
illegal cartel activity as a possible solution to a decrease in firm profits although the 
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scanning activity is directed internally.  With regards to profitability I hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of relative industry profitability on illegal cartel activity 
is moderated by the amount of board scanning of the external environment such 
that for a given level of relative industry profitability, less scanning by a board 
will result in a greater probability of illegal cartel activity in less profitable 
industries. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of relative firm profitability on illegal antitrust activity is 
moderated by the amount of board scanning of the internal environment such that 
for a given level of relative firm profitability, less scanning by a board will result 
in a greater probability of illegal cartel activity in less profitable firms. 
3.4.3 Munificence 
In 1975, Staw and Szwajkowski noted that up to that point, organizational research rarely 
included an empirical analysis of the impact of munificence in the environment as a 
determinant of organizational action even though it had such a direct relationship with the 
availability of external resources.  Munificence and scarcity are complementary concepts, 
with scarcity being a lack of resources within an environment and munificence 
representing an abundance of resources.  When examined through the RDT framework, 
an organization must try and control resources from the environment in order to meet the 
organization’s goals up to and including survival.  The more munificent the environment, 
the easier it will be to secure these resources and achieve organizational goals.  A more 
munificent environment has fewer constraints on it and more resources available 
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therefore providing less uncertainty to the organization and a reduced need to resort to 
illegal cartel activities in order to control these resources and their constraints. 
Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) were the first researchers to specifically test the 
munificence of the environment to examine how it was related to illegal activities.  They 
looked at firms that had committed antitrust activities and used the performance of the 
firm, the industry the firm participated in and the universe of firms as represented by the 
Fortune 500 to assess environmental munificence.  They discovered that firms that 
committed illegal cartel activities performed less well than the universe of all firms but 
the same as their industries.  The industries the firms participated in performed 
significantly worse than the universe of firms.  Based upon these results, they concluded 
that these firms’ environments were less munificent, not because of organizational factors 
such as poor management but because of industry wide factors, specifically “the 
industrial environments of the companies cited for illegal acts were less munificent than 
those of other companies in the Fortune 500” (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975:351).   
Subsequent to Staw and Szwajkowski’s groundbreaking work, the consideration of 
munificence in relation to a firm or industry environment became more prevalent in 
organizational literature.  Dess and Beard (1984) took the concept of munificence 
(describing it as resource abundance and the capacity to support growth for the industry 
environment in question) and added two more constructs, complexity and dynamism, to 
the analysis of industry environment demonstrating that all three were in fact separate 
constructs. 
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Keats and Hitt (1988) proposed that environmental munificence had an impact on 
organizational size, operating performance and market performance.  Their study of 110 
large manufacturing firms measured munificence as the growth in net income and the 
growth in operating income in the dominant industry over a five year period.  Keats and 
Hitt (1988) found a significant relationship between munificence and organizational size, 
leading them to conclude that munificence provided opportunities for the growth of the 
firm as well as the creation of excess slack that supported growth even in inefficient 
firms. 
Following the influence of Staw and Szwajkowski, Baucus and Near (1991) included the 
munificence concept in their model of the antecedents of illegal corporate activity 
specifically examining environmental scarcity. A scarce (less munificent) environment 
creates more uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Namely, as managers attempt to 
reduce this uncertainty they may choose to engage in illegal activities to increase their 
chances of gaining the resources necessary to achieve corporate goals including survival 
(Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975).  Their study of 88 convicted firms in the Fortune 500 from 
1974 to 1983 along with 104 randomly selected, non-convicted firms revealed that 
scarcity (munificence) as measured by the industry growth rate (change in industry value 
added) resulted in a curvilinear U shaped relationship. They concluded that illegal 
behaviour was more likely in a less munificent environment versus a moderate level of 
resource munificence but more likely in a munificent environment than a less munificent 
environment.  With a somewhat confused picture, Baucus and Near advocated a more 
complex environmental scenario where there is interplay among the environmental 
variables rather than looking at just one variable on its own.  Baucus (1994) continued to 
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conceptually developing munificence, arguing theoretically that organizations in a less 
munificent environment will commit illegal activity to control uncertainty and acquire 
resources based upon pressure or need. 
Based on this research, it appears that in environments where there is low munificence, 
firms require more effort to understand the opportunities and threats presented by the 
environment (Goll & Rasheed, 1997).  As a result, firms are stretched thin and commit 
less effort to controlling resources or tackling the uncertainties of the environment.  One 
way to make up for this lack of available effort is to take a short cut by committing illegal 
acts.  Goll and Rasheed (1997) hypothesized that a reduced munificence environment 
leads firms to avoid risk taking and conserve resources.   However, they found that in low 
munificent environments, the result was not significant and was negative in direction 
while in high munificent environments it was positive and significant.  This led them to 
speculate that in low munificent environments, firms are in a crisis mode and opt for 
quick and less than optimal responses to the environmental stimuli (Goll & Rasheed, 
2005).  This speculation supports previous research that in a low munificence 
environment, firms may resort to illegal activity as it requires fewer resources in order to 
more quickly and effectively control the environment (Daboub et al., 1995).  
In striving to maintain maximum control over constrained resources, a firm faces 
increasing pressure as the munificence of the environment decreases. As munificence 
decreases, the constraints and hence uncertainty increases.  With this increased 
uncertainty comes an increased likelihood that the firm will take action to control these 
constraints and reduce uncertainty.  One of the ways in which a firm may control the 
constraints on revenue and decrease the revenue uncertainty in a low munificent 
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environment is through the profit enhancement and stability that goes along with illegal 
cartel activity.  The board is able to scan the environment to gain an understanding of its 
munificence.  This understanding of the environment increases as the board’s scanning 
increases. As the board’s comprehension of the environment increases, their ability to 
accurately assess the possibility of illegal cartel activity also increases.  They are then 
better able to advise the organization against adopting this course of action or by taking 
even more direct steps to ensure this type of activity does not take place. Based upon the 
foregoing I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of munificence on illegal cartel activity is moderated by 
the amount of board scanning of the external environment such that for a given 
level of munificence, less scanning by a board will result in a greater probability 
of illegal cartel activity. 
 3.4.4 Dynamism 
Dynamism is defined as change that is hard to predict and therefore leads to increased 
uncertainty for managers and leaders in the organization.  As environmental uncertainty 
increases, then the amount of resources that must be marshalled by the organization to 
deal with this uncertainty increases, leaving fewer resources available to be devoted to 
increasing the performance of the organization.  Dess and Beard (1984) found that 
instability in sales, price-cost margin, employment, and value added all were factor 
components of the dynamism construct.  Other researchers have categorized dynamism in 
slightly different ways.  The Keats and Hitt (1988) model presented dynamism as 
instability, primarily reflected by volatility.  They theorized that this stability would only 
impact diversification; however, they discovered that they had underestimated the 
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pervasive effect of instability on other constructs in the model.  They discovered that 
instability had significant results, impacting not only on diversification, but also 
operating performance, market performance and divisionalization leading them to 
conclude that firms faced with an unstable environment reacted by divesting businesses 
and developing a simpler structure. As stated by Keats and Hitt (1988:587) “those actions 
would suggest that the decision focus among the firm was on the reduction of uncertainty 
by retreating to a better-understood environment and creating a simpler organization 
rather than on risk reduction through increasing diversification…This reduction of 
uncertainty may take precedence over risk reduction.” 
Baucus and Near (1991) focussed on dynamism in their research suggesting that firms 
rely in some cases on illegal activity  to cope with dynamic, turbulent or rapidly changing 
environments.  As an example, firms trying to exist in turbulent environments may 
respond to these environments by adding divisions or specialized units to deal with 
particular aspects of the environment.  This results in the diffusion of responsibility for 
overall business decision-making over several individuals.  As a result, no one person has 
the perspective, authority or knowledge to stop illegal activities.  In addition, standard 
operating procedures are challenging to maintain in ever shifting environments, making it 
easier for illegal activities to manifest (Baucus & Near, 1991; Zahra et al., 2005).   
Baucus and Near (1991) felt that dynamism reflected both the degree of turnover in the 
environment and the interconnections among organizations in the environment. The 
results of their study indicated a curvilinear relationship between dynamism and illegal 
activity; a firm in a low dynamic environment was 43% more likely to engage in illegal 
activity than a firm with a moderate level of dynamism.  A firm with a high degree of 
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dynamism was 51% more likely to behave illegally than a firm with a moderate level of 
dynamism.  Baucus’ subsequent theoretical work (1994) likewise suggests that dynamism 
is related to the opportunity of an organization to engage in illegal activity. 
Based on the review of the research to date, a dynamic environment creates more 
uncertainty which managers seek to reduce (Asch & Seneca, 1975; Keats & Hitt, 1988; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Industry members may organize themselves outside of the 
normal boundaries of the organization in order to control or reduce uncertainty and 
respond to unpredictable environmental change (Jamieson, 1994).  Generally as 
dynamism increases, environmental uncertainties increase, constraints on resources in the 
environment increase and firms will act to reduce uncertainty and constraints.  As 
examples, variance and levels of revenues are constraints leading to uncertainty.  One of 
the ways to decrease the uncertainty associated with variable revenues in the environment 
is to engage in illegal cartel activities in order to gain stability to expected returns. 
However, at very low levels of dynamism there is little room for the firm to legally 
manoeuvre and as such they will experience operational constraints and environmental 
uncertainty which they will attempt to reduce thus creating a higher level of illegal cartel 
activity.  As dynamism increases operational constraints are reduced, decreasing 
environmental uncertainty; therefore, at moderate levels of dynamism illegal cartel 
activity will be reduced.  Once dynamism rises above moderate levels, uncertainty in the 
environment also begins to increase again and the incidence of illegal cartel activity rises. 
The board can scan the environment to assess the dynamism of the environment and its 
potential implications for the organization.  As the relationship between dynamism and 
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illegal cartel activity varies, the board will be able to take this knowledge of the changes 
in the environment and project how they may advise the firm in avoiding the illegal cartel 
activity.  Therefore, the board’s scanning activity once again serves as basis for the 
advice that the board provides to the organization; the more scanning by the board, the 
more directed the advice will be to the organization in avoiding illegal cartel activity 
caused by dynamism in the environment.  Based upon the foregoing I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: The effect of dynamism on illegal cartel activity is moderated by the 
amount of board scanning of the external environment such that for a given level 
of dynamism, less scanning by a board will result in a greater probability of 
illegal cartel activity. 
3.5 Summary 
RDT provides a framework through which to examine the dependencies between 
organizations and their shared environment.  As profits are reduced throughout an 
industry and at each individual firm, and as the environment becomes less munificent and 
more dynamic, environmental constraints increase producing uncertainties.  The firm 
then attempts to control these constraints and reduce these uncertainties to increase their 
chance of survival.  Illegal cartel activity provides the firm with the structure and 
opportunity to reduce one of the environmental constraints (competitors) ensuring there 
are more resources available to be directed to other means of survival.  
The temptation to adopt this type of illegal activity can potentially be mitigated by the 
presence and professional expertise of the board.  The board has the ability to scan the 
environment to determine its potential to impact the operations and future actions of the 
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firm.  As the effectiveness of this scanning activity increases, the board can use this 
information in their advisory roles to influence firm strategy.  The board will act to avoid 
illegal activity and as such will use information they have gathered to influence the firm 
away from this activity.  Therefore, as the board’s scanning becomes more effective, the 
likelihood that environmental factors will motivate the firm to engage in illegal cartel 
activity is reduced. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTROL 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented hypotheses designed to explore the relationship between the external 
industry environment and illegal cartel activity; Chapter 4 turns its attention to how the 
internal operations of the organization, namely board control mechanisms, can impact 
illegal corporate activities.  While separate constructs, the consideration of both the 
external and internal characteristics form an overarching corporate governance 
perspective that is designed to present a holistic picture of the antecedents of illegal cartel 
activity in a way that has not been articulated in research to date.   
To be able to interpret the research model as set out in Chapter 4, it is necessary to 
understand the basic tenets of corporate governance as well as its historical evolution.  
Corporate governance is the method used in the administration of the corporation’s 
strategies and the actions taken to achieve the corporation’s goals.  Directors are charged 
by shareholders to ensure that managers act in the best interests of the corporation.  The 
best interests of the corporation is usually meant to be the best interests of shareholders 
(Dodge v. Ford 1918), held to be an obligation to maximize profits (Jamieson, 1994). 
The power of corporate governance is felt at all levels of the organization – board of 
directors, CEO and managers – through the administration of a variety of control 
methods.  Indeed, it is these control methods that allow shareholders to best ensure that 
their intentions are transmitted to the board, CEO and managers and the subsequent 
actions are then monitored (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  These control mechanisms broadly 
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take two forms:  incentives and dismissal (Seward & Walsh, 1996).  Dismissal is 
generally considered to be the most extreme mechanism as it causes the most upheaval in 
the organization (Rowe, 1996).  Firms more often employ a control system to determine 
if the subordinate level is motivated and performing satisfactorily in order to apply the 
appropriate reward or sanction (Goold & Quinn, 1990).   
There are two basic choices on how control can be exercised: behavioural controls and 
output controls (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1977).  Output types of control methods result 
in there being an undue influence on short-term firm outcomes, namely profits, and result 
in little corporate supervision (Hill et al., 1992; Robertson & Anderson, 1993) including a 
lack of supervision of legal issues within the corporation (Jordan, 2010).  Rather than 
focus on the means to achieve these goals, the focus on attaining short-term goals can 
leave the CEO and managers in an ethical dilemma if the legal means to achieve these 
goals either prove to be ineffective or not available to them.  When faced with this 
decision, the CEO and managers may resort to illegal activity in order to achieve these 
heavily emphasized corporate goals.  This process is termed anomie (Merton, 1938, 
1968) a theoretical precursor to strain theory.  This chapter will set out the differences in 
controls and how they motivate particular behaviours at different levels of the 
organization.   
There are a number of reasons why this line of study is very important to the field of 
corporate strategy specifically and management broadly.  First, there is a need for 
academic insight into the relationship between compensation decisions and firm 
outcomes as it is an area that has been under-considered in research to date. This includes 
the need to more closely examine the discrepancy in the deleteriousness of short versus 
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long-term compensation schemes (Deckop, Merriman, & Gupta, 2006; Harris & 
Bromiley, 2007).  In addition, given the ongoing public interest in CEO compensation 
packages, there needs to be a more in-depth look at the possible connections between 
CEO compensation packages and illegal activity (Harris & Bromiley, 2007).  Finally, 
there is a significant gap in the existing literature in that there is no empirical or specified 
theoretical work in the area of how corporate culture directly impacts corporate illegal 
activity (Shover & Hochstetler, 2002). 
This chapter begins with a discussion of anomie, its origins, its applicability to 
organizations and its relevance to illegal cartel activity and proceeds to juxtapose this 
with strain theory (Agnew 1992).  This is followed by a brief discussion on corporate 
history and an examination of control systems.  Incentive systems and their impact on 
behavioural and output goals are then reviewed.  I examine how strain theory animates 
the goal seeking of the CEO and managers, while agency theory animates the relationship 
between the CEO and the board.   
Also at operation is a cascading effect whereby the control method (output or 
behavioural) that the board is under is passed down to the CEO who then passes it down 
to the managers in charge of carrying out the strategy of the firm.  This chapter further 
hypothesizes that the control method used by the board will be associated with the 
control method used by the CEO. 
Finally, I posit that the independence of the board influences the control method of the 
CEO and thence the probability of illegal cartel activity.  The theoretical model 
demonstrating these relationships was presented in Figure 1. 
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4.2 Strain Theory 
Strain theory is virtually unheard of in management literature.  Its predecessor, anomie, is 
more common but still seldom used.  I will outline the evolution of strain theory spending 
sometime on anomie as anomie provides a useful, if not current, perspective on the 
phenomenon of illegal cartel activity.  Although Durkheim (as referred to in Merton 
(1938)) may have been the first to apply this anomie in the subject of deviance (notably 
suicide), the concept of anomie was most popularly set out in Merton’s (1938) original 
monograph on the subject.   While Merton does not specifically address the definition of 
anomie in his 1938 article, he does suggest its purpose is to provide a conceptual scheme 
“designed to provide a coherent, systematic approach to the study of socio-cultural 
sources of deviate behaviour” (Merton, 1938: 672).    
Merton’s premise was that while every society has goals, the methods for achieving those 
goals are limited by the institutional norms of the society.  He was interested in those 
cases where there was a disproportionate emphasis on the goals of the society and where 
the range of possible means of achieving the goals was limited only by technical 
feasibility.  Merton referred to this as winning at all costs.  He juxtaposed this idea 
alongside the emphasis of wealth accumulation in American society as the primary 
symbol of success.  As he noted, “fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short the entire 
catalogue of proscribed behaviour, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on 
the culturally induced success-goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional 
emphasis” (Merton, 1938:675).  Merton emphasized that individuals strive to achieve the 
culturally advocated symbols of success; the inability to achieve these symbols through 
legitimate means leads to frustration and the undertaking of undesirable means of action 
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causing the “ends-justify-the-means” doctrine (Merton, 1938:681).  It is this lack of co-
ordination between the means and the ends that leads to anomie.  This can occur through 
an over emphasis of goals or alternatively, goal blockage where the means to achieve the 
goals are somehow constrained and is referred to as strain theory (Murphy & Robinson, 
2008). 
There is the potential for strain to occur in organizations where cultural goals are 
emphasized but the institutional means of achieving those goals are not available to 
individuals.  In Merton’s model, the individuals who are blocked from acting are termed 
“Innovators”.  Innovators in this context do not necessarily carry the laudable attributes 
they are generally associated with in management literature.  As an example, the 
perpetrators of illegal cartel activity would be Innovators in Merton’s classification 
system.  There is a sense of frustration that occurs in an Innovator where the cultural 
goals are not achievable by legitimate, institutionalized means.  This frustration results in 
a moral conflict; the Innovator strongly desires to achieve the cultural goal but recognizes 
he is not able to do so by means that are both legitimate and effective.  The Innovator 
resolves this conflict by foregoing the institutionally acceptable means in order to achieve 
the culturally preferred success-goal: “The dominant pressure of group standards of 
success is, therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but more or less effective, 
expedients of vice and crime” (Merton, 1938:679).  This results in Innovators trying to 
achieve institutionally desirable ends without having institutionally sanctioned means to 
achieve those ends.  It is not asserted that those engaged in goal attainment either always 
break the rules or never break the rules.  It is more probable that there are conditions that 
elicit this behaviour; Innovators may mostly follow the rules, breaking them only where 
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they feel compelled to do so in order to achieve specific cultural goals (Murphy & 
Robinson, 2008).  
It is worth noting that even though Merton initially presented his concept at the individual 
level of analysis, he asserted this theory also applied to classes or groups of individuals 
with regard to group deviance or individual deviance within groups (Merton, 1957; 
Murphy & Robinson, 2008).  Indeed, he himself utilized it in his consideration of 
political machines (Merton, 1968) and has been supported by other researchers (Messner, 
1988). 
Anomie fell somewhat out of favour in the 60s and 70s and was kept alive through 
reference to the more generic strain theory which found greater use for researchers 
(Agnew and Kaufman, 2010).  Agnew (1992) set out the General Strain Theory of Crime 
in 1992.   This theory looked not only at the failure to achieve positively valued goals as 
did anomie but also regarded the removal of positively valued stimuli and the 
presentation of negative stimuli (Agnew, 1992) resulting in a more robust criminological 
theory (Agnew & Kaufman, 2010). 
Agnew (2001) encouraged the evolution of strain theory and brought the field up to date 
a decade later.  He noted that there are two types of strains that are relevant: objective 
strain which the group acknowledges; and, subjective strain which impacts the individual 
alone.  While noting that failure to achieve economic goals may lead to strain, the 
characteristics (noted below) of the illegal phenomenon I am investigating would lead to 
strain and hence the illegal activity.  The strain that is referred to here would be the strain 
imposed by the market pressures and compensation that the organization or individual 
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faced.  The characteristics from Agnew (2001) are: the circumstances the victim 
(organization) found themselves in were not caused by them; the strain inflicted on the 
victim may seem to be malevolent; the harm can be seen to be severe; the victim believes 
the strain is undeserved; the strain does not serve a higher cause (such as religion); there 
is a perceived injustice to how the strain was inflicted upon the victim; the strain violates 
desired norms (profitability); there may be treatment that is different than colleagues’ 
treatment; the degree of strain is high; the duration of the strain and frequency of the 
strain is high; the strain is recent; the strain affects the core goals (profit making) of the 
victim; the strain is associated with low social control (also see Sutherland, 1949 on this 
point); and the strain creates a pressure or incentive to engage in illegal activity (see 
Sutherland 1940, 1949 and Clinard & Quinney, 1973 on this point).  All these 
characteristics would collectively lead to strain which would be relaxed by illegal activity 
(Agnew, 2001). 
Strain is a robust theoretical basis that has found favour in the criminological discipline to 
encapsulate behaviour that is the subject matter of this thesis. 
4.2.1 Strain Theory and Organizations 
There has been very little research that applies strain theory to organizations (Tsahuridu, 
2006).  In the few cases where researchers have considered strain theory in an 
organizational context, they have stayed true to Merton’s original exposition of the idea 
and emphasized goal setting rather than paying attention to the process of achieving those 
goals.  Additionally, in cultures with a history of innovation and individualism where 
goals attainment is highly emphasized, it is not unusual to find examples of illegal 
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corporate activity (Cohen, 1995).  It has been argued that from an organizational 
perspective corporations are inherently predisposed to crime because they are primarily 
focused and rewarded by shareholders for the achievement of goals, and uncertainty in 
their environment prevents them from using legitimate means to accomplish them 
(Cohen, 1995) and may be seen to be pathological in their pursuit of profits (Bakan, 
2005).  
The use of strain theory in a business context follows that corporations are focused on 
profit as an end or goal; they seek this profit as the main purpose of their existence and 
are under pressure from shareholders (including members of the corporation that are 
invested in the stock of the company) to maximize this profit (Clinard & Quinney, 1973, 
Jamieson, 1994).  However, corporations may also have primary goals of growth, 
stability, maximizing sales, increase in the size of management, or diversification 
(Vaughn, 1998).  These goals are arguably also designed to achieve the long-term 
profitability of the corporation. This goal of profit maximization is transmitted 
throughout the organizational hierarchy, ensuring that everyone in the firm recognizes the 
importance of achieving the profitability goal.  The upper management of the corporation 
is also under increasing pressure from its shareholders – often through the board – to 
achieve ever increasing profits; as a result, they are incented to not object when less than 
legal means are utilized (Cohen, 1995).  This causes a cascading effect throughout the 
organization.  Pressure in the form of top management desires as well as the continual 
articulation of the corporate profitability goal can induce middle managers to break the 
law in order to achieve their, and by implication, the corporation’s goals (Passas, 2001). 
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If individuals or organizations are blocked from achieving goals through legal means, 
then the chance of innovation within and by that corporation will increase depending 
upon primary organizational characteristics including firm culture, history, opportunity, 
and top management preferences (Passas, 2001; Simpson & Koper, 1997).  However, it is 
also conditional on the environment in which the firm finds itself.  In competitive 
situations where there is uncertainty and the corporate culture is predominantly based 
upon goal attainment, a corporation will opt for innovation in order to realize those goals.   
Therefore, if an organization is threatened with a possible loss because they do not have 
existing mechanisms to legally achieve their goals, then they may innovate in order to 
avert that loss (Vaughan, 1983). 
4.2.2 Strain Theory and Illegal Activity 
While corporate America has traditionally exhibited a laissez faire attitude when it comes 
to business operations, the increasing occurrences and public attention being paid to 
white collar crime means that there is a research imperative for business scholars to better 
understand the motivations behind this type of illegal activity.  Strain theory presents a 
useful lens through which to conduct this analysis, although strain theory is rarely used in 
the study of white collar crime (Waring, Weisburd, & Chayet, 1995).  In a study of the 
socio-psychological aspects of strain theory it was found that simple illegal white collar 
crime such as fraud and theft was explainable by the socio-psychological aspects of strain 
theory at the individual level but that the more complex white collar crimes such as 
antitrust were better explained by the structural aspects of strain theory at the 
organization level (Langton & Piquero, 2007; Merton, 1938). Specifically, it was found 
that while personal and financial motives were not significant predictors of antitrust 
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offenses, business and organizational motivations were significant (Langton & Piquero, 
2007).  It has also been argued that for employees to achieve or rise to the level in the 
corporation where they are able to make decisions that are of an antitrust nature they 
must be dedicated company personnel who, because of their dedication, put the 
corporation’s dictates above their own personal ethics and mores resulting in an increased 
propensity to commit antitrust activities on behalf of the corporation (Randall, 1987).  
This commitment to the organization also suggests a rejection of the individualistic 
perspective of strain in favour of the collectivist perspective. 
As noted, there have been very few applications of the concept of strain to management.  
One of the few empirical articles that have addressed the issue of illegal activity in 
combination with Merton’s theories was the work of Simpson and Koper (1997).  They 
linked illegal activity to the external environment; environmental uncertainties produce 
organizational strain that result in deviant (illegal) behaviour.  However, they also 
acknowledge that strain can be internal to the organization, differentiating it from 
external strain by terming it “operating” strain.  Following Merton, they indicated that 
strain may result when there are internally created pressures to achieve certain strategic 
goals combined with the absence of the availability of the traditional means by which to 
successfully achieve these goals.  They theorized that firms controlled mainly by 
financial strategies should see the greatest amount of crime.  To test their hypothesis, 
Simpson and Koper (1997) looked at corporate antitrust criminality as the dependent 
variable in combination with independent variables including top management 
succession, firms headed by sales and marketing officers, powerful executive officers, 
decentralized management structures, and product dominant strategies.  They found that 
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while organizations with high levels of top management succession had lower instances 
of illegal corporate behaviour, organizations that were run by CEOs from finance and 
administration units and organizations that followed a product dominant strategy 
exhibited higher instances of illegal activity.    
The calls for further research of strain in management (Caruana, Ramaseshan, & Ewing, 
2001) and organizations (Tsahuridu, 2006) were recently answered by Saini and Krush 
(2008) who studied strain from a structural and organizational perspective.  Saini and 
Krush’s (2008) research was particularly interesting as the level of analysis at the 
structural level was unique as was their conceptualization of the dynamics of top 
management’s control mechanisms as an antecedent to strain.  In addition, they framed 
their research with the same sociological interpretation as Merton (1968).  This 
interpretation suggests that the unit of analysis is the collective or group, that the group or 
collective’s control structure and methods influence the actions of the group and that this 
approach has the ability to explain a wide range of deviant behaviours.   
Saini and Krush (2008) specifically considered the marketing function of an organization, 
analyzing how the control systems put in place by upper management may contribute to 
ethical transgressions by the marketing staff.  They argued that an organizational 
emphasis on profit goals where they are not legally attainable under existing conditions 
leads to strain and then to unethical behaviour.  Further, top management’s choice of 
control mechanisms, outputs versus marketing processes, impacts the level of strain in the 
marketing organization where output controls are manifested by setting performance 
targets such as market share or profit margins.  With a high emphasis on bottom line 
performance and a corresponding level of operational freedom, they found that the 
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marketing team may choose the most efficient path to achieve these goals even if that 
path is unethical.  The authors concluded that strain is created when these profit goals are 
emphasised over the means to achieve them; hence, the level of output controls is 
positively related to the level of strain in the business unit.   
4.2.3 Strain Theory – A Call to Action 
Strain theory is an interesting and relevant theoretical research approach when 
considering illegal corporate behaviour.  However, organizational strain needs to be 
operationalized by considering the “degree to which attaining economic goals dominates 
other considerations in the firm” (Cohen, 1995:199); this would be strengthened through 
an examination of strain and organizational control mechanisms. Research also needs to 
focus on the relationship between criminal activity and dimensions of organizational 
culture including instances where “incentive systems are exclusively performance based” 
(Cohen, 1995:200).  These two potential research topics elicit the broader question of 
whether corporate type offenses such as antitrust would be better explained through 
organizational theories rather than socio-psychological theories (Langton & Piquero, 
2007).  The intent of this thesis is to address the call for further study of organizational 
strain and illegal activity, and in doing so, augment our knowledge to gain a rich and 
robust understanding of these phenomena. 
4.3 Corporate Governance History 
Even though corporate crime is an extremely popular topic in the mainstream media and 
practitioner publications, organizational studies have not concentrated on determining 
what organizational conditions encourage or prevent illegal corporate activity 
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(Schnatterly, 2003).  I suggest in this thesis that corporate crime is partially determined 
by corporate control, namely, who runs the corporation and how they, themselves are 
controlled.   
In order to frame the conceptualization of corporate control as presented in this thesis, it 
is helpful to briefly describe the origin and structure of the corporation itself.  The 
corporate form had its origins in Roman law almost 2000 years ago and acquired a 
separate legal personality (including the ability to sue or be sued and to hold property) 
and unlimited life in 14th century Europe.  By the mid-19th century, the corporation had 
evolved from a non-profit membership organization to a for profit business corporation.  
The shift from closely held to widely held and traded share ownership was accomplished 
by the early 20th century.  Today, we are accustomed to corporations with multi-billion 
dollar global operations and broadly held share ownership  (Avi-Yonah, 2005). 
Adam Smith foresaw that there would be control issues that would arise as corporations 
became more complex: “The directors of such companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own...Negligence and profusion, therefore must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company” 
(Smith, 1776).   
Smith proved to be prescient in that as the size, complexity and power of corporations 
grew, the directors ceased to be the sole shareholders creating new accountability issues.  
As a response, legal systems in many countries stepped in and developed a new, higher 
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standard of performance expected of directors, requiring of them the same level of 
responsibility that they would exhibit were they to be the sole shareholders (Monks & 
Minow, 1995).  Directors thus became the formal agents of shareholders with the 
responsibility of ensuring that senior managers in the firm acted in the best interests of 
the corporation. The directors became responsible for considering and approving 
recommendations from the top management team (TMT), and then ensuring their 
appropriate implementation (Barney, 2007). 
Directors’ obligations are considered within the context of the shareholder primacy norm, 
fundamental to corporate law in many developed countries including Canada and the 
United States.  It is perhaps best illustrated in the oft cited 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company (1919:463): 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed to 
that end.  The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, 
to the reduction of profits or to the non-distribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. 
 
The current state of affairs in corporate governance and fiduciary responsibility has 
been  clearly articulated by the American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate 
Laws: “Directors have fiduciary duties to shareholders which, while allowing directors 
to give consideration to others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the 
long term interests of shareholders when so doing” (Committee on Corporate Laws, 
1990; Smith, 1998). 
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The long term interests of the shareholders have generally been interpreted as meaning 
one thing: financial profits.  As a result, the primary, and arguably only, motivating force 
for the modern corporation is that of profit maximization, on behalf of the shareholders as 
carried out through the strategies employed by management and approved by the board.  
Indeed, whatever other goals a corporation may have, they are furthered by the 
corporation focusing on profit (Jamieson, 1994).   
4.4 Control Systems 
Corporate control is the method used in the administration of the corporation’s strategy to 
exert pressure upon both the individuals within an organization and the organization itself 
to achieve the goals as set out by the various corporate governance structures of the 
organization.  The governing body of the corporation, the board, requires a means by 
which to motivate their subordinates, the CEO and top management team, so that they 
attempt to achieve the goals as determined by the board acting on behalf of the 
shareholders.  This means is termed the corporate control system. 
Control systems, recognized to be required for the smooth operation and coordination of 
an organization, exist at all levels of an organization.   They are the process by which one 
level in the hierarchy of an organization can determine if another level is motivated and 
performing satisfactorily (Goold & Quinn, 1990).  Barnard (1938) indicated that the 
purpose of an organization was to coordinate the actions of individuals who work within 
the organization to some purpose.  In order for the coordination to be successful, there 
must be agreement between hierarchical levels (for example, the executive and the 
manager or the manager and the front line worker) in terms of the organizational 
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objectives which should be as precise as possible in order to ensure there is clarity to 
guide their achievement (Goold & Quinn, 1990).   
Agency theory offers us another explanation.  Agency theorists suggest that all agents 
within an organization need to be motivated by principals in order to perform the tasks 
expected of them (Eisenhardt, 1985).  The absence of this motivation will allow agents to 
act in a self-interested manner, rather than in the best interest of the board and thus 
shareholders.  This self-interest is manifested at all levels of the organization; therefore, 
control systems are necessary not only for just upper management, but are also required 
throughout the entire organizational hierarchy (Goold & Quinn, 1990).  Finally, control 
systems are important as they can provide a signal to management that their intervention 
is required because the organization is not achieving the goals that have been set out for 
it.  This allows management to decide if correction is needed either to adjust the 
operation of the organization or the corporate goals (Goold & Quinn, 1990). 
While a number of different types of control methods have been addressed in the 
literature, there are two types that can be monitored and evaluated: behaviour controls 
and output controls. Mintzberg (1979) refers to output controls as “performance controls” 
which allow for those being measured to select the means to achieve the outputs desired.  
The focus on output controls is on the ends not on the means.  In order to have 
satisfactory output controls there must be some degree of reliability and validity in the 
measurement of the outputs themselves (Ouchi, 1977).  For example, if a manager wishes 
his subordinates to achieve certain sales targets he can simply state the dollar or unit 
volume of sales to be achieved and rely on that goal to serve as the control method. The 
manager is unconcerned with how the salesperson achieves these goals; whether the sales 
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person succeeds is easily verifiable in most companies.  Thus, output controls are used 
when there is a need for quantifiable and simple measures.  Surprisingly, it has been 
found that the use of output measures occurs in exactly the least appropriate type of 
situation, one where there is complexity, interdependence and lack of expertise on the 
part of the manager (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975).  
The other control mechanism, behaviour controls, is often put in place when the 
governing body has the ability to understand and enforce the means-ends relationship; in 
other words, understanding the means by which they desire the subordinate party to 
achieve the outputs (Ouchi, 1977).  As the level of comfort and certainty in the means-
ends relationship increases, the level of certainty and comfort in achieving the desired 
ends also increases. Behaviour controls are most appropriate where the validity or 
reliability of proposed output controls is questionable, or when there is some degree of 
knowledge and/or agreement on the means-ends relationship. In the salesperson example, 
if the manager has some degree of comfort in how successful sales are achieved (such as 
making a certain number of sales calls, attending certain conventions, submitting a 
certain number of quotes) then they can specify that these behaviours be attended to with 
the belief that this will result in the desired outcome of more sales.  The manager is 
specifying the behaviour that they want their sales rep to engage in which will result in 
the desired outcome.  
While behaviour based controls require that the manager have a deep understanding of 
the business and markets, for behaviour control systems to be effective, it is best if there 
is close co-ordination between the manager and their subordinates (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997).  In the case of a hierarchically 
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structured organization, behavioural controls exhibit a top down procedures based 
management model and are useful when the means-ends linkage is known or understood 
(Snell, 1992).   
Behaviour controls are seen as a balance to the output control system as evidenced by 
Ouchi (1977).  Behaviour control is “responsive to the particular needs of the task, the 
abilities of the individual manager, and the norms of the company” and not useful for 
comparing the many and varied subunits of a large company (Ouchi & Maguire, 
1975:563).  While output controls usually stress financial outputs and a short-term focus, 
they do not deal with things such as the company’s progress regarding competitors and 
non-financial objectives that may be important to the company’s long-term success 
including how these outputs may be achieved (Goold & Quinn, 1990).  Behaviour based 
controls in this way are strategic in nature.   
Subsequent researchers have found in field studies that organizations use output and 
behavioural controls in conjunction with each other (Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992).  The 
balance between them depends upon the extent of salary compensation (behavioural 
control) or commission compensation (output control) the manager has at his disposal.  It 
also relies on the extent to which the organization exhibits a means-ends understanding 
and an ambiguity of standards of performance with ambiguity favouring behavioural 
based controls (Snell, 1992).  While the amount of compensation remains fixed, there is 
an option to allocate the compensation to either behavioural or output related 
compensation.  This discretion is emblematic of the control systems that the organization 
favours. 
 76 
 
4.5 Incentive Systems 
Incentive systems are thought to send a strong signal regarding the types of behaviour 
that will be rewarded by management. Agency theory suggests that the “strength, 
pervasiveness and immediacy” of output (mainly financial) control systems will lead to 
short-term thinking and a bias towards short-term performance rather than strategic 
considerations (Goold & Quinn, 1990:46).   
There are several reasons why compensation impacts an executive’s response to risk.  
When faced with the possibility of not achieving their goals, executives engage in riskier 
behaviour to avoid the loss.  It has been demonstrated that when compensated with stock 
option pay executives took bigger risks than when compensated with stocks alone; the 
difference between stock and stock option pay is important and significant (Sanders, 
2001).  Executives rewarded with stock options also tended to take bigger risks (Sanders 
& Hambrick, 2007).  Similarly, executives meeting their performance goals were less 
likely to engage in risky behaviour so as not to put their goal attainment at risk (Palmer & 
Wiseman, 1999).  When the goal outcomes are independent of the agent’s efforts, 
transferring incentive risk to the agent may make them react by reducing their effort or 
taking evasive actions to reduce the risk (Miller, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  The 
more the principal knows ahead of time about the outcomes of behaviour then the less 
sense it makes to rely on outcome measurement as a means of incenting agent 
performance.  
Output control systems generally place the onus on the individual to achieve the goals set 
out for them and provide them with the independence to do so as they see fit.  Often, 
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these types of systems exhibit a compensation plan that are mostly proportional to the 
results to be achieved (e.g. variable income) with a very low salary component 
(Robertson & Anderson, 1993).  Within these kinds of systems, executives that receive 
higher pay are more likely to make decisions that increase the financial viability of the 
organization while ignoring issues relating to both the legal culpability of the 
organization and the wellbeing of subordinates (Jordan, 2010).  In an output control 
system the chance of detection to the measured person will be low as the monitoring is 
relatively hands off and it is easy to conclude that management does not care how the 
output is achieved, merely that it does so successfully.  For example, in a study related to 
salespersons, Robertson and Anderson (1993) found that the sales force control system 
had an impact on the ethical reaction patterns of the sales force.  Those salespersons 
operating in a system that was outcome driven (variable pay) and where they were 
granted independence in their behaviour were more likely to recommend unethical 
actions.    
Incentive systems play a pivotal role in determining the behaviour of those being 
incented.  Behavioural control systems are more difficult to implement but result in more 
ethical behaviour while output control systems provide for easier monitoring but more 
unethical behaviour.  For any one compensation system there is usually a mixture of 
output and behavioural controls so in comparing compensation systems one can view 
them as existing on a continuum with purely output control systems on one end and 
purely behavioural control systems at the other. 
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4.5.1 Cascade Effect 
The control systems that the board puts in place to monitor the CEO will influence the 
control systems established for the TMT which in turn cascades down to their 
subordinates.  For example, wage systems created for CEOs are mimicked structurally in 
those created for their subordinates (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002).  In addition, incentive 
systems will cascade down from the top of the organization to the second line managers 
and so on (Makri et al., 2006; Werner & Tosi, 1995).  As the distance in the hierarchy of 
the organization increases, so too does the relative similarity in compensation and hence 
control structure diminishes. The closer the subordinate is to the CEO, the more alike the 
reward systems will be (Wade et al., 2006).   
Corporate managers set goals based upon the control system by which they are measured.  
This places pressure on their subordinates to achieve the goals of their manager by 
whatever means they have at their disposal – legal or otherwise.  One need only look at 
the history of the creation of the Ford Pinto, where managers set the goal of producing a 
car under 2,000 lbs. that could be retailed for less than $2,000.  This pressure on 
engineers to achieve their superiors’ goal resulted in a decision by subordinates to save 
money and achieve the weight requirement by rejecting safety modifications after 
considering a cost benefit analysis regarding the cost savings as compared to the cost of 
legal liability related to litigation from accidents (Coleman, 1987).  Illegal and unethical 
behaviour thus becomes permissible as the compensation and control structures from the 
CEO cascade down the organization to lower operational levels.   
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4.6 Control and Illegal Cartel Activity 
In agency theory, one of the strongest ways that the principal is able to enforce outcome 
or behaviour based monitoring of the agent is through the chosen compensation method.  
Long-term compensation mechanisms tied to objective financial criteria such as stock 
price or earnings are seen to align the agent’s actions with the goals of the principal; as 
the organization’s fortunes rise so too do the fortunes of the agent (Carpenter, 2000).  
These types of compensation systems are thought to be particularly effective when the 
agent’s behaviour is difficult to measure (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) which often occurs 
when principals attempt to measure strategic actions aimed at achieving strategic goals 
(Carpenter, 2000). 
One of the most prevalent output control measures employed involves boards using 
financial incentives to motivate CEOs to meet organizational earnings expectations 
(Zahra et al., 2005).  Agency scholars have suggested that employing financial or output 
control measures increases the likelihood of financial misrepresentation as the CEO’s 
compensation is skewed towards stock options which would provide an inducement for 
the CEOs to manipulate earnings in order to increase the value of the options (Harris & 
Bromiley, 2007).   
However, Deckop, Merriman and Gupta (2006) found that compensation packages that 
included short-term incentives as measured by bonuses were much more deleterious to 
corporate social performance than those that included long-term incentives as measured 
by restricted stock and stock options.   
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If management signals, either through specific sanctioning or through a lack of 
monitoring that only outputs are important and not the means through which the outputs 
are achieved, an employee will believe that illegal behaviour is acceptable as long as it 
successfully leads to outputs (Shover & Hochstetler, 2002).  As managers are incented 
based upon their superiors’ incentive system (which may be output oriented) then they 
are potentially more likely to engage in illegal activities in order to meet their incentives 
(Daboub et al., 1995).  In addition, an organizational focus and demand for high 
performance at all levels of the organization may lead to further illegal activity (Baucus, 
1994; Shover & Hochstetler, 2002), especially if the subunit is particularly crucial for 
overall goal attainment.  A firm’s compensation system provides normative support for 
such illegal activity when it explicitly links the organization’s goals to individual goals 
(Vaughan, 2002).    
As these output controls permeate the organization, those portions of the firm that are 
underperforming will engage in illegal activity to raise their performance and increase 
their compensation (Pinto et al., 2008).  This pursuit of ends (goals) rather than means 
drives people to illegal activity in order to reach these goals (Merton, 1938; Ordóñez et 
al., 2009); the pressure to engage in this type of behaviour becomes intensified if it 
appears that the manager is going to fall just short of the goals.  It was found that people 
with unmet goals will engage in unethical behaviour more than people attempting to do 
their best (means oriented) (Schweitzer et al., 2004).   
It is not just academic research that makes the linkage between control method and illegal 
corporate activities such as price fixing. In examining a number of companies convicted 
of illegal corporate activity, managers had compensation systems that relied almost 
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exclusively on sales volumes and profits.  Bonuses and commissions (sometimes 
exceeding 50% of the base salary) were also based solely on sales and profits 
(Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, 1978).  A divisional manager at a convicted company set out 
how these control systems worked: “People have been evaluated on the basis of profit 
and how forcefully they can execute a price increase.  Thus, if he does this by price 
agreement with competitors, he’ll build profit and price credits and get a reward...So, 
instead of seeing top people explicitly and officially acknowledge the difficult industry 
conditions, many of the lower officials see only strong pressures and inducements to “get 
the numbers no matter what”” (Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, 1978:149).   Based on this type 
of first-person account, it is easy to see how the control system that is implemented at the 
top cascades down through the hierarchy to permeate lower levels of the organization 
directly impacting actions taken at these levels to satisfy the organization’s goals. 
Therefore, if a CEO (and through the cascading effect, managers) is exposed to output 
based controls and incentive systems, they will take actions to maximize their incentives 
and reach those goals while minimizing their compensation risk.  As previously 
articulated, through strain theory, the CEO and managers will be overly influenced by the 
goal setting of the control system which shall lead them to decrease emphasis on the 
means they and their subordinates use to reach those goals.  As an Innovator (as proposed 
by Merton 1938), this lack of attention to the means makes it more likely that illegal 
activities will be used to achieve these sanctioned goals if legal means are either 
unavailable or ineffective.   
Illegal cartel activity provides for a steady and higher revenue level which will, in all 
likelihood, be in accordance with the goals set by the board. Therefore, illegal cartel 
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activity is a very effective means, albeit not legitimate, of attaining the goals set out by 
the board.  The more that the board emphasizes output based controls the greater the 
probability that the Innovator scenario will take place and lead to illegal cartel activity. I 
therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: An increase in goal based output control methods for the CEO will 
increase the probability of illegal cartel activity. 
4.7 Board Control 
Shareholders rely on their elected boards of directors to monitor and control the upper 
most levels of management.  Broadly, the board is generally seen to utilize behavioural 
control and output control to manage the behaviour of its senior executives.  The board’s 
decision to utilize either of these types of controls generally relies upon their desire to 
achieve the most effective alignment of the interests of the shareholders with those of top 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  Outcome based controls impose risk upon 
employees because an undesirable outcome can still occur even when they do their job 
effectively (Beekun, Stedham, & Young, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1985).  When faced with 
outcome based controls, an employee seeks to minimize risk and therefore the occurrence 
of an undesirable result.  This same logic may be applied to the control mechanisms that 
shareholders have at their disposal when compensating directors.  I argue that directors 
are less tolerant of risk than shareholders since they derive their income from one firm 
whereas shareholders can more easily diversify their income streams among firms. 
Directors usually push for the behaviourally based compensation schemes such as yearly 
fees.  However, an alignment with shareholder interests would indicate a more output 
 83 
 
based compensation system may be more effective (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Deutsch, 
2005). 
It has been held that there is an incestuous relationship (correlation) between executive 
compensation and director compensation which has been attributed to “mutual back 
scratching and/or cronyism” (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2002). This result was confirmed 
in a study of hospitals where it was found that CEOs earned more if directors were paid 
more (Cardinaels, 2009).  Unfortunately, the topic of director compensation has not been 
deeply explored.  In one of the few studies of director compensation it was found that 
greater director compensation led to greater director effort, and in this case greater output 
as indicated by transparency (Chiang & He, 2010).   
Just as directors are faced with a compensation system that is skewed towards outcome or 
behavioural based controls, following the cascade theory, they will similarly drive this 
skewness to the CEO in their control methods who in turn will transmit it down through 
the organizational hierarchy (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Makri et al., 2006; Wade et al., 
2006; Werner & Tosi, 1995).  In addition, the same agency theories that apply to the 
shareholder/CEO relationship, I assert may apply to the shareholder/director relationship.  
The type of control method that the shareholders impose upon the board (or the board 
imposes on itself) will influence the type of control system that the board imposes on the 
CEO.  I therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 7: An increase in goal based output control methods for the board, 
will increase the use of a goal based output control method for the CEO. 
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Since the board determines the control method of the CEO who then determines the 
control method of those actors within the organization that may engage in illegal cartel 
activity the board ultimately impacts illegal corporate activity through the CEO control 
method.  I therefore assert that: 
Hypothesis 8: The relationship between board control method and illegal cartel 
activity is fully mediated by CEO control method. 
4.8 Director Independence 
The effect of outside or independent directors on various board functions and board 
performance has received a significant amount of attention from corporate governance 
scholars.  Agency theory would suggest that outsider directors are more aligned with 
shareholder interests whereas inside directors, even though they would have superior 
information on the operations of the firm, would have to engage in more problematic 
self-monitoring and be beholden to the CEO for their position.2  As a result, conflicts of 
interest could easily arise (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
proposed that inside directors would advocate for more behaviourally based 
compensation for the CEO, while outsider or independent directors would advocate for 
more output oriented compensation.  Therefore, it is not only the control type of 
compensation received by the directors that affects the control type imparted on the CEO, 
but it is also the director’s status as an insider or outsider that may impact their desire for 
either output or behavioural controls for the CEO.  Outsiders will look to more output 
                                                            
2 The assumption that outside directors are less tolerant of risk is questioned by many agency scholars as 
many outside directors are current or former CEOs and hence not concerned about compensation relatively 
speaking. 
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based controls due to their lack of knowledge of the ends-means relationship; conversely, 
insiders have a greater knowledge of the ends-means relationship and so will push for 
behaviour based controls for the CEO.  I therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 9: An increase in the proportion of outsiders on the board will 
increase the use of goal based output control systems for the CEO. 
Since the proportion of outsiders determines the control method of the CEO who then 
determines the control method of those actors within the organization that may engage in 
illegal cartel activity, the proportion of outside directors ultimately impacts illegal 
corporate activity through the CEO control method.  I therefore assert that: 
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
illegal cartel activity is fully mediated by CEO control method. 
4.9 Summary 
Corporate governance demonstrates that the board can employ two control methods 
(behavioural or output) to advance the interests of the shareholders, where their primary 
interest is usually profit maximization.  Through a cascading effect, the board will 
designate this control method to the CEO who will then impart it to the senior 
management team and so on down the hierarchy.  In organizations with strong drivers 
towards financial goals, output control methods emphasize goals attainment over the 
means to achieve those goals.  Merton’s (1938, 1957, 1968) concept of anomie informs 
us as to why organizations become Innovators when faced with goals that are difficult to 
achieve.  Anomie (now strain) then provides a mechanism by which goal driven 
organizations are more likely to use illegal activities to achieve those goals. 
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I assert characteristics of corporate governance that could influence whether an 
organization will use illegal activity to achieve their goals.  Independent directors on 
boards influence the type of control method used for the CEO and through cascading, to 
the upper management and then operational managers.  Directors’ backgrounds and 
independence from both the organizational hierarchy (e.g. inside directors) and from the 
organization itself also have an impact on whether the organization uses illegal cartel 
activity to achieve its goals.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ILLEGAL CARTEL ACTIVITY DATA 
The data I have available on illegal cartel activity are robust and comprehensive.  The 
measure for the dependent variable “Illegal Cartel Activity” was taken from a proprietary 
database compiled by Professor John Connor of Purdue University (“Connor Database”).  
Dr. Connor has written a text book on cartel activity entitled “Global Price Fixing: Our 
Customers are the Enemy” (Connor, 2001) and has previously used this dataset in peer 
reviewed research (Connor, 2006).  The sources used for the construction of the database 
is detailed  by Connor and Helmers (2007): 
Information is drawn from many sources.  First, most discovered cartels are 
first revealed to the public when fines, a guilty plea, or an indictment is 
announced in process releases of the DOJ [US Department of Justice], the 
Canadian Competition Bureau, EC [European Commission], or a score of 
other national antitrust authorities with active anticartel programs.  The brief 
press releases are followed by additional documents, such as sentencing 
memorandums, plea agreements, detailed published decisions (in the EU 
especially), “statements of fact” (in Canada), annual reports, and speeches 
of antitrust officials.  In Europe the most important cartels have the full 
decisions of the EC (some of them running to more than a hundred pages) 
posted publically a year or two after the brief press releases about 
Commission decisions. Lesser decisions are described in the Competition 
Directorate’s quarterly newsletter.  All these documents are preserved on 
websites of the U.S., Canadian, and the EU antitrust authorities going back 
to the mid-1980s in most cases.  Related U.S., Canadian and European court 
decisions are fully archived. 
A second source of data occurs when an investigation is announced or 
leaked to the press or when raids on corporate offices are noticed.  Then 
business newspapers, trade magazines, and news services begin to publish 
pieces on the alleged violators and their industries.  Older articles are often 
available that describe the size, growth and market structures of the affected 
markets.  Once the span of the violation is known, production quantities or 
list of transaction prices can sometimes be located for some industries.  
Among the more useful trade magazines and newsletters are Chemical 
Market Reporter, Oil and Gas Journal, and similar publications available 
on major business-and-law search engines (Factiva, LexisNexis). 
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Third, a small number of academic and government researchers have been 
compiling similar datasets.  Among the most useful are working papers by 
Levenstein and Suslow (2001, 2002) and Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald 
(2003).  A useful government publication is the OECD (2002) and its 
annual competition-law reports by members.  And of course we have built 
upon data collected in the authors’ previous publications (e.g. Connor 
2003). 
 
I use the Connor database for this research and followed the database methodology as 
previously outlined.  The database has been used in peer reviewed research before.  
Attempts to recreate this database or to selectively choose a year and verify the results 
have met with disappointment as the sources of the material are so varied and the 
database itself would have to be recreated to verify.  I could find evidence of a selected 
sample of illegal cases stipulated therein.  This database is then at most a population and 
at least a sample of a population. 
The Connor dataset contains data that have been broken down into the following 
categories: cartel name and location (i.e. global or region of activity); legal status (i.e. 
investigation open or concluded); market and cartel structure; type of illegal conduct (i.e. 
bid rigging or 3rd party support); the identity of the defendants, both organizationally and 
personally; cartel affected commerce; monetary penalties and other sanctions; severity of 
sanctions in relation to sales; cartel duration; dollar damages and overcharges; date 
exposed and sanctioned by country; and, lag of sanction to date of exposure.  Each of 
these categories is further broken down into sub categories resulting in over 150 
subfields.  A cartel/company observation occurs when a cartel is first identified and 
companies are subsequently included as part of the investigation into that cartel.    
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As an example, in the global citric acid cartel that ran from 1991 to 1995 five companies 
- Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) of the United States, Bayer AG out of Denmark, 
Hoffmann- Laroche of Switzerland, Montana AG of Switzerland and Eridania of France - 
controlled about 55% of the global market for citric acid.  These companies were found 
guilty of anti-trust offenses and were fined and paid damages that totalled (in millions of 
U.S. dollars) $142.29 for ADM, $164.64 for Bayer AG, $86.17 for Hoffmann-Laroche, $ 
44.90 for Montana AG and $1.13 for Eridania.  The citric acid cartel would count as five 
cartel/company observations. The dataset contains 1,582 cartel/company observations 
covering 174 international cartels.  To qualify as an international cartel it had to have 
included participants from more than one country.  In this dataset these international 
cartels include 848 separate organizations.  
However, the Connor dataset does have limitations.  These limitations are primarily 
centred around gaps in the data for particular cartel/company observations.  There are 
over 150 columns of information and few observations populate all fields either because 
the information was not available or it was not applicable for each cartel/company 
observation.   
The Connor dataset served as the basis for the data that is used in this study.  The dataset 
was narrowed down to cartel/company observations that had the following 
characteristics: U.S. based head office; the company listed on either the NYSE or 
NASDAQ; an available cartel start date; and, a cartel end date of 2008 or earlier.  Once 
these selection criteria were applied to the original Connor database, 164 cartel/company 
observations remained. 
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80 separate cartels were represented in these 164 observations.  These cartels were evenly 
spread among raw material producers such as hydrogen peroxide and potash and 
potassium chloride (31 cartels), service providers such as commercial insurance 
brokerages and tobacco leaf auctions (19 cartels), and processed products cartels such as 
medical x-ray film, commercial explosives and automotive aftermarket filters (30 
cartels).  The firms in this sample participated in cartels that varied from a minimum 
membership of two members for auction house art buyers’ and sellers’ fees, to a 
maximum membership of 47 for specialty piping steel.  The average number of firms 
participating in these cartels was 8.6 with a standard deviation of 8.1.  It is important to 
note that while the Connor database identifies international price fixing cartels, the 
sample for this thesis contains only U.S. firms; thus, by definition, the sample for my 
research would not contain all of the members of any one cartel.  Table 1 details the 
breakdown of the number of cartels in the sample with their respective observations. 
Table 1: Number of Cartels at each Observation Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Connor data contains an estimate of the market share for all of the participants in the 
cartel in the market in which they were fixing prices as a whole.  The original source 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of Cartels at 
Observation Level 
1 51 
2 12 
3 7 
4 3 
5 1 
6 4 
10 1 
17 1 
Total: 164 Total:  80 
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documentation does not always contain this information.  Where it is included it is 
usually only an estimate due to the inherent problems in assessing market share over the 
number of years in which the cartel was in operation.  My methodological approach 
included collecting industry data from as close a date as possible to the inception of the 
cartel.  This is critical as cartels can be formed to influence industry metrics.  In fact, the 
basis of much of the litigation (whether originating from government agencies or private 
parties seeking compensatory damages) surrounds what actual effect, if any, the cartel 
had on such things as market share and pricing.  It is difficult to quantify; even in 
lawsuits with expert witnesses produced on both sides of the argument, there is little, if 
any, agreement.  Therefore, the data on market share is termed an estimate in the Connor 
database and in the sample I have selected.  The estimate of the market share controlled 
by the cartels in the sample was included for 48 of the 80 cartels and ranged from a low 
of 25% for the soda ash cartel to 100% for many cartels including SRAMs (Static 
Random Access Memory devices) for computers, the insecticide BT for forests and 
specialty piping steel.  The average market share estimate for these 48 cartels was 92% 
with a standard deviation of 39%. 
Along with variability in the size of the cartels and variability in their market share, there 
was variability in the size of the markets affected.  Again, during the legal proceedings 
related to cartel activity, there was little agreement as to the actual size of the markets 
influenced by these cartels.  In my sample, the smallest market affected was that for the 
Three Tenors CD of which AOL Time Warner was the American cartel participant.  The 
Three Tenors market was estimated at $500,000 USD, very small as compared to other 
documented cartel activity.  More typical were the industrial diamonds cartel in a global 
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market estimated to be worth $600 million and the disposable contact lens market which 
was estimated to be worth over a billion dollars. 
In the Connor dataset, cartel members were punished through a finding of guilt in 
criminal, regulatory or civil actions and were generally penalized monetarily.  The fines 
varied with the extent of damages, market size and other legal aggravating factors such as 
whether coercion was involved in the execution of the cartel.  The fines also varied by 
country and by type.  For example, UCAR Inc. was the American participant in the 
graphite electrodes cartel (graphite electrodes are used in electric arc furnaces in the steel 
industry) from 1992 to 1998.  This company was fined $110 million in the United States 
and subjected to another $256 million in monetary damages from a civil suit.  The 
graphite electrodes cartel was also fined $20 million in Canada and $43.1 million by the 
European Commission. 
Another important variable documented in the Connor dataset is the duration of the 
cartels.  In the 80 cartels contained in my sample, cartel activity ranges from a four month 
duration for the cruise lines fuel surcharge cartel and five month duration for the Three 
Tenors CD to a high of 311 months for the soda ash cartel and 360 months for the cartel 
involved in the construction of gas pipelines on the northern slopes of Alaska.  The 
average was 86 months with a standard deviation of 73 months; a typical example is the 
high fructose corn syrup cartel which lasted 77 months.  In my sample, the earliest start 
date was 1966 and the latest start date was 2007, while the earliest end date was 1970 and 
the latest 2008. 
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My sample also included firms that are household names such as AOL Time Warner, 
Dow Chemical, DuPont, Prudential Insurance, Goodyear, Sherwin Williams, Haliburton, 
United Airlines, MasterCard, VISA, Proctor and Gamble, Pfizer, Nordstrom, Ford Motor 
Company, Exxon Mobile, Goldman Sachs, General Electric, and Johnson & Johnson.  
The characteristics of each company were generally captured in the cartel level data and 
each company had the particulars of its participation detailed in the sample. 
One factor that is interesting to note is the recidivists that appear numerous times 
throughout the sample. Of the 164 observations there were 127 separate firms 
represented. Crompton Corporation was involved in seven separate cartels.  ADM was 
involved in six cartels: carbon dioxide from 1968 to 1992; sodium glutamate from 1987 
to 1995; glucose and fructose corn syrup from 1989 to 1995; citric acid form 1991 to 
1995; and, MSG and nucleotides from 1992 to 1996.  Three firms were involved in four 
cartels (DuPont, Dow and Exxon), two firms had participated in three cartels (AIG and 
FMC Corp.) and 14 firms participated in two cartels.   
These multiple convictions added a concerning complexity to the analysis.  Time is an 
important variable in assessing the state of the environment and the firm prior to the 
commencement of illegal cartel activity.  In many cases there were overlapping time 
frames with these recidivists; the proper time to view the firm just prior to the illegal 
cartel activity was therefore clouded by this almost continual state of participation in 
illegal activity.  Selecting matching companies also became problematic.  If I had 
rejected all cases where there was recidivism then I would have been left with 112 
cartel/company observations.  However, I believe that their inclusion is defensible. The 
thrust of this thesis is that the status of the environment and the firm’s corporate 
 94 
 
governance at t-1 is causative of the firms’ illegal cartel activity at t.  If a firm is in a 
more or less continuous state of illegal cartel activity in various industries (this data 
sample contains no instances of the same industry being the subject of cartel activity), 
then there may well be a difference when compared to the matching firms where no 
illegal cartel activity occurs.  I did not measure the change in the environment or 
corporate governance in the same firm. 
Even with the information gaps, the database from which my sample was selected is 
robust and comprehensive.  In addition, the sample contained enough data points to 
conduct my statistical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Methodological Approach 
The study of the factors that may impact or predict illegal cartel activity is complicated as 
it is both multilevel and complex.  Given that there is relatively little research in this area, 
the initial methodological challenge was to decide which research paradigm was most 
appropriate to explore the research question of why firms engage in illegal cartel activity.  
Quantitative methods were attractive as my hypotheses assert cause and effect and 
antecedent relationships for the phenomenon (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) 
which would suggest a post positivist approach to this research question.  However, this 
phenomenon also lent itself to qualitative analysis since illegal cartel activity is nuanced 
and influenced by the specifics around each individual occurrence indicating an 
interpretive approach to the research question.  Therefore, for a robust understanding of 
the phenomenon, qualitative methods were used to inform and add context to the 
quantitative findings at different levels and units of the analysis (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003) leading to a pragmatist approach.   
6.2 Quantitative Sample and Data Collection 
As the quantitative data collection and analysis formed the core component and method 
for my research, it is helpful to provide a description of the constructs, detailing how each 
was measured and indicating its data source.  Wherever possible, priority was given to 
aligning the data measurement with previous research on cartel activity.  Given that the 
dependent variable is dichotomous (either the illegal activity was committed or it was 
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not), the data involving the dependent variable of illegal cartel activity was analyzed 
using logistic regression (Cohen et al., 2003).  All other analyses employed OLS 
regression unless otherwise stipulated.  All data for interactions were mean centred. 
6.2.1 Illegal Cartel Activity 
I began by reviewing the proprietary dataset detailing illegal cartel activity.  Illegal cartel 
activity can be measured by observing whether the company committed illegal cartel 
activity or it did not.  In order to perform this type of analysis using my dataset, I 
included a number of observations from firms that were not convicted (or even 
suspected) of illegal cartel activity in order to be able to match them to firms who had 
been convicted of illegal cartel activity.  The matching technique paired firms according 
to both the timeframe within which the illegal cartel activity started and the type of firm 
that conducted the illegal activity.  The time frame within which the illegal activity began 
is an important matching criterion; as I am suggesting that there is a causal relationship 
between the independent variables and the commission of the illegal cartel activity it was 
important to show the time relationship.  The Connor database allowed for this 
comparison as it includes the start, end and duration of the illegal cartel activity.  All 
matching cases were for firms in existence at the time of the beginning of the illegal 
cartel activity.   
Secondly, all firms were matched with firms who, at the time period of the start of the 
original offense, were of similar size (Lehmberg, Rowe, White, & Phillips, 2009).  While 
size has been measured a number of ways including through total assets (Ornstein, 1972), 
for this research size was measured in net sales.   Since I am only dealing with American 
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firms, the matching firms were taken from the S&P 1500 universe of firms with no single 
firm used as a match more than once.  For a firm close in size to more than one 
observation, the next closest firm at the relative date was used.  This matching method is 
preferable to the matching method of Asch and Seneca (1975) which simply used a 
random sample of firms from the general population.  A paired samples t test was 
performed to ensure that the two matching firms did not significantly differ in size 
(Lehmberg et al., 2009);  the t test was not significant..   
To further understand any industry effects I have run statistical tests to determine how 
similar the portfolio of industries is between the illegal and legal datasets.  I used the 2 
digit SIC code for this analysis as this gives a somewhat broader measure of the 
similarity of industries.  The 3 and 4 digit codes were seen to be too parsimonious since 
each of these industry levels could be tainted by the illegal activity. 
I used cross tab analysis for this nominal data to assess the similarity of the portfolio of 2 
digit industries between the illegal and legal data.  I tested for the contingency co-
efficient which is a measure of the association based upon the Chi square.  The value 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no association between the row and column 
variables and values closer to 1 indicating a high degree of association between the 
variables. The contingency co-efficient for this data was 0.986 indicating a high degree of 
association. 
I also tested for the uncertainty co-efficient which measured the association that indicates 
the proportional reduction in error when values of one variable are used to predict values 
of the other variable.  In this case I found that the legal dataset reduces the error of the 
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illegal dataset by 79.2%, a favourable result indicating confidence in the similarity of the 
datasets. 
Finally, I tested the Lambda co-efficient which is a measure of association that reflects 
the proportional reduction in error when values of the independent variable are used to 
predict the values of the dependent variable.  A value of 1 means the independent 
variable perfectly predicts the dependent variable while a value of 0 indicates there is no 
predictive capacity of the independent variable vis à vis the dependent variable.  The 
analysis indicated a score of 0.648 which shows a favourable association between the 
legal and illegal datasets.  I am confident with this analysis that the association between 
the portfolio of the illegal and the legal industries is strong and that industry related 
issues with the analysis are not great. 
Table 2:  Legal/Illegal SIC Codes 
2 Digit Sic 
Code Industry Description Legal Illegal 
10 Metal Mining 0 1 
13 Oil and Gas 2 4 
20 Food and Kindred Products 12 9 
21 Tobacco Products 1 1 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 2 3 
25 Furniture 1 1 
26 Pulp and Paper 4 2 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 18 35 
29 Petroleum Products 3 8 
30 Rubber and Plastic Products 1 1 
32 Glass, Concrete , Stone Products 0 1 
33 Metal Manufacturing 5 2 
34 Metal Products 2 2 
35 Machinery 9 7 
36 Power and Electrical Products 8 6 
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37 Motor Vehicles 5 7 
38 Laboratory and Metering Devices 4 8 
40 Railroads 2 1 
42 Trucking warehousing and storage 2 1 
44 Water Transportation 2 3 
45 Air Transportation 7 7 
47 Transportation Services 1 1 
50 Wholesale Durable Goods 2 0 
51 Wholesale Non-Durable Goods 1 2 
52 Retail Building Materials 1 0 
53 Retail Department Stores 5 2 
56 Retail Apparel and Accessories 4 1 
57 Retail Home Furniture 1 0 
58 Retail Eating and Drinking 2 0 
59 Retail Misc. 1 0 
60 Commercial Banks 3 3 
61 Financial Services 2 0 
62 Security and Commodity Brokers 8 5 
63 Insurance 9 11 
64 Insurance Services 9 7 
73 Business Services 7 2 
75 Automotive Services 1 0 
78 Motion Picture and Related Services 0 1 
99 Other 1 3 
   Total 148 148 
 
This resulted in a final sample of 296 observations, where half were for firms that 
committed illegal activity and half were for firms that were not charged and convicted.  
The data were obtained through the Connor Database and the Compustat database.  There 
was difficulty in getting data for all of these observations, particularly those before 1990, 
which resulted in quantitative analysis being conducted on between 180 and 185 
observations depending upon available data. 
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6.2.2 Industry Concentration 
Historically, industry concentrations have been measured through concentration ratios, 
calculated as the four firm value of shipments (Asch & Seneca, 1975; Ornstein, 1972).  
This is the percentage of the total industry value of shipments held by the top four firms.  
A meta-analysis conducted by Datta and Narayanan (1989) concluded that concentration 
measured by four and eight firms’ market shares in an industry are appropriate.  I used 
industry concentration ratios at the four and eight firm level as compiled by the U.S. 
Census Bureau in 1987, 1992, 1997 or 2002, using data from the Census year before and 
closest to the year that the illegal cartel activity began.  The data regarding the start date 
of the cartel was obtained from the Connor database.  I have selected the closest census 
before the cartel began because the census afterward may be affected by the operation of 
the cartel itself.  Following the methodology proposed by Datta and Narayanan (1989), 
the analysis was run separately for both the four and eight firm concentration levels. 
6.2.3 Industry Profits 
Research in the antitrust area has utilized a number of different ways of measuring 
profits.  As examples, Ormstein (1972) used the ratio of net income after taxes as one of 
his measures of profit to equity while McKendal and Wagner (1997) used the five year 
average return on assets for the industry.  Interestingly, Asch and Seneca (1975) did not 
even detail how they measured profits or sales.  In my construct for industry profit I used 
the five year average of both the return on equity and return on assets, starting before the 
incidence of the illegal cartel activity. This data was then divided by the market average 
for these indices to produce a ratio.  The market average was the S&P 1500 universe of 
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companies.  Companies or industries that made up over 10% of the market were excluded 
from the average in order to not skew the results.   The ratios were summed to produce an 
index; according to Boyd, Gove and Hitt (2005), an index is a preferable form of 
measurement to a single measure.  This index was used in the analysis with the dependent 
variable.  The data used were taken from the Compustat database. 
6.2.4 Firm Profits 
Firm profits were measured in a similar way to industry profits; an index for firm profits 
was calculated using the five year average of return on assets and equity for the firm in 
question.  Similar to the determination of industry profits, this measure was compared to 
the average market return on equity and return on assets to produce a ratio.  The market 
average was calculated as described in section 6.2.3. Once again, these two ratios were 
summed to produce an index of firm profits which was used in the analysis with the 
dependent variable.  The data used were taken from the Compustat database.  
6.2.5 Munificence 
The determination of the level of munificence, and what should be included in the 
construct itself, has been calculated in a variety of ways in studies on illegal corporate 
activity.  Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) used the mean return on equity and sales for the 
preceding five years of the industry’s, firm’s and market’s performance to measure 
munificence. While the authors rejected the measure of a percentage change in profits 
and sales as less valid indicators, Dess and Beard (1984) found that growth in sales, price 
to cost margin, total employment, and number of establishments loaded on munificence.   
Other researchers in this area included different factors in their munificence construct.  
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Keats and Hitt (1988) used growth in net income and growth in operating income, 
Baucus and Near (1991) employed growth in industry value added and finally Goll and 
Rasheed (1997) measured munificence as the regression slope of the value of shipments.  
I adopted Keats and Hitt’s measurement by measuring munificence as the regression 
slope of the difference between industry sales and cost of goods sold (a rough estimate of 
net income) over a five year period before the incidence of illegal cartel activity.   I 
regressed the difference of sales from the cost of goods sold on time and use the 
regression slope from this OLS regression.  This data were taken from the Compustat 
database. 
6.2.6 Dynamism 
Dynamism, as a construct, has been considered in a number of different ways, some more 
robust and inclusive than others.  Dess and Beard (1984) found that the measures of 
instability of sales, price to cost margin, employment, and value added loaded on their 
measure of environmental instability whereas Keats and Hitt (1988) (using the name 
instability as opposed to dynamism) only looked at the instability of net sales and 
operating income over a five year period prior to the time frame in question. Baucus and 
Near (1991) measured complexity of a firm by the number of four digit businesses the 
firm was in.  I followed the measurement technique used by Keats and Hitt (1988) by 
taking the standard error of the regression slope co-efficient and dividing it by the mean 
value of the net sales and net incomes over a five year period.  These two measures were 
combined in an index for analysis with the dependent variable.  This data were available 
from the Compustat database 
 103 
 
6.2.7 Board Scanning 
Board scanning is a construct that has very rarely been dealt with empirically in the 
literature.  To inform this construct, I searched both the ProQuest ABI Global Research 
Database and the Web of Science Database on such topics as “board scanning”, “director 
scanning”, “board of directors scanning” and found only one article on this topic, a 1979 
study by Ritvo, Salipante and Notz (1979) that looked at board problem recognition and 
used board scanning as the independent variable.  Methodologically, they used a survey 
that was sent to hospital board members.  I then expanded the search to include the 
concept of corporate scanning more broadly.  This search was more fruitful, locating a 
number of articles which incorporated the CEO and the TMT rather than just scanning 
carried out by the board. This research stream relied upon a broader toolbox of methods 
to demonstrate the validity of the scanning construct including the survey method (Boyd 
& Fulk, 1996; Garg et al., 2003; Goll & Rasheed, 1997),  interviews (Daft, Sormunen, & 
Parks, 1988), case studies (Ngamkroeckjoti & Johri, 2000), and simulations (Hough & 
White, 2004). 
It has been suggested that the board scanning function is partially developed from the 
knowledge that a director obtains from their experience in general (Murphy & McIntyre, 
2007) and from serving on other boards in particular (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). The 
experience of individual directors and the fact they may serve on other boards indicates a 
superior scanning ability. A reasonable proxy for this ability is to determine whether the 
director is an outside or an inside director.  An outside director will arguably have a 
better scanning potential than an inside director as a result of a more intense immersion in 
the external environment.  
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In scanning the external environment and its attendant information processing 
requirements, a larger board has greater ability than a smaller board (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998); in general this also applies to the general monitoring function of the 
board (Petra & Dorata, 2008).   Furthermore, I assert that having more directors on the 
board will result in an enhanced scanning ability as each director brings with them the 
skill, time and effort to scan the environment and bring the information back to the 
organization.  This ability accumulates as the number of directors increases. Finally, the 
relative size of the firm will also affect the scanning effectiveness of the board.  The 
larger the firm the more overall scanning is required to achieve a given level of 
effectiveness. As the proportion of outside directors and the total number of directors are 
important when considering the board’s effectiveness in scanning the external 
environment, my measure for this construct was an index of the two measures.  As noted 
previously, an index provides better construct validity than single indicators, single ratios 
or discrete indicators (Boyd et al., 2005).  This index was compiled by adding the 
percentage of outside directors to the log of the number of directors, generating an index 
measure of between 0 and 2.5.  This data were obtained from the companies’ annual 
reports and the Compustat database. 
Given that board scanning is not a common variable, it was important to ensure that this 
conceptualization was appropriate. I developed face validity for board scanning by 
interviewing six current and former board members on their views of board external 
environmental scanning.  These board members represented both for-profit 
(manufacturing, consulting and financial services) and not-for-profit (economic 
development commissions and religious institutions) organizations.  The goal of these 
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interviews was to provide insight into the conceptualization of board scanning, ensuring 
that it was consistent with both theory and practice.  The interviews followed a semi-
structured format (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and were conducted by telephone.  I began by 
introducing the research topic and asked interviewees to describe their thoughts and 
experiences with board scanning.  I followed three main areas in the interviews:   
1.  How do board members scan the external environment for issues that may 
have some impact on the organization;  
2.  Does the size of the board have any impact on the effectiveness of the board’s 
scanning activities; and,  
3.  Does the percentage of outsiders affect the board’s effectiveness in scanning?   
All interviews were approximately thirty minutes long and followed the semi structured 
questions outlined in Appendix A.  The ethics approval is contained in Appendix B.  The 
individuals interviewed confirmed that the proportion of outside directors and the total 
numbers of directors are important when considering the board’s effectiveness in 
scanning the external environment.  Thus, the index I constructed was used as the 
indicator for board scanning.   
6.2.8 Complexity 
I included complexity as a control variable in the environmental analysis.  A more 
complex external environment requires greater information processing by the firm as 
there are significantly more inputs and/or outputs that each requires more complex and 
difficult resource acquisitions or output dispositions.  This relationship has been 
demonstrated in RDT research; Dess and Beard (1984) used environmental complexity as 
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an indicator of the amount of heterogeneity and therefore uncertainty that a manager 
would perceive in the environment.   
This concept was furthered through research by Keats and Hitt (1988:573) who 
introduced complexity in their study defining it as “heterogeneity and concentration of 
environmental elements”.  The construct of heterogeneity can be defined as the degree of 
similarity and diversity in the organization’s environment (Baucus & Near, 1991). Their 
underlying assumption in measuring complexity was that the environmental elements 
they chose to study would vary in their number, diversity and distribution and that this 
would affect the information processing requirements of the organization; the more 
complex the elements, the more complex the systems a firm would need to have in place 
to interpret the information.  Keats and Hitt (1988) speculated that a complex external 
environment placed a constraint on firm growth by requiring the organization to devote 
resources to internal operations to manage the complexity rather than externally focused 
activities such as acquiring competitively advantageous resources or reducing 
uncertainty.   
The more complex and uncertain an environment the more constraints will be placed on 
the resources in the environment.  A firm will seek to control the constraints on the 
resources in the environment in order to reduce the uncertainty emanating from that 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Illegal cartel activity allows a firm to increase 
its level of control over its environment by controlling the interdependency of the firm 
with its competitors thereby removing one of the constraints on revenues.  Therefore, at 
high levels of environmental complexity one would expect that there would be an 
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increased incidence of illegal cartel activity as firms attempt to reduce the level of 
uncertainty in their external environment.   
The construct of complexity (which includes the idea of heterogeneity) was created by 
Dess and Beard (1984).   Complexity has been measured in several ways in the literature 
depending on the phenomenon of interest.  This has included constructing measures of 
technical complexity by measuring the percentage of scientists and engineers in an 
industry’s workforce and the diversity of product categories (Sharfman, Dean, Dess, & 
Rasheed, 1991), counting the number of competitors faced and the number of geographic 
markets (Miller & Chen, 1996), and calculating the average number of employees per 
firm (Jarley, Fiorito, & Delaney, 1997).   
The measurement of complexity or heterogeneity is closely aligned with that of industry 
concentration; complexity can be measured as the level of dispersion within an industry.  
The less concentrated the industry, the more firms there will be and the more 
heterogeneous the market place.  I used the market share of the 50 largest firms in the 
industry to measure complexity and heterogeneity.  The lower the percentage of market 
control that these 50 firms had, the more complex the industry. To obtain the measure of 
complexity, I examined data from the U.S. Census Bureau in 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 
and used whichever year’s data fell closest to, yet was before, the year that the illegal 
corporate activity commenced. 
6.2.9 CEO Control 
The CEO’s main responsibility is to direct the company in the best interests of the 
shareholders, largely considered to be achieving the strongest possible long-term return 
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on their investment.  To align the CEO with the long-term goals of the shareholders 
(through the board of directors), successful behaviourally directed controls will be those 
with a long-term perspective.  Traditionally, they have included such things as salary and 
fixed bonuses. 
Output controls are those controls that use incentives to focus the CEO’s attention on 
short-term results (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993; Ordóñez et al., 2009); therefore, there 
are also elements of the CEO’s compensation that are focussed on short-term earnings 
expectations and include elements such as stocks and stock options (Zahra et al., 2005).   
Output controls are those on which the CEO has less influence and they vary from year to 
year; the CEO will attempt to avoid output controls in order to reduce their risk. Davila 
and Penalva (2006) propose that the variability in a CEO’s total compensation from year 
to year is primarily due to variations in the compensation that are dependent upon output 
controls such as earnings performance.   
To measure behavioural controls and output controls, I took the residuals of the 
regression of total CEO compensation over the five years before the start of the illegal 
cartel activity and considered them to indicate a measure of variation of CEO 
compensation over and above base pay.  This fluctuation over and above base pay is 
predicated upon the attainment of output measures specified in the compensation plan.  
Low variation is either an indication of goal achievement and hence some measure of 
certainty while high variation is an indication of the difficulty in achieving the goals of 
the organization.  The residuals were the variation in the CEO’s compensation which I 
argue are tied to short-term incentives as they change and vest from year to year.  This 
was taken as the sum of the squares from the mean of the five year series of 
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compensation data.  The control ratio was the average of the residuals over this five year 
period divided by the average total CEO compensation for the same five year period.  
The higher the variability in CEO compensation and hence the output portion of the CEO 
control, the higher the control ratio.  The lower the variability of the CEO compensation, 
the lower the output control ratio and the more behaviorally based I considered the 
control ratio to be.  This information was available from the Compustat database. 
6.2.10 Board Control 
Board control was measured in a similar fashion to the CEO control; it was calculated by 
determining the total compensation of the board members as well as the residuals of their 
total compensation over the five year period prior to the illegal cartel activity.  The ratio 
of the residuals to the total compensation determined the control ratio of the board.  
Board compensation data were available from the Compustat database.  
6.2.11 Director Independence 
Directors were considered independent (an outsider) if they did not hold a paid role inside 
the firm.  If the information was available to determine affiliated directors, those usually 
being directors from professional organizations such as accountancy firms and legal 
firms, then they were coded as inside directors.  It was a binary construct; an individual 
was either an independent board member or not.  This measure was a ratio of the number 
of independent directors as a fraction of the whole board. This information was available 
from the annual reports of the companies.   
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6.2.12 Statistical Tests 
It was important to ensure that the variables being tested in this thesis were subjected to 
tests that ensured statistical rigour.  To test for discriminant validity, Variance Inflation 
Factors were used for all independent variables put forward in this thesis (Bagozzi, Yi, & 
Phillips, 1991).  In addition, skewness and kurtosis were checked for every continuous 
variable.  If the skewness was greater than two or the kurtosis greater than seven, then 
windsorization (Ferguson, 1961) was used on the data to lower the skewness or kurtosis 
values.  While other statistical diagnostics are more challenging in logistic regressions 
than they are in OLS regression, the measurement of deviance residuals (as opposed to 
the normal distribution of residuals as seen in OLS) and the identification of outliers 
through graphs were used as recommended in the literature (Cohen et al., 2003).  
6.3 Qualitative Sample and Data Collection 
6.3.1 Qualitative Methodology 
Qualitative data can be used to provide for a greater depth of understanding and holistic 
explanation of the phenomenon in question and help answer the research question in a 
more robust way (Sheth & Babiak, 2010).  Qualitative research is well accepted in the 
study of social sciences and is fundamentally interpretive in nature; the researcher draws 
upon the data to make an interpretation in pursuit of an answer to the research question 
(Creswell, 2003).   
I planned the qualitative research design in terms of both its methodology and sample in 
order to increase the chance of this analysis providing valuable detail and texture to the 
research question.  For my research, the qualitative research included conducting 10 
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semi-structured interviews with international experts in the area of illegal cartel activity. I 
took a realist approach, comparing the interview data obtained from each individual with 
responses elicited from other interviewees, as well as eventually linking the qualitative 
data directly to the constructs used in the quantitative data analysis.  The ethics approval 
is provided in Appendix B and the list of semi-structured interview questions for the 
attorneys is set out in Appendix C. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with primarily (8) plaintiff side (those attorneys 
representing the consumers in these lawsuits as opposed to the companies committing the 
illegal cartel activities) class action attorneys involved in prosecuting illegal cartel 
activity and two attorneys who conduct defense side work on behalf of corporations and 
individuals.  The initial section of the interview was unstructured to ascertain their 
general views on the causes (including environmental and organizational) underlying 
why firms engage in illegal cartel activity.  I then obtained the attorneys’ opinions and 
reactions to the various constructs of the model I proposed and queried them as to 
whether they believed there was a causal effect of the antecedents. 
The interviews, which averaged over one hour in length, all took place by telephone and 
were digitally recorded and then transcribed.   The interpretation process began once the 
data had been coded.  Unlike a strictly qualitative method, the subordinate qualitative 
method used for this research did not seek to gather data until the point of saturation.  
Rather, the data was gathered then interpreted in light of the primary quantitative method.  
As described by Morse and Niehaus (2009), the qualitative data can be used to confirm 
the quantitative analysis or to describe or explain it. 
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The value of the qualitative approach was that it provided for an enriched perspective of 
illegal cartel activity based upon a sample of many cases that each attorney had 
participated in.  Additionally, while my initial quantitative sample (before including my 
matching firms) only included cases where there had been a conviction, the qualitative 
sample included cases where there was not a conviction but may have been a settlement 
and ongoing cases where there is not yet a resolution.  Furthermore, the qualitative 
method was able to touch upon relationships among the antecedents or to other 
antecedents that were not captured by the current model. 
The point of interaction between the qualitative and quantitative sections occurred when 
the findings of the qualitative method were integrated with the findings of the core 
quantitative method.  The qualitative findings either supported or refuted the quantitative 
findings, and resolved any ambiguity inherent in the quantitative findings.  This allowed 
me to present research findings that are more compelling and informed than had I 
undertaken either quantitative or qualitative methods alone. 
6.3.2 Qualitative Sample 
The qualitative sample was taken from the ranks of class action attorneys that specialize 
primarily in the plaintiff side of price fixing cartel lawsuits although some of the 
attorneys did have defense experience as well.  Attorneys were chosen as their views on 
the overall phenomenon are extremely well informed and encompass the different levels 
of analysis.  Class action attorneys have a vested interest in understanding as much of the 
phenomenon as possible as they are financially rewarded for utilizing this information on 
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behalf of their clients.  Their clients are usually the customers that buy the products from 
the companies or are the alleged transgressors themselves. 
The convenience sample for the qualitative research included senior, experienced class 
action plaintiff side attorneys primarily practicing in the United States and Canada.  My 
contact with these attorneys was initially through a Canadian class action plaintiff side 
attorney who has been involved in every such case in Canada and is a board member of 
the American Antitrust Institute.  The American Antitrust Institute is an independent, 
Washington-based, not-for-profit education, research and advocacy organization that is 
supportive of an increased role for competition in the American and world economy.  The 
Canadian attorney made the introductions on my behalf to the top U.S. attorneys in order 
to facilitate my interviews.  I contacted 20 lawyers which resulted in 10 interviews being 
conducted with 10 different lawyers based on the timeframes for this research.  This was 
an international sample as the lawyers were located in the United States (Washington, 
D.C., New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco) and Canada (Toronto and Ottawa).       
6.3.3 Class Actions and Class Action Attorneys 
From my own knowledge and experience as a previously practicing (and still licensed) 
attorney who has conducted trials as both plaintiff and defence counsel, has advised 
corporations regarding anticompetitive and price fixing matters, and has conducted 
research into hundreds of cases, class action plaintiff lawyers are extremely well 
informed about all relevant details of why a particular cartel formed, conducted 
operations and then ended.  These attorneys spend, either themselves or through their 
junior and associate lawyers, law clerks and various experts, thousands of hours of 
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research time combing through literally tens of thousands of documents related to cartels. 
They are assisted by the legal obligation of the allegedly offending organizations to 
disclose this information, in order to understand who did what, when and why regarding 
these illegal cartels.   
In the process of trying to prove that organizations joined cartels and set out to engage in 
illegal cartel activity, plaintiffs’ attorneys are aided by the legal system.  Once they can 
establish that there is a class of persons allegedly harmed by the defendant(s) a number of 
legal devices come into play.  The most crucial of these devices is the discovery process 
which is made up of documentary discovery and oral examinations or depositions.  In 
documentary discovery both sides have to produce for the other side all of the documents 
in their possession that may be relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.  The 
number of documents that are produced is usually in the tens of thousands and in larger 
cases it is not unusual for it to be in the hundreds of thousands.  These documents are all 
categorized on CDs for use and ease of searching.  In the oral discovery or deposition 
each side must produce a person or several persons who can represent the organization 
and answer questions on its conduct and its documentation.  Again, these oral 
examinations go on for at least tens and often hundreds of hours.  In short, the discovery 
process is long, extensive, very expensive, and fully explores the antecedents of illegal 
cartel activity.  It is through this process, the gathering and review of written and oral 
depositions that plaintiffs’ attorneys gather the evidence they need to bring the case to 
trial and gain the depth of insight which will inform this thesis. 
The attorneys that represent the plaintiffs are highly educated, skilled and experienced in 
the area of illegal cartel activity.  Over the years, as the number of similar cases 
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conducted by the attorney increases, they learn more about how, when and why cartels 
come into existence, persist and eventually are ended.  Thus, class action attorneys are 
ideally suited to provide general information based upon specific cases about the 
antecedents to illegal cartel activity.  It is by interviewing these attorneys that I gained 
valuable insight into the myriad of forces that create and sustain the commission of illegal 
cartel activity by organizations. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of my analysis on a hypothesis by hypothesis basis for 
the sake of clarity.  As outlined in Chapter 6, the analysis utilized historical economic and 
compensation data using logistic and linear regression techniques.  First-person 
interviews were conducted with various class action attorneys in North America who are 
experts on cartel activity.  
All of the quantitative analysis used standard logistic regression techniques except where 
noted.  For each of the hypotheses, I have first outlined the quantitative results, followed 
by the qualitative findings.  For the environmental variables, namely industry 
concentration, industry profitability, firm profitability, munificence, and dynamism, I 
analysed the data in three ways in order to ensure robustness of the results.  Since these 
environmental variables all are theorized to be moderated by board scanning, I first 
regressed the independent environmental variable on the dependent variable (illegal cartel 
activity) moderated by the moderator (board scanning); all results are presented in Tables 
4A-E.  I then repeated this analysis and added in all of the other environmental 
independent variables as control variables as well as the complexity variable; the results 
of this analysis are contained in Tables 5A-E.  Finally, I regressed all of the 
environmental independent variables as moderated by board scanning on illegal activity 
while including all of the other environmental independent variables as controls as well 
as their interaction terms with the board scanning variable; these results are set out in 
Table 8. 
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The second part of my analysis examined the relationship between board and CEO 
control and illegal cartel activity.  I conducted standard linear regression where required, 
logistic regression when testing against binary variables (illegal cartel activity) and a 
three step process to test the mediation effect of CEO control on the relationship between 
board control and illegal corporate activity.  The results are presented in Table12.  
The qualitative analysis was designed to allow for an exploration of each of the 
hypothesized relationships that were tested in the quantitative analysis.  Interviewees 
were asked for their insight based upon extensive knowledge of illegal cartel activity; in 
many of the cases they were able to render their opinions and insights on these 
relationships.  Throughout the results section I incorporate the qualitative data on a 
hypothesis by hypothesis basis.  I begin by detailing, for each hypothesis, the 
observations of the attorneys on the underlying direct relationship between the 
independent variable and illegal cartel activity as their views are important to the 
theoretical validity of the concepts being tested.   
While conducting interviews, I found eliciting comments on the moderating effect of 
board scanning was more effective when it followed a conversation about direct effects.  
However, due to the nature of the interview process there was necessarily overlap in 
some of the responses that the attorneys gave to my questions; I have noted where this 
occurred but found it to be particularly valid in the responses regarding the board 
scanning moderator.  As a result, in reporting on the qualitative data obtained regarding 
the scanning moderator, I include all of the comments from the attorneys in one section, 
directly following the quantitative and qualitative reporting of results for Hypothesis 1.  
As the comments of the attorneys on board scanning hold equally for all of the 
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hypotheses, I only included them once, up front, to avoid unnecessary repetition.  I have 
also included a sample of additional comments in Appendix D (environmental variables) 
and E (internal control variables). 
I now present the results of my analysis.  Prior to running the analysis and in order to 
ensure statistical rigour, I identified outliers through graphs (Cohen et al., 2003) and 
tested for skewness and kurtosis.  If the skewness was greater than two or the kurtosis 
greater than seven, then windsorization (Ferguson, 1961) was used on the data to lower 
the skewness or kurtosis values.  In addition, where appropriate, I tested variance 
inflation factors.   All variance inflation factors were calculated using OLS models and 
did not indicate that multicollinearity was a concern (Neter, Wasserman, Kunter, & Li, 
1996).  Descriptive statistics for the variables (before windsorization) used in the 
environmental hypotheses (1-5) are presented in Table 3, the description of what portion 
of N came from those firms that participated in illegal activity versus those others is 
contained in Table 4,  and their correlation matrix is provided in Table 5.  The different 
Ns resulted from the ability to get data in certain years for certain variables.  While the N 
is close in most cases there were some discrepancies due to data collection issues in 
Compustat.  I do not believe these discrepancies have affected the analysis or results. 
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables used in the control 
hypotheses (6-10) are provided in Table 8 and the description of the proportion of N 
derived from illegal cartel firms versus the matching firms is contained in Table 11. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Environmental Hypotheses (1-5) 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Illegal Cartel 
Activity 
296 0.50 0.50 0 1.00 
Industry 
Concentration 
185 38.50 21.40 3.50 100 
Industry 
Profits 
184 0.99 0.87 -4.38 2.03 
Firm Profits 183 1.23 3.49 -37.63 15.76 
Munificence 184 0.07 0.15 -0.29 0.92 
Dynamism 184 0.07 0.15 -0.16 0.92 
Board 
Scanning 
183 -0.001 0.28 -0.71 0.45 
Complexity/ 
Heterogeneity 
187 79.30 21.17 20.70 100 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of N for Each Variable (Illegal vs. Legal) 
 Illegal  Legal 
Illegal Cartel  Activity 148 148 
Industry Concentration 
(both at the 4 and 8 level) 
94 91 
Industry Profits 93 91 
Firm Profits 92 91 
Munificence 93 91 
Dynamism 93 91 
Board Scanning 92 90 
Complexity 93 94 
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Table 5:  Correlation Matrix for Environmental Hypotheses (1-5) 
 Illegal 
Cartel 
Activity 
Industry 
Concentration
Industry 
Profits 
Firm 
Profits 
Munificence Dynamism Board 
Scanning 
Complexity/ 
Heterogeneity 
Illegal Cartel 
Activity 
1.00        
Industry 
Concentration 
-0.10 1.00       
Industry 
Profits 
-0.49** -0.15* 1.00      
Firm Profits -0.15* 0.07 0.41* 1.00     
Munificence -0.08 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 1.00    
Dynamism 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 1.00   
Board 
Scanning 
-0.18* 0.07 0.18* -0.01 -0.04 -0.17* 1.00  
Complexity/ 
Heterogeneity 
0.01 0.69* 0.06 0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.09 1.00 
Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
. 
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7.1  Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 suggested a relationship between industry concentration and illegal activity, 
moderated by the scanning variable.  To review: 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of industry concentration on illegal cartel activity is 
moderated by the amount of board scanning of the external environment such 
that for a given level of industry concentration, less scanning by a board will 
result in a greater probability of illegal cartel activity. 
7.1.1 Industry Concentration - Straight Interaction 
The results from the logistic regression with no control variables indicate that the 
hypothesis is supported (β=-0.90; p<0.05).  The R2 (Cox and Snell, used throughout for 
logistic regression) is only 0.06 indicating a minimal effect. The specifics of this analysis 
can be found in Table 6A.  Throughout the analysis, industry concentration was measured 
and reported using the four firm concentrations.  As a robustness check I also tested using 
the eight firm concentrations without any change in the results. 
Table 6A: Industry Concentration x Scanning (Hypothesis 1) 
 
 β (S.E.)
Industry Concentration -0.01 (0.01)
Board Scanning -2.02 (0.78)**
Industry Concentration x Scanning -0.09 (0.05)
N = 183, χ2 = 10.80, p<0.01, R2 = 0.06 Cox and Snell, 0.08 Nagelkerke 
 Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7.1.2 Industry Concentration - Interaction with Environmental Controls  
I then added the other environmental independent variables into the analysis as control 
variables and again tested the hypothesis.  The results indicate no significant result or 
support (Table 7A).  Model 1 in Table 7A is just the control variable, Model 2 is the 
control variable with all the independent variables and Model 3 adds in the interaction 
term.  This format will be used throughout the balance of Hypothesis 1-5. 
Table 7A:  Industry Concentration x Scanning with Controls (Hypothesis 1) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.53 (0.15) -4.39 (0.73)*** -5.63 (1.03)** 
Complexity 0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Conc.  -0.17 (0.02) -0.19 (0.17) 
Industry Profits  -1.52 (0.52)** -1.49 (0.53)** 
Firm Profits  -0.06 (0.27) -0.14 (0.30) 
Munificence  -0.98 (1.86) -0.85 (1.85) 
Dynamism  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Scanning  -2.03 (1.12) Ϯ -2.02 (0.78)** 
Industry Concentration x 
Scanning 
  0.07 (0.08) 
χ2 0.29 132.49*** 133.42*** 
Cox & Snell 0.00 0.51 0.52 
Nagelkerke 0.00 0.69 0.70 
N = 183, Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
7.1.3 Industry Concentration - Interaction with Environmental Controls and 
Interactions 
 
Likewise, when the interactions terms of all the independent environmental variables 
were added into the equation, I found no significant result for the interaction of industry 
concentration and board scanning (Table 8). 
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Table 8:  All Variables x Scanning (Hypotheses 1-5) 
 
    β (S.E.) Wald 
Industry Concentration  -0.02 (0.02)  0.61 
Industry Profits -2.88 (0.73) 15.69*** 
Firm Profits  0.12 (0.35)  0.13 
Munificence  -0.78 (2.43)  0.10 
Dynamism -0.01 (0.00) 33.28*** 
Board Scanning  -.7.92 (3.19)  6.16* 
Industry Concentration x 
Scanning 
 0.15 (0.15)  1.11 
Industry Profits x 
Scanning 
-8.30 (2.57) 10.41*** 
Firm Profits x Scanning  -4.80 (1.51)  0.10 
Munificence x Scanning  4.87 (13.04)  0.14 
Dynamism x Scanning -0.01 (0.00) 13.43*** 
Complexity/Heterogeneity  0.02 (0.02)   1.46 
N = 183, χ2 =166.07, p<0.001, R2 = 0.60 Cox and Snell, 0.80 Nagelkerke 
 Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
For robustness I also tested all the direct effects with the complexity control, set out 
below in Table 9. 
Table 9:  Direct Effects of Environmental Variables 
 
  β (S.E.) Wald 
Industry Concentration -0.02 (0.02) 1.15 
Industry Profits -1.52** (0.50) 9.23** 
Firm Profits -0.03 (0.24) 0.02 
Munificence -1.26 (1.83) 0.47 
Dynamism 0.001*** (0.00) 31.51*** 
Complexity/Heterogeneity  0.02 (0.02)   1.46 
N = 183, χ2 = 128.772, p<0.001, R2 = 0.51 Cox and Snell, 0.68 Nagelkerke 
Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7.1.4 Industry Concentration - Qualitative Analysis 
The class action cartel lawyers interviewed were supportive of Hypothesis 1.  They all 
agreed that a greater industry concentration leads to an increase in illegal activity and that 
the moderating effect of increased scanning would decrease the amount of illegal activity.  
When asked about the direct effect of high industry concentration and illegal cartel 
activity, a seasoned attorney from New York with experience involving cases in the 
accounting industry remarked: 
“I am finding…the higher the concentration, the more apt there is to be 
illegal activity.”   
 
 
This point was echoed by a Toronto attorney: 
“The fewer players there are, the easier it is to establish a cartel and the 
easier it is to monitor compliance with the cartel.”   
 
Thus, all (10 out of 10)  attorneys were in agreement that higher industry concentrations 
lead to higher levels of illegal activity although they suggested that a single concentration 
measure may not have enough granularity to properly answer this question.  Therefore, 
there is support for Hypothesis 1 (without control variables) and the general opinion of 
the attorneys in the qualitative results. 
I will now examine the qualitative data regarding the moderator variable, board scanning. 
7.1.5 Industry Concentration - Qualitative Analysis regarding Board Scanning 
The issue of the moderating impact of the board scanning variable was discussed by each 
of the interviewees.  It is important to note that the scanning variable was more likely to 
be described by the interviewees as “board oversight”.  Also, none of the attorneys was 
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aware of any instances where the board of an organization shut down an illegal cartel and 
they were quick to remark that this is not an action they (the interviewees) would usually 
be privy to.  However, based upon their experience they still felt comfortable 
commenting on the dynamics between the board and the conduct of illegal activity.  The 
comments and results of my discussions with the attorneys on scanning are, unless noted, 
equally applicable to all of the environmental hypotheses (1-5) and will be dealt with here 
in totality rather than repeating them in the reporting of subsequent hypotheses. 
The general theme of the interviews on board scanning was articulated by an attorney in 
New York City (New York): 
“The board plays an oversight and generally a tone setting role with the 
company.  I mean if the board says they are and want all their people to 
be above board, this will act in some way as a deterrent to people acting 
illegally.” 
 
A number of the attorneys interviewed also do consulting work with companies on how 
to avoid illegal cartel activity; this education starts at the board level as suggested by an 
attorney in the United States.3   
A concept upon which almost all of the interviewees could agree was that aside from the 
general compliance regime, the board would usually have little knowledge as to the exact 
goings on within the corporation, especially with respect to illegal cartel activity.  While 
there was general agreement that higher levels of independent board members increased 
the likelihood of catching illegal activity as it was occurring or being contemplated, they 
                                                            
3 In some instances, I have not identified attorneys specifically by city in order to protect their identity. 
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believed this relationship to be minor. Therefore, the moderating effect of scanning was 
not considered by them to be a strong influencer.  In fact, they believed that the impetus 
outlined in the control section of the thesis would far outweigh the impact that a board 
position or threat would have on the actions of executives and managers.  As noted by 
one former U.S. prosecutor, who is now defense counsel: 
“The board meets a few times a year and talks about strategy and how to 
pay the CEO. Their knowledge of and impact on the day to day goings on 
of the company are minimal.  I think the board make up you speak of [the 
components of the scanning variable] would have some marginal impact 
but things such as the other relationships you talk of [environmental 
forces] are much more relevant. That has been my experience anyways.” 
A U.S. defense attorney specifically referenced the difference of attitude regarding 
compliance held by inside and outside directors: 
“In my experience dealing with boards and compliance issues, outside 
directors seem to be more sensitive to this issue and push for stricter 
compliance throughout the company. In addition, because they do not 
know the day to day operations they are more comfortable with across the 
board compliance programs to protect themselves and the company, 
Insiders have more confidence in the compliance of day to day operations 
so do not feel additional compliance measures are needed.”   
 
In general, 8 out of 10 of the attorneys felt that the scanning variable was seen to offer 
some, albeit weak, moderating effect on the environmental factors being analysed.  As 
the opinions expressed by these attorneys applied to the moderating effect on all of the 
environmental hypotheses (Hypotheses 1-5), the reporting that follows of the insights 
from the qualitative comments only detail the impact of the direct effects of the 
environmental variables on illegal activity.  It should be assumed as per the attorneys 
interviewed, that the moderating effect of board scanning would be minor and in the 
direction hypothesized.   
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7.2  Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 explored the relationship between illegal activity and industry profitability.  
I predicted: 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of relative industry profitability on illegal cartel 
activity is moderated by the amount of board scanning of the external 
environment such that for a given level of relative industry profitability, less 
scanning by a board will result in a greater probability of illegal cartel activity. 
7.2.1 Industry Profits - Straight Interaction 
In analysing this relationship using just the independent variable and the interaction term 
of board scanning, I found strong support in the anticipated direction (β=-5.43; p<0.001) 
and a large R2 of 0.35 indicating a medium effect (Table 6B and Figure 2).  The scanning 
line may look linear but in fact is non-linear; this is a function of the graphing program 
that was used. 
Table 6B: Industry Profits x Scanning (Hypothesis 2) 
 
   β (S.E.)
Industry Profits -2.69 (0.46)***
Board Scanning -1.06 (0.95)
Industry Profits  x Scanning -5.43 (1.41)***
N = 183, χ2 = 78.23, p<.001, R2 = 0.35 Cox and Snell, 0.47 Nagelkerke 
 Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 2:  Interaction Effects of Industry Profits x Scanning (Hypothesis 2) 
 
 
 
7.2.2  Industry Profits - Interaction with Environmental Controls 
Likewise, when the other environmental independent variables were added in as control 
variables the support was very strong for the interaction term (β =-14.41; p<0.001) and 
the model had an R2 of 0.56 (Table 7B).   
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Table 7B:  Industry Profits x Scanning with Controls (Hypothesis 2) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.53 (0.15) -4.39 (0.73)*** -5.63 (1.03)** 
Complexity 0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Concentration  -0.17 (.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Profits  -1.52 (0.52)** -2.62 (0.63)*** 
Firm Profits  -0.06 (.27) -0.23 (0.17) 
Munificence  -0.98 (1.86) -1.32 (2.02) 
Dynamism  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Scanning  -2.03 (1.12) Ϯ -2.02 (0.78)** 
Industry Profits x 
Scanning 
  -14.41 (1.95)*** 
χ2 0.29 132.49*** 146.50*** 
Cox & Snell 0.00 0.51 0.56 
Nagelkerke 0.00 0.69 0.74 
N = 183, Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
7.2.3  Industry Profits - Interaction with Environment Controls and Interactions 
Finally, when all of the interaction terms were added the support remained strong for the 
interaction between industry profits and board scanning (β=-5.43; p<0.001) (Table 8).   
From a quantitative perspective, this hypothesis found strong support in the data. 
7.2.4  Industry Profits - Qualitative Analysis 
There was a clear consensus from the interviewees that declining industry profits are a 
strong precursor to illegal cartel activity.  It was a common theme that maintaining profits 
seemed to be of greater importance than increasing profits.  This was articulated by a 
New York attorney: 
“Falling prices for example, are very often what leads to anticompetitive 
activity.  There can be a lot of competition that leads to a fall in prices 
then they [companies] begin to get together to try to stem the tide.  Often, 
what has induced the falling price is foreign competition, such as the 
Chinese coming in with very cheap goods that are almost of good quality.  
Other companies then get together to try to stop the falling prices.  You’d 
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see stable prices then, rather than prices zooming up as reflective of cartel 
activities.” 
The interviewees also mentioned that capacity utilization agreements are a special form 
of illegal cartel activity that have the effect of increasing or at least maintaining industry 
profits at a level otherwise not reflective of the competitive environment. This type of 
industry profit manipulation was commented on by an attorney in San Francisco:  
“Well, what I find is that there are capacity utilization agreements where 
a company has excess capacity but chooses not to use it and keep this 
supply tight. If you look at a company’s capacity utilization, you’ll often 
find implicit agreements not to produce more and undercut the price that 
would in essence keep the profits up.  So capacity utilization is a very 
useful area to look at.”  
 
The discussion surrounding industry profits was one the attorneys were interested in and 
had many opinions.  This discussion also provided a vehicle to discuss the general 
prevailing view of the causes of illegal cartel activity from an industry perspective.   
The interviews provided support (10 out of 10 attorneys) for the hypothesis that lower 
industry profitability was an important precursor to illegal cartel activity.  It was brought 
out by the attorneys that there are nuances to this hypothesis, most notably that 
downward pressures on profits are a powerful impetus for illegal cartel activity.  In 
addition, it is often a function of the industry; increased foreign competition, barriers to 
entry and capital utilization can be an impetus for this illegal activity.  The attorneys 
agreed that in general, better board scanning (as previously indicated) would also 
influence this relationship.  All in all there was strong qualitative as well as quantitative 
support for this hypothesis. 
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7.3 Hypothesis 3 
While Hypothesis 3 was similar to Hypothesis 2, it changed the level of analysis from the 
industry to the firm, testing for the moderating effect of board scanning on firm 
profitability.  I suggested: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of relative firm profitability on illegal antitrust activity 
is moderated by the amount of board scanning of the internal environment such 
that for a given level of relative firm profitability, less scanning by a board will 
result in a greater probability of illegal cartel activity. 
7.3.1 Firm Profits - Straight Interaction 
I found support (β=-.0.74; p<0.10) for this hypothesis when including just the interaction 
term and the independent variable in the regression analysis (Table 6C).  However, there 
was a small R2 of 0.08. 
Table 6C:  Firm Profits x Scanning (Hypothesis 3) 
 
   β (S.E.) 
Firm Profits -0.40 (0.16)*
Scanning -1.51 (0.71)*
Firm Profits x Scanning -0.74 (0.43)Ϯ
N = 183, χ2 = 15.56, p<0.001, R2 = 0.08 Cox and Snell, 0.11 Nagelkerke 
 Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7.3.2 Firm Profits - Interaction with Environmental Controls  
There was no significant statistical support when the independent environmental 
variables were added into the analysis (Table 7C). 
Table 7C:  Firm Profits x Scanning with Controls (Hypothesis 3) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.53 (0.15) -4.39 (0.73)*** -5.63 (1.03)** 
Complexity 0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Concentration  -0.17 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Profits  -1.52 (0.52)** -1.42 (0.54)** 
Firm Profits  -0.06 (0.27) -0.12 (0.29) 
Munificence  -0.98 (1.86) -1.15 (1.88) 
Dynamism  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Scanning  -2.03 (1.12)Ϯ -1.93 (1.14)Ϯ 
Firm Profits x Scanning   -0.88 (1.06) 
χ2 0.29 132.49*** 133.15*** 
Cox & Snell 0.00 0.51 0.52 
Nagelkerke 0.00 0.69 0.70 
N = 183, Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
7.3.3 Firm Profits - Interaction with Environmental Controls and Interactions 
There was no significant statistical support when the independent environmental 
variables and their interaction terms were included (Table 8). 
7.3.4 Firm Profits - Qualitative Analysis 
The attorneys strongly agreed (all 10 attorneys) with the proposition that a firm’s profits 
impacted whether organizations undertook illegal activity and suggested it was 
sometimes difficult to separate the influence of company profits and industry profits.  
This included noting a connection between the industry cycle and overall profitability 
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which influences the profitability potential of companies.  A New York attorney spoke to 
this relationship: 
“When the economy tightens up, the companies do not have the available 
capital at their disposal, but, the pressures for growth and positive 
numbers are still there and that’s where basically middle to lower 
management and the sort of the frontline sales folks gets squeezed to 
generate some returns and that’s when the cartel activity takes place.”   
 
For an organization to become involved in a cartel, the first step is for an organization to 
feel the need to participate in the cartel based upon the organization’s own profits.  The 
industry level of analysis recognizes the success they have in forming a cartel.   
Most of the commentary from the attorneys related to the fact that company profit level 
pressure would lead to the desire to maintain or increase the profits, which in turn would 
lead to cartel activity.  An attorney from Ottawa suggested a causal chain: 
“I think it is probably to make their numbers better, first of all at the 
divisional level or product line level and particularly if they are usually 
under environmental business pressures.  As circumstance becomes 
important, I think it increases motivations to try to preserve profits to 
avoid erosion and things like that, that can lead to price fixing.” 
 
The pressure to improve a company’s profit margin may have company specific drivers, 
such as M&As as outlined by this New York attorney who discussed a company that 
manufactured filters: 
“In the filters industry, the allegation was that one of the major players in 
the field was just taken over by a conglomerate, and the newly installed 
chief of the filters division said that our parent needs profit margins to be 
higher than they are currently, and so find out from XYZ [another 
company in the industry] where their pricing is going.  Our new parent 
wanted price increases; we haven’t had a price increase in this market in 
10 years, and the last time we did (in 1996) all of us in the industry ended 
up at the same market shares at lower prices, because nobody worked 
together. Let’s go out there together, that’s what allegedly was said.” 
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The attorneys also had opinions regarding the internal corporate mechanics that 
motivated specific functions within the corporation to pursue illegal cartel activity.  A 
Washington, D.C. attorney stated that these internal mechanics may not be so clear:  
“Sales people reaching out to their competitors to make certain 
commissions stay high, I can see that.  But I don’t know much about that 
as being the inducement at the top to do that.  Sure it’s in the back of their 
mind, when profit falls because of excess of competition so to speak, that 
they lose their jobs.”  
 
There is clearly a connection between individual corporate profitability (as opposed to 
industry) and illegal cartel activity whether driven by M&A activity or macro business 
cycles.  Corporate profitability is an initial motivation to pursue this kind of activity, 
which is itself part of a general industry phenomena which provides the environment for 
a cartel to take shape.  The general consensus from the attorneys interviewed provides 
qualified support for the hypothesis.  Therefore, this hypothesis is supported to some 
degree by both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
7.4  Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 looked at the relationship between munificence and illegal activity while 
moderated by board scanning. In particular: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of munificence on illegal cartel activity is moderated 
by the amount of board scanning of the external environment such that for a 
given level of munificence, less scanning by a board will result in a greater 
probability of illegal cartel activity. 
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7.4.1 Munificence - Straight Interaction 
The interaction between munificence and board scanning presented no significant result 
when testing just the interaction term (Table 6D). 
Table 6D:  Munificence x Scanning (Hypothesis 4) 
 
   β (S.E.) Wald 
Munificence -0.94 (1.13) 0.69 
Board Scanning -1.60 (0.72) 5.03* 
Munificence x Scanning 3.91 (6.33) 0.38 
N = 183, χ2 = 6.92, p<0.10, R2 = 0.04 Cox and Snell, 0.05 Nagelkerke 
 Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.01 
 
7.4.2  Munificence - Interaction with Environmental Controls  
The interaction presented no significant result when the other environmental independent 
variables were included as controls (Table 7D).  
Table 7D:  Munificence x Scanning with Controls (Hypothesis 4) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.53 (0.15) -4.39 (0.73)*** -5.63 (1.03)** 
Complexity 0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Concentration  -0.17 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Industry Profits  -1.52 (0.52)** -1.51 (0.52)** 
Firm Profits  -0.06 (0.27) -0.07 (0.27) 
Munificence  -0.98 (1.86) -1.17 (1.96) 
Dynamism  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Scanning  -2.03 (1.12)Ϯ -2.00 (1.12)Ϯ 
Munificence x Scanning   -2.49 (7.78) 
χ2 0.29 132.49*** 132.59*** 
Cox & Snell 0.00 0.51 0.52 
Nagelkerke 0.00 0.69 0.69 
N = 183, Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7.4.3 Munificence - Interaction with Environmental Controls and Interactions  
This interaction presented no significant result when the other environmental variables 
and their interaction terms were included in the model (Table 8). 
7.4.4 Munificence - Qualitative Analysis 
When interviewing the attorneys on the issue of munificence (the abundance of 
resources), it was difficult for them to specifically speak to this concept as they were not 
used to thinking of an industry in such terms.  Therefore, their opinions and thoughts 
were rather less informed than that for other constructs such as industry or firm 
profitability and industry concentration.  The concept of munificence centred on such 
things as inputs (fuel) and industry capacity.  Regarding inputs, a Toronto attorney 
commented: 
“I would say that illegal cartel activity is usually responding to negative 
business conditions rather than where we see the opportunity, where we 
just exploit people.  That may be because the company doesn’t want to be 
perceived as an exploiter.  Cartels about fuel surcharges sometimes they, 
you know, run up prices and people do not react well in the context of that 
market.” 
 
In general the attorneys supported the idea that the less munificent the environment, the 
more likely there was to be illegal cartel activity and they relied upon their previous and 
more general comments on board oversight and scanning to describe any moderating 
relationship.   
I would conclude that there is marginal support for this hypothesis from a qualitative 
perspective keeping in mind that these attorneys were unfamiliar with the concept as 
outlined in this thesis; however, there was no support from a quantitative perspective. 
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7.5  Hypothesis 5 
With hypothesis 5, I looked at how the dynamism of the industry impacted illegal activity 
and how the moderator (scanning) was involved in the relationship: 
Hypothesis 5: The effect of dynamism on illegal cartel activity is moderated by 
the amount of board scanning of the external environment such that for a given 
level of dynamism, less scanning by a board will result in a greater probability 
of illegal cartel activity. 
7.5.1 Dynamism - Straight Interaction 
In analysing this relationship using just the independent variable of dynamism, the 
statistical relationship of the interaction term of was significant (β=-0.003; p<0.001) with 
a large R2 of 0.51 (Table 6E).  I provide the graph in Figure 3; the co-efficients are so 
small as to preclude the graphing program from being able to graph the interaction. 
Table 6E:  Dynamism x Scanning (Hypothesis 5) 
 
   β (S.E.) 
Dynamism 0.01 (0.00)
board Scanning -14.89 (2.89)
Dynamism x Scanning -0.003 (0.01)
N = 183, χ2 = 130, p<0.001, R2 = 0.51 Cox and Snell, 0.68 Nagelkerke 
Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 3: Interaction Effects of Dynamism x Scanning 
 
 
7.5.2  Dynamism - Interaction with Environmental Controls  
The addition of the control variables saw the interaction between dynamism and board 
scanning remain significant and in the expected direction (β=-0.01; p<0.001) with an 
increase in the R2 to 0.57 (Table 7E). 
Table 7E:  Dynamism x Scanning with Controls (Hypothesis 5) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.53 (0.15) -4.39 (0.73)*** -5.63 (1.03)** 
Complexity 0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02) 
Industry Concentration  -0.17 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Industry Profits  -1.52 (0.52)** -1.42 (0.52)** 
Firm Profits  -0.06 (0.27) -0.24 (0.32) 
Munificence  -0.98 (1.86) -0.37 (2.18) 
Dynamism  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Scanning  -2.03 (1.12)Ϯ -13.90 (3.11)*** 
Dynamism x Scanning   -0.01 (0.00)*** 
χ2 0.29 132.49*** 133.15*** 
Cox & Snell 0.00 0.51 0.57 
Nagelkerke 0.00 0.69 0.76 
N = 183, Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7.5.3 Dynamism - Interaction with Environmental Controls and Interactions  
The addition of the environmental control variables interaction with the scanning variable 
did not change the previous results.  The interaction between dynamism and board 
scanning remained significant (β=-0.01; p<0.001) (Table 8).   
7.5.4 Dynamism - Qualitative Analysis 
The attorneys were somewhat split on the impact of dynamism on illegal cartel activity.  I 
noticed this split based upon those attorneys on the West Coast (San Francisco and Los 
Angeles) and those on the east coast (Washington, Toronto, Ottawa and New York).  The 
West Coast attorneys had a high level of experience in the high tech industries and so 
were familiar with cartels in rapidly changing industries.  The East Coast attorneys had 
the bulk of their experience in the more service oriented and commodity industries that 
were lower on dynamism.   
A Los Angeles attorney whose experience was mostly in the high tech area provided his 
opinion on the differences between cartel activity in high and low tech industries: 
“There are commodities such as milk products that everybody just takes 
for granted.  A fix on those products doesn’t have to be very big in order 
to create gigantic profit.  You get a company like X which is a super 
market to the world; people within the company decide they actually are 
going to talk to their competitors and fix prices and it’s caught on video 
tape and it’s pretty amazing how simple it was.  Then you also have high 
technology products where it’s something very, very special like LCD’s, 
DRAM’s, or SRAM’s and the stuff is being made and the technology is 
changing literally every month or two months or few months.  In order to 
keep up if you can’t be the one that’s the technological genius who keeps 
your product at the forefront of the consumer’s expectations and wants, 
then you turn to other means to try to do that.  That’s a whole different 
variety but, I think in each of those categories the economics and the profit 
driving portion of why people do these things might be both different and 
familiar enough.” 
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The results for this hypothesis were in some ways more complicated than conceptualized 
in this thesis.  There seems to be a great difference between industries and their speed of 
change; unfortunately, a direct comparison from an experimental perspective was not 
possible.  Several of the attorneys provided a triangulation of ideas by commenting that 
the high tech industries were more volatile and dynamic on a number of levels than the 
more traditional commodity industries.  However, both offered different incentives based 
upon their market dynamics to engage in or give rise to illegal cartel activity.  One can 
surmise that in volatile markets cartel activity will primarily focus on moderating the 
downward pressure on prices while in a less dynamic industries where the activity is 
easier to spot, if it does occur, the main incentive would be to raise prices.  These 
comments dovetail with earlier comments by attorneys that most cartels are managing 
downward pressure on prices and the maintenance of profits as opposed to increasing 
profits. 
Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported as there was not a clear consensus as to the 
impact of volatility on the creation and sustaining of illegal cartel activity.  As with the 
other hypotheses, the moderating effect of the scanning variable was one of general 
application and would hold for this hypothesis as well. 
I next move on to testing the internal control hypotheses.  Table 10 (below) outlines the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis and Table 11 outlines the 
proportion of data points that came from each of those firms that conducted illegal 
activity and those that did not. I have included a sample of attorney comments for this 
part of the model in Appendix E.  
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Table 10:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Control Hypotheses 
    (6-10) 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Illegal 
Corporate 
Activity 
296 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00    
2. Board 
Control 
182 37.01 43.76 0.00 238.00 0.46** 1.00   
3. CEO 
Control 
136 303.96 213.00 4.00 987.00 0.11 0.14 1.00  
4. % 
Outside 
Directors 
202 0.85 0.12 0.17 1.00 -0.16* -0.32 0.18* 1.00 
Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 11: Proportion of Data for Illegal vs. Legal Companies 
 Illegal  Legal 
Illegal Activity 148 148 
Board Complexity 92 90 
CEO Control 69 67 
% Outside Directors 100 102 
 
7.6 Hypothesis 6 
With hypothesis 6, I moved from the testing of the environmental variables to the internal 
control based variables.  Specifically, in hypothesis 6 I theorized the following: 
Hypothesis 6: An increase in goal based output control methods for the CEO 
will increase the probability of illegal cartel activity. 
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7.6.1  CEO goal based output controls 
Since the logistic coefficient for CEO control was not statistically significant, there is no 
simple relationship between CEO control and illegal cartel activity.  Illegal cartel activity 
is thus not likely to be related to variability in goal based compensation for the CEO.   
Therefore, hypothesis 6 was not supported (Table 12). 
Table 12:  Results for Control Hypotheses (6-10) 
 
 
  
Hypothesis 
6:   
DV:  Illegal 
Activity 
Hypothesis 
7: 
DV: CEO 
Control  
Hypothesis 
8: 
DV: Illegal 
Activity 
Hypothesis 
9: 
DV:  CEO 
Control 
Hypothesis 
10: 
DV: Illegal 
Activity 
CEO 
Control 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00)
 0.00
(0.00)
Board 
Control 
 0.64Ϯ 0.05 
(0.10)*** 
 
% Outside 
Directors 
 315.83  
(150.85)* 
 
-6.06
(2.14)**
Constant -0.40  
(0.30) 
280.36*** -1.86 
(0.48)***
37.72  
(130.86) 
4.79
(1.84)
R2  0.02 0.03 
Nagelkerke 
R2 
0.02 0.38  0.111
Model  
Chi-square 
1.61 46.17***  11.684**
N 136 136 136 202 136
Ϯ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Unstandardized coefficients are shown.  Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
7.6.2  CEO goal based output controls - Qualitative Analysis 
Contrary to the quantitative findings, there was some (7 out of 10 attorneys) qualitative 
support for the hypothesis that CEO control, as evidenced by the compensation 
measurement utilized in this research, did have an impact on illegal cartel activity. The 
generality of the support was evidenced in these comments from a Toronto attorney: 
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“If it is profit at all cost and you have to meet your quarterly or your 
annual numbers no matter what, then you know, that’s a signal to the Vice 
Presidents or the lower level executives and the managers, that it’s get 
your numbers no matter what versus, you know, a more non-financially 
oriented or, I must say ethically oriented message coming from the top.” 
 
This cascading effect as set out in the theory sections of this thesis was further supported 
by a New York attorney: 
“There is another question whether very top management knew or not.  
They set out an atmosphere to allow it to happen. I mean upper 
management wants to make sure middle management is doing things that 
will increase upper management’s pay.” 
 
While there was some doubt expressed by a number of attorneys that this cascading effect 
was the main motivator for managers (non CEOs) to construct and carry out cartel 
activity since it was not usually the CEO that was directly implicated in this type of 
activity, the majority felt that CEOs, while protected, influenced and knew about the 
goings on of their managers.  This was noted by a Washington attorney: 
“In my experiences, CEOs keep a close eye on profit and loss and are 
generally tapped in to whether or not collusions are happening. They 
know for a government to bring a case against the CEO it can be much 
more difficult.  CEOs are aware or at least turn to blind eye to their 
underlings who are in contact with competitors because prices are a key 
factor in a firm’s profitability.”   
 
Human Resource customs and trends also pay a part in this analysis. Over the last 40 
years there have been changes in these trends in the United States as to how CEOs and 
senior managers are compensated.  A New York attorney talked extensively about how 
this has impacted compensation trends: 
“Yeah it’s interesting because in my past life or one of my past lives if 
there was a healthy compensation scheme it’s obvious we’d jump to that.  
There was a period where the percentage of the variable that’s 
attributable to performance would be individually measured. In other 
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words, how did you do for our company; did our market share go up a 
point or two and for every point it goes up you get compensated because 
the trigger is there.  Then there was a movement away because of the 
cyclical nature of some businesses. In the HR environment they moved to a 
model where your compensation is a function of performance relative to 
your peers.  So you take the cluster of industry companies and sort of 
sorted out what their growth rate was this year as a group and then you 
position your individual company relevant to that and then the individuals 
will get compensated on whatever the bench marks they established for 
that relationship.  The back side to that or the potential negative side to 
that is that creates an incentive for all the peers to get together.  All the 
salesmen say, well okay let’s just try to hold the line here or we all agree 
to reallocate the market shares this way so there all relative to each other 
where we are okay. You tried to make the analysis more precise by tying 
performance to or bonus to performance relative to peers but it ends up 
creating a harmony of interest among the people that are trying to earn 
those bonuses with their competitors.”  
 
This hypothesis was not quantitatively supported.  There was support for the cascading 
theory and support that CEO compensation itself can be a motivating factor.  However, 
there are several cautions from the attorneys when trying to use compensation as a 
causative effect, since the field of executive compensation is subject to a number of 
variables and these variables have changed over time. Therefore, this hypothesis was not 
supported. 
7.7  Hypothesis 7 
I hypothesized that the goal based compensation system for the board also had an impact 
on illegal activity. In particular: 
Hypothesis 7: An increase in goal based output control methods for the board, 
will increase the use of a goal based output control method for the CEO. 
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7.7.1  Board Goal Based Output Controls  
Hypothesis 7 predicted that an increase in goal based output control methods for the 
board will increase the use of a goal based output control method for the CEO.  Board 
control was found to be a significant predictor of CEO control (β=0.64; t=1.78; p<0.1); 
however, the R2 of 0.02 suggested that it was a very small effect.  Therefore, hypothesis 7 
was supported (Table 12).   
7.7.2  Board Goal Based Output Controls - Qualitative Analysis 
From a qualitative perspective, the attorneys did not have a lot of knowledge or opinions 
on board compensation; it just was not something that they had considered or something 
that they had encountered in the prosecution and defense of illegal cartel activity.  While 
they were supportive of the general cascading theory as set out in hypothesis 6 and felt it 
would also apply to board behaviour, they were not able to directly speak to a case or 
cases where this phenomenon was evident. 
This hypothesis received weak statistical support (p<0.1) while only tenuous support 
from the attorneys. 
7.8  Hypothesis 8 
I then brought the concepts of board control and CEO control together to suggest the 
following relationship: 
Hypothesis 8: The relationship between board control method and illegal cartel 
activity is fully mediated by CEO control method. 
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7.8.1  Mediation of Board Control by CEO Control 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that the relationship between board control method and illegal 
organizational activity is fully mediated by the CEO control method. This was tested 
using the Baron and Kenny approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  While the first two steps 
were found to be significant (Board control related to illegal activity and board control 
related to CEO control), the third step which tested whether CEO control mediated, either 
fully or partially, the relationship between board control and illegal cartel activity was not 
significant.  Therefore, hypothesis 8 was not supported (Table 12). 
7.8.2  Mediation of Board Control by CEO Control - Qualitative Analysis 
Hypothesis 8 and the fully mediated effect was not something easily explored with the 
attorneys.  In my explanation of this hypothesis and their reaction to it there was very 
little that could add to the quantitative analysis. 
However, the attorneys did have opinions on how these three constructs could be 
connected and how complicated it may be. A New York attorney suggested: 
“If you look at the CEOs in the fine arts office case, both those guys kind 
of said this helps my pay packet so that’s pretty good. I think that it was a 
significant component of poor [board] participation as seen in a lot of 
corporations.  A board was there to oversee management.  But you know 
the management had a very, very significant input let’s say on, on what 
the board would decide or what was put to the board and how it was put 
to the board.”   
 
This hypothesis did not receive statistical support.  
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7.9  Hypothesis 9 
This hypothesis examined the relationship between director independence and CEO 
control systems: 
Hypothesis 9: An increase in the proportion of outsiders on the board will increase the 
use of goal based output control systems for the CEO. 
7.9.1  Outside Directors 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that an increase in the proportion of outsiders on the Board will 
increase the use of goal based output control systems for the CEO.  There was a testing of 
this hypothesis using OLS regression resulting in a significant model (p<0.05) and a 
significant direct effect (β=315.83; t=2.09; p<0.05) suggesting support for hypothesis 9.   
However, the effect was small with an overall R2 of 0.04 (Table 12).      
7.9.2  Outside Directors – Qualitative Analysis 
Even though the attorneys generally supported the board scanning construct as evidenced 
in the environmental analysis, they could not definitively say that there was a relationship 
between the fact someone was an independent director (or the proportion of independent 
directors) and illegal cartel activity.  This skepticism was expressed by a Washington 
attorney in this manner: 
“I would imagine that you are not going to have somebody on the board 
who is going to come and start attacking you if you are the CEO. You are 
going to have people who are friendly.  I mean you may have one or two 
outside directors but basically these are your buddies right?”   
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However, some felt that independent members could add some value in being alert for 
illegal cartel activity, albeit in a general sort of way as suggested by an attorney from 
New York: 
“I think there’s a slight tendency for outsiders to be more detached from 
management and therefore they feel obviously more individually based.  
They will feel more comfortable in asking management or challenging 
some management assumption from the inside.”  
 
Therefore, while there was quantitative support for the relationship between the 
percentage of outside directors and CEO control, this relationship was not supported by 
my interviews with attorneys.    
7.10 Hypothesis 10 
This hypothesis examined the relationship between outside directors and illegal cartel 
activity: 
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
illegal cartel activity is fully mediated by CEO control method. 
7.10.1 Mediation of Outside Directors by CEO Control Method 
Hypothesis 10 predicted that the relationship between outside directors and illegal 
organizational activity is fully mediated by the CEO control method. This was tested 
using the Baron and Kenny approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  While the first two steps 
were found to be significant (outside directors related to illegal activity and outside 
directors related to CEO control), the third step which tested whether CEO control 
mediated, either fully or partially, the relationship between outside directors and illegal 
cartel activity was not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 10 was not supported (Table 12). 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The topic of illegal cartel activity and its relationship to corporate governance issues, 
specifically the role of boards, is one that has not been explored in research to date.  
Given the ongoing corporate governance scandals that continue to occur with alarming 
frequency in developed countries, it is an area that needs to be better understood.   
This thesis presents the theory and analyses required to explore the research question 
“Why do organizations engage in illegal activity?”  I address this question by undertaking 
a methodological approach including analysis utilizing a proprietary dataset and 
interviews with knowledgeable legal experts. 
There is a seventy year history on what is meant by illegal corporate activity. I 
thoroughly reviewed the applicable literature and in doing so, developed a definition that 
applies specifically to illegal cartel activity, the dependent variable in this research: 
Illegal cartel activity is collaborative action with competitors aimed toward 
the purpose of price fixing which is the result of deliberate decision-
making by those who occupy structural positions within the organization 
such as corporate executives and managers.  The decisions are 
organizationally based, made in accordance with the normative goals, 
standard operating procedures and cultural norms of the organization and 
are intended to benefit the organization itself. 
 
Research has demonstrated that the environment has an impact on why organizations 
conduct illegal activity.  Using the lens of resource dependency theory, I established the 
parameters through which the environment affects an organization, increasing the 
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possibility of the occurrence of illegal cartel activity.  Furthermore, I introduced the 
construct of board scanning as a moderator to this model to demonstrate how the 
effectiveness of the board’s scanning capability can reduce the incidence of illegal cartel 
activity. 
There are always ways in which an organization is internally constructed and governed 
that may have an impact on the undertaking of illegal cartel activity.  Specifically, how a 
board is remunerated affects how the CEO and managers are remunerated.  This is 
important because certain types of remuneration encourage the CEO and top managers to 
focus on the ends they are supposed to achieve instead of the means by which to get 
there.  I hypothesized that too little focus on the means to achieve the required ends can 
result in a greater incidence of illegal cartel activity.   
This two pronged explanation as to the causes of illegal cartel activity is reflected in the 
comments of an attorney from San Francisco who practices in the area of illegal cartel 
activity: 
 “I think my personal view is that illegal corporate activity tends to occur 
when there are times of crisis or I think once there is sort of depth of 
problems.  I think you are going to find that for all sorts of things there 
has been a lot of collusion that went on in the last couple of years or is 
going on now because firms are under extreme pressure to meet market 
share parts of targets or quarterly revenue targets.  You have this really 
bad mixture of recession, efforts to cut costs, efforts to cut corners, 
reduction of compliance programs, greater stresses on managers and 
salesman at every level to get sales done, and greater desperation. On the 
flip side, you are getting customers who are trying to squeeze more money 
and producers because they are under lot of stress as well so I tend to 
think the people in that situation take baby steps towards reaching 
situations where they would admit finding themselves in middle of a price 
fixing case.” 
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I created and tested a model of environmental and internal control factors that I 
hypothesized could lead to illegal activity.  I present a summary of the results of this 
hypothesis testing in Figure 4 below.   
Figure 4:   Model with Quantitative Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
Concentration 
Board Scanning 
Industry Profits 
Munificence 
Dynamism 
CEO Output
Control 
Director 
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Board Output 
Control 
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NS 
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8.2 Discussion of External Environmental Factors 
The thesis set out to better understand how environmental variables, namely, industry 
concentration, industry profits, firm profits, munificence, and dynamism impact illegal 
cartel activity as moderated by the board scanning variable.  I now briefly review each of 
the environmental variables to reiterate the frame that underpins the discussion of the 
results obtained.  I begin with a commentary on the board scanning variable that I used as 
a moderator in my analysis. 
8.2.1 Scanning Variable 
Previous research has already tested the direct effects of the environmental variables I 
included in this research.  I felt it was important to examine whether these main 
environmental effects were in fact subject to a moderation effect related to board 
structure and make up.  I developed a scanning variable based upon previous literature. 
The board scanning variable is a combination of the size of the board and the 
independence of the board.  After developing this variable, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with board members and CEOs in order to gain further insight that allowed me 
to validate and refine the conceptualization of this variable (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2008).  The board scanning variable received face validity from these board members and 
CEOs as a viable variable for measurement of this moderation effect; the interviewees all 
(6 out of 6) felt that having a greater number of board members would allow for 
enhanced scanning of the external and internal environment to be able to better detect and 
prevent illegal activity.  Likewise, they also felt that the independence of the board would 
assist in scanning the external and internal environment to detect and prevent illegal 
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activity.  The initial affirmation of this variable led me to hypothesize the moderating 
effect on the environmental forces. 
The international attorneys who specialize in illegal cartel activity that were interviewed 
as part of the qualitative analysis of this thesis were in general (7 out of 10) agreement 
that independent directors provide more scrutiny than inside directors as it broadly relates 
to illegal activity.  While inside directors may understand the operations of the firm in 
more detail, it was felt that the independent directors would view potentially illegal 
situations or risk more critically and objectively.  The attorneys also largely agreed (7 out 
of 10) that the more directors there were on the board, the greater the chance that illegal 
activity or its precursors would be monitored and addressed.  However, they felt the 
impact that would be felt as a result of the difference in the scrutiny of inside directors 
and outside directors and the number of directors was middling at best.   
Of greater concern to the thrust of this thesis from a corporate governance view was the 
attorneys’ skepticism that board members would actually be in a position to detect illegal 
activity.  The attorneys’ views and interactions with boards and executives led them to 
believe that in their experience, boards were mostly ineffectual in sniffing out and 
correcting the precursors and occurrence of illegal activity.  However, the attorneys were 
quite sure that the board, in their role as leaders in the organization, did have an indirect 
effect on the incidence of illegal activity.  They fully supported the concept of the 
cascading mechanism where the tone, tenor and emphasis of the board in relation to 
compliance permeates down through the organization and has an effect on the frequency 
of illegal activity.  While the attorneys did not provide direct evidence of this belief, they 
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have found that boards that emphasized compliance appeared to govern organizations 
that experienced few legal difficulties. 
To summarize, the board scanning moderator did have validity and showed results that 
were informative for the discussion of the relationship between these environmental 
variables and illegal cartel activity.  However, the compliance emphasis of boards and its 
effect on illegal or other regulatory non-compliance is worthy of further study as it was 
consistently brought up by the attorneys as a potentially stronger mechanism than the 
board scanning variable used herein.   
8.2.2 Environmental variables 
The environmental variables have all been previously studied in the context of their direct 
effect on the propagation of illegal activity.  Each one of these variables had found favour 
in previous studies that tested for causal relationships between the articulated variables 
and the presence of illegal organizational activity.  For robustness, I also tested for direct 
effects with the appropriate controls using the cartel dataset; only industry profits and 
dynamism were significant (Table 9).   In addition, during the qualitative interviews I 
asked the attorneys for their expert opinion on the direct effect of each of the 
environmental variables on illegal cartel activity.  While the majority of environmental 
factors (industry concentration, industry profits, munificence and dynamism) were 
primarily external to the company in question, I also included the internal variable of firm 
profits given its potential impact.   
This thesis adds to the governance literature in testing these relationships using a new 
type of illegal organizational activity, namely price-fixing cartels and by using this 
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context to apply the board scanning moderator to these variables for the first time.  I now 
provide a synopsis of each of the environmental variables followed by a critical 
discussion of their impact on illegal activity both directly and as moderated by the board 
scanning variable.   
8.2.2.1  Industry concentration 
Industry concentration figures prominently in the assessment of the underlying 
motivation for antitrust or illegal cartel activities; as the industry becomes more 
concentrated (as measured by 4 and 8 company concentration levels), the opportunity or 
at least the probability of collusion increases (Zahra et al., 2005).  A low industry 
concentration requires many industry participants to be involved in antitrust activities 
which would not only lower the success rate of any antitrust attempt, it would make it 
more difficult to conceal from detection (Coleman, 1987).    However, it is important to 
recognize that although most of the convicted private international price fixing cartels 
had fewer than eight members, there have been convictions of cartels of up to 30 
members (Connor, 2001). 
Industry concentration has been a subject of great interest to class action cartel attorneys. 
The attorneys, especially those with U.S. Department of Justice prosecutorial experience, 
were quite adamant that industry concentration was related to cartel activity.  It is a 
Department of Justice litmus test to look at industry concentration in order to determine if 
a cartel may exist in a particular industry.4  A high industry concentration allows for the 
efficient operation of a cartel; the fewer the players that dominate an industry, the easier 
                                                            
4 The field of IO economics stemmed from studies on industry concentration to detect price fixing potential 
in an industry. 
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it is to form a cartel because fewer consents or participants are required.  Likewise, the 
higher the industry concentration, the easier it is to maintain a cartel as it is easier to 
internally police who is obeying the pricing or capacity practices mandated by the cartel.  
There was complete agreement among all attorneys that a higher industry concentration 
indicated a higher potential for cartel activity, a sentiment that reinforced previous 
research in this area. 
As noted, I tested the direct effects of the environmental variables on illegal cartel 
activity (Table 9).  I found no direct effect of industry concentration on illegal activity.  
The addition of the scanning variable as a moderator elicited a significant result only 
when there were no control variables.  This did not inspire confidence in this hypothesis.  
Therefore, while there was previous research on this variable that would indicate it 
represents a degree of uncertainty in the environment, I found only a small moderated 
effect that would substantiate and extend prior findings.   
8.2.2.2 Industry and firm profits 
Profits are defined as the residual income when all expenditures and taxes have been 
accounted for; firms and organizations attempt to maximize profit and, by extension, 
shareholder value.  While they are a primary environmental driver associated with illegal 
activity, there is some debate within the literature as to which level of profits, industry or 
firm, should be studied in order to best understand the relationship.  Through an industry 
lens, RDT would suggest that if resources in the form of profits are constrained in the 
industry environment then these resources are providing a source of uncertainty which 
firms will seek to reduce through removing or controlling the constraints.  Firms within 
 157 
 
the industry can elect to exercise control through entering into a cartel to fix prices to 
either stabilize or artificially increase industry profits.  Additionally, RDT would also 
advocate that if profits at the firm level are scarce or otherwise constrained, a firm would 
then look to the outside environment to remove and control these constraints, possibly 
through the auspices of forming or joining a cartel.   
It is unsurprising that all of the attorneys agreed with the premise that a decrease in 
profits (uncertainty to a specified income stream) either at the industry or the firm level 
would put pressure on companies and the individuals within them to engage in illegal 
activity to remedy this situation.  The attorneys did draw a clear distinction between the 
motivational power of industry profitability and corporate profitability.  While they felt 
overall that it was a decrease in corporate profitability that was the instant cause of 
looking for ways to increase this type of profitability, it was a decrease or loss of 
momentum in industry-wide profitability that enabled or set up the conditions for a cartel 
to be created and then maintained.  They felt that the internal pressures of the corporation 
to achieve a certain level of profitability provided the impetus for seeking remedies.  The 
fact that the industry itself was experiencing low profitability provided the pool of willing 
co-conspirators who themselves were, due to industry factors, experiencing low 
profitability.  There is therefore a symbiotic relationship between these two types of 
profitability.  The attorneys felt that of the two, industry profitability would be a greater 
indicator of the potential for illegal activity since it signaled an opportunity for there to be 
more than one corporation in a poor profit position and therefore ripe to be approached 
and engaged in illegal activity.  The attorneys overwhelmingly supported the previous 
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research in that a decrease or low growth in profitability would be an indicator of illegal 
activity.   
Only industry profits remained significant in directly predicting illegal activity when the 
other environmental variables were included as controls.  In fact, industry profits were 
very significant in all of the models tested, whether measured as a direct effect, just with 
the moderator or with the moderator and all of the control variables.  It also received face 
validity from the attorneys.  It is one of the very clear-cut findings of this thesis that 
industry profits are a strong indicator of the presence of illegal activity and that their 
effect is moderated by the board scanning variable.  Company profits on the other hand 
were significant until control variables were introduced, suggesting that while they have a 
bearing on illegal activity, it is not as strong an effect as industry profits. 
From a moderation perspective, it appears that the premise of the board scanning 
variable, with its increased external vigilance, is also at play with industry profits in that 
the scanning variable moderates the impact of industry profits on illegal activity.  This is 
reasonable as my contention is that this increased scanning of the external environment 
would have such an effect. 
8.2.2.3  Munificence 
Munificence and scarcity are complementary concepts, with scarcity being a lack of 
resources within an environment and munificence representing an abundance of 
resources. When examined through the RDT framework, an organization must try and 
control resources from the environment in order to meet the organization’s goals up to 
and including survival.  The more munificent the environment, the easier it will be to 
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secure these resources and achieve organizational goals.  A more munificent environment 
has fewer constraints on it and more resources available therefore providing less 
uncertainty to the organization and a reduced need to resort to illegal cartel activities in 
order to control these resources and their constraints. 
While previous research supports the contention that a lack of resources will lead to a 
company seeking innovative ways to gain these resources (including illegal activity), the 
attorneys I talked to did not view the business landscape in these terms and so were only 
able to generally support the position of a lack of resources leading to illegal activity.  In 
general, they agreed that resources in the shape of capacity or produced and supplied 
products were a key determinant in whether a cartel would be desirable (in the case of 
limited supply) and provide a way to execute the cartel (in terms of  controlling the 
industry capacity).  Unfortunately, I was unable to directly measure these types of 
capacities due to limitations in my data.  Therefore, while the attorneys conceptually 
supported the contention that munificence is tied to illegal activity, their vision of how 
this connection operated was different than that measured by my research. 
My analysis found that munificence exhibited no direct effects on illegal activity and the 
moderation was not significant.  As a result, I cannot conclude that my operationalization 
of munificence has a causal relationship with illegal cartel activity.  Given the insight 
from the attorneys, I suggest a different operationalization of munificence may be 
required to test this construct. 
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8.2.2.4  Dynamism 
Dynamism is defined as change that is hard to predict, leading to increased uncertainty 
for managers and leaders in the organization.  Generally, as dynamism increases 
environmental uncertainties increase, constraints on resources in the environment 
increase and firms will act to reduce both uncertainty and constraints.  As an example, 
variance in revenues is a constraint leading to uncertainty; one of the ways to decrease 
the uncertainty associated with variable revenues is to engage in illegal cartel activities in 
order to gain stability to expected returns. 
Despite my best efforts the attorneys did not understand what was meant by dynamism as 
it has been theoretically and empirically developed in management literature.   However, 
they did have their own practitioner definition of dynamism that they relied upon; they 
viewed dynamism as indicative of how vigorous the competition was within an industry.  
The attorneys had varying views (depending upon which industries and the types of 
industries they had been exposed to) as to how their conceptualization of dynamism 
impacted illegal cartel activity.  The point of departure between the qualitative and 
quantitative elements in my thesis was in the operationalization of the variable.  The 
concept itself seemed to find favour with both parts of the analysis but requires further 
work in the operationalization to encapsulate the thrust of the attorneys’ visions of this 
variable. 
Dynamism was found to have a significant direct effect on illegal activity.  While the 
effect was small, there also was a very significant effect when the moderator was added 
into the analysis.  I view dynamism as a variable that is indicative of those environments 
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where there is the incidence of illegal activity, yet it remains a peripheral variable.  The 
effect is small yet intense and I believe it indicates that where there are environments in 
flux there is a risk reducing urge by companies within the industry to act in concert to 
reduce this risk.  Price fixing is an easy way to do this. 
8.2.3  External Variables Conclusion 
This analysis found that industry profits and dynamism had a significant and robust direct 
effect on illegal cartel activity, and a significant interaction with the board scanning 
moderator variable.  Therefore, this research, which used a sample of illegal cartels, does 
not fully support previous research in this area.    
My research adds to our collective knowledge of how the concept of board scanning 
interacts with traditional corporate governance environmental variables to impact illegal 
organizational activity.  I found that the board scanning variable received face validity 
and tentative support from practitioners and that it acts as a rather neutral moderator as 
evidenced in the small change to the direct effects of the environmental variables.   The 
idea of the effect of the board on illegal activity may be further explored by looking at 
other indices of the board’s activities namely compliance regimes which were suggested 
by the attorneys as being the actual mechanism of how the board influences illegal 
activity. 
8.3 Discussion of Internal Control Variables 
I apply a theory not traditionally used in the management literature strain theory, in an 
organizational context to explain illegal corporate activity (Agnew 1992, Merton, 1968).  
I believe there is a need for further research on the contribution strain theory could have 
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in management (Caruana et al., 2001) and organizations (Tsahuridu, 2006).  As this 
theory becomes more readily accepted as a tool for management research, I feel there are 
also broader implications for corporate governance as well as human resource theory.  I 
have suggested in this thesis that deviance, in particular illegal activity, be considered at 
the organizational level, rather than just as actions by an individual or group of 
individuals.  This is predicated on the recognition that organizations are legally 
recognized as being capable of committing crimes and injuring society and the 
environment.  There are other laws, designed to protect the very same societies and 
environments that place restrictions around how firms are able to achieve their 
organizational goals.  When this occurs and there is an organizational imperative to 
realize these goals, the organization and those within it become innovative in finding 
routes to these objectives by going outside of the boundaries established by society 
(Merton 1938, 1968).  This innovation becomes the impetus for organizational deviance 
and illegal activity in the drive to realize organizational goals. 
In short, my argument is that to the extent organizations are pushed through shareholders, 
special interest groups or legislation to focus more on the results of their operations (and 
specifically financial results),  the more illegal organizational activity will be encouraged.  
This highlights the tension inherent in an incentive scheme that encourages innovation 
which can manifest through positive or negative activities.  While in both cases 
organizational goals can be achieved, goal attainment achieved through negative 
innovation can place the organization at legal risk.   
The results from my research are mixed with respect to the theories in this part of the 
model.  I was able to confirm the cascading effect from the board compensation to the 
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CEO compensation as statistically significant.  This lends support to the notion that 
compensation systems from the top of the hierarchy tend to flow down through the 
hierarchy.  
I was also able to find statistical support that an increase in independence of the board 
results in an increase in output controls for the CEO.  Again this offers verification for 
the thesis in that independent directors have less day to day knowledge of the actions 
within the organization and so rely on output controls to monitor the performance of the 
CEO.  There was a direct effect measured between the independence of the board and 
illegal activity which led to the result that in the board Scanning variable a high 
proportion of independent directors was good in that this assisted in moderating the 
incidence of illegal activity and in the control part of the model a high proportion of 
independent directors was associated with a greater incidence of illegal activity.  This 
may be explained by the different focuses of the independent directors; externally in the 
case of scanning and internally in the case of CEO control.   
However, I was unable to find any statistical confirmation for the hypothesis that the 
CEO control method has any impact on illegal activity.  As a result, I was able to 
statistically support some of the constituent parts of the model but not the whole model 
itself. 
I do feel that the hypothesized model bears further review as it is mostly supported from a 
quantitative perspective and received strong qualitative support for the balance.  The 
model may require further modification as the linkages between CEO compensation vis-
à-vis control methods require additional study; it is clear from the evidence of the 
 164 
 
attorneys that there is a linkage but in its present form the operationalization of the 
construct does not adequately reflect the underlying theoretical thrust of the construct.  
There also may be linkages between the environmental variables and the control methods 
related to environmental uncertainty and type of control method used (Henri, 2006). 
Additionally, as shall be noted in the future research section of this thesis there may be an 
opportunity to theorize how strain theory could be associated with the environmental 
variables in the top part of my model. 
8.4 Contribution to Theory 
By thoroughly exploring the phenomenon and antecedents of illegal organizational 
activity, I advance several strands of cross-disciplinary theory, all of which have 
academic and practical applicability.   
First, I apply a theory not traditionally used in the management literature, namely strain 
theory in an organizational context to explain illegal corporate activity (Agnew, 1992, 
2001, Merton, 1968).   In so doing, I heed the call to research the contribution strain 
could have in management (Caruana et al., 2001) and organizations (Tsahuridu, 2006).  
As this theory becomes more readily accepted as a tool for management research, I 
believe we will discover there are also broader implications for corporate governance as 
well as human resource theory.  I have added to the boundaries of this theory by 
extending it directly to management actions within the context of corporate crime.  This 
is the first time to my knowledge that strain has been extended to address this neglected 
area of criminology (Geis, 2007). 
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Strain theory encapsulates the ongoing motivational tensions within organizations and 
found partial support in my research.  I have advanced our understanding of our approach 
to illegal activity by using this theory in conjunction with other common management 
theories of control.  In the end Innovators, as Merton would describe them, are acting in 
response to a situation they cannot control; the desire to achieve the goals of the 
organization is more powerful than the societal (and legal) prohibitions against such 
action.  The juxtaposition of management control systems with actions derived from 
strain theory advances our theories of organizational action. 
This research also expands upon and clarifies work that has been done in the past on 
illegal corporate activity, extending the applicability of RDT and agency theory.  The 
management literature on illegal corporate activity is fairly sparse (Murphy & Robinson, 
2008; Pinto et al., 2008); my study of cartels and the examination of the control method 
of the board influencing the control method of the CEO will help address this deficit.  I 
also believe that this is the first time that board scanning activity is used as a moderator 
of the environment’s causation of illegal cartel activity and one of the very few times a 
board scanning activity variable has been used at all.    
I have advanced our theorizing about RDT by linking it to the makeup of the board and 
the board’s external scanning ability to control the unknown risks of the environment.  
Theoretically, RDT can be seen as an explanatory avenue of how boards interact with the 
organization and environment to control the actions of the organization in order to 
minimize uncertainty.  I have tried to extend this thinking by suggesting a construct, 
board scanning, which can act as a mechanism by which the organization interacts with 
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its environment.  This moderator serves both as an uncertainty detector and an influence 
on the actions of the firm. 
I believe that this thesis has expanded our thinking in the areas of environmental 
awareness and organizational action in the specific context of deviant behaviour.  In so 
doing, it sets the stage for future research and theorizing to broaden the appeal of strain 
theory in management research and of RDT in work that examines how organizations 
scan and react to the environment. 
8.5  Contribution to Practice 
One of the unique strengths of this thesis is that the research is based not only on 
archived data, but also on the interview results from very knowledgeable and previously 
unexplored experts in the field, namely those lawyers that are involved in investigating, 
defending and prosecuting illegal cartels.  This thesis gains from the time they provided 
to share their knowledge to ensure that this research would be relevant to current practice 
in the field of organizational deviance.  I also interviewed individuals who sit on 
corporate boards to solicit their first-person experiences with corporate governance issues 
as they pertain to scanning activity.   
I believe that this research will benefit practice in a number of ways.  First, there are 
potentially significant implications for remuneration practices in organizations. Through 
understanding how compensation systems may impact illegal activity, I provide insight 
into how best to proactively design compensation systems that minimize the incentives 
for illegal activity and reduce its incidence.  While I was statistically unable to support 
this contention, it was unambiguously the opinions of the class action attorneys that a 
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compensation system that places an undue emphasis on achieving the ends specified by 
the system at the expense of the means will result in increased illegal activity.  The law of 
unintended consequences is in full operation in this context.  Organizations must take 
much more care in balancing the output and process aspects of their human resource 
compensation systems.  In compensation decisions, too much of a reliance on outputs 
only encourages those who have innovative tendencies (a good thing) to use these 
tendencies to become an Innovator in Merton’s context (potentially a negative).  Balance 
is required. 
Second, the corporate governance structure of the organization may impact the 
compensation of the CEO.  By recognizing how board independence impacts 
compensation, governance structures can be arranged to more adequately co-create the 
appropriate compensation structure.  The dataset used for this research includes data from 
several decades; it is clear that the greater the ratio of independent directors, the greater 
the reliance on output control mechanisms for the CEO.  In this thesis, I have gathered 
and included qualitative evidence (7 out of 10 attorneys) that suggests that the greater the 
output control mechanisms for the CEO, the greater the incidence of illegal activity.  
Thus, we are left with the result that independent boards inadvertently are associated with 
an increase in illegal activity.  This result is counter-intuitive and has significant 
implications for the corporate governance regime in North America, particularly in a time 
where increasing the independence of boards is being mandated through legislation such 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  By striving for and creating legal mechanisms mandating 
more accountable management through independent boards, we may in fact be creating 
the conditions that exacerbate the occurrence of organizational deviance.  A balance must 
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be struck between the trend to more independent boards and a tendency to structure CEO 
compensation to be more output based.  This will require enhanced skill sets and training 
at the board level to more adequately assess the CEO’s performance from a means 
perspective rather than an ends perspective. 
Additionally, the results that the compensation profile of the board is aligned with that of 
the CEO provide interesting views on how CEO compensation is derived.  Board 
compensation, and the fact that it is aligned with CEO compensation (through the 
cascading effect outlined in this thesis) could be used by compensation consultants and 
board Human Resources committees in arriving at the best methods of setting CEO 
compensation.  If there is an inherent bias in boards aligning CEO compensation with 
their compensation maybe it is board compensation that needs to be changed first before 
CEO compensation is changed in order to provide a more aligned compensation system 
within the top ranks of the organization. 
Governments have the ability to adopt a regulatory approach to mandate that 
organizations adopt measures that encourage the means rather than the ends.  Regulators 
have options at their disposal including both carrot and stick approaches to influence the 
behaviour of organizations and individuals within organizations.  A commonly used 
technique is the imposition of very onerous financial penalties to the organization and its 
constituents for engaging in this type of misdirected innovative behaviour.  This may 
drive not only compensation decisions but also hiring choices and internal organizational 
policies, provided the penalties are both known to the relevant parties and they are of 
sufficient size to alter or circumscribe behaviour.  Another common practice is for 
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regulatory powers to proscribe specific means oriented behaviour by organizations which 
can be used in tandem with penalties. 
From a policy perspective, the legislated purpose of the organization can be amended to 
include not only the ends of the organization but the means available to achieve these 
ends.  While it is a cultural tenet in our society that organizations act legally, a specific 
provision that organizations will act in a manner that is to benefit society will act to 
condemn innovative behaviour that is not only just illegal but also more broadly 
detrimental to society.  While I believe a provision such as this will complicate the duties 
of the board, it may be necessary to assist in curbing this type of behaviour and add to the 
importance of the board scanning variable.  This additional societal buffer layered with 
legal sanctions will help to minimize this negative innovative behaviour.   
Corporate governance is also addressed through an emphasis on the scanning activity of 
the board.  I did not find that board scanning alone, as measured in this thesis, had an 
impact on illegal activity but that it moderated already significant direct effects of a 
number of environmental variables including dynamism and industry profits.  The ability 
of the size and independence of the board to scan the external environment for risk and 
uncertainty was supported by qualitative evidence and quantitatively supported where 
those risks were significant.   
8.6 Limitations 
The most important limitation deals with generalization issues of the findings.  The data 
that I used for the quantitative analysis is taken from a proprietary dataset detailing illegal 
activity that is itself conspiratorial and complicated.  It involves an interaction between 
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two or more parties to engage in the illegal activity as opposed to much of the illegal 
activity that occurs in North America such as fraud or tax evasion where only one party is 
required. As such, it involves a degree of complexity and co-ordination in order to 
successfully reap the benefits of this activity. 
From a data perspective, it should be recognized that since the data are gathered from 
over 40 years of cartel activity, there have been a number of environmental factors that 
have not been accommodated by this dataset.  In particular, there are factors related to 
corporate governance trends, both legislative and market driven.  For example, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that came into effect in 2003 with its heavier emphasis on outside 
directors is not incorporated here.  Likewise, trends in the environment variables affected 
by macro-economic forces such as industry profits are not specifically addressed.  
Finally, trends in executive compensation resulting from CEO disclosure requirements 
that arose in the 1990s are not included.   I have tried to mitigate these issues by using a 
matching methodology but these issues may impact different industries in unique ways 
and since I have not controlled for industry there may be spurious effects not accounted 
for.  It should be noted that the matching process required me to compare different 4 digit 
SIC code industries as using the same industry was not advised as price fixing is an 
industry phenomenon. 
The data is also for U.S. companies that have participated in international cartels.  There 
may be differences in this set of companies from those U.S. companies that only 
participated in domestic (only US) cartels.  This problem may relate to the complexity of 
a firm’s operations in that they operate in conjunction with international partners either 
domestically or internationally.  As such, anecdotally from the attorneys that I 
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interviewed, these companies are on average larger than those that participate in U.S. 
only cartels.  However, the size variable has been addressed in the matching scheme used 
in this methodology. 
This research may also be limited by the depth of knowledge of the subjects interviewed 
with regard to academic theories and discourse.  The qualitative analysis relied upon 
practitioners who were unfamiliar with the criminological theories involved as well as 
certain environmental factors.  While it was beneficial to speak directly to practitioners, I 
found their data not especially congruent with some of the variables such as the 
dynamism and complexity variables.  However, I view this as a necessary limitation in 
that the value of their experience far outweighs any limitations in their understanding of 
the academic nuances in models and variables. 
I also view it as a limitation that the operationalization of behaviour variables in the 
control methods is a difficult task and subject to many other forces that are themselves 
difficult to identify, let alone measure.  Why persons behave in certain ways is and has 
been a very difficult process to quantify and while I have attempted to be robust in 
addressing the direction of the theory to date, there may be still work yet to do. 
Also the scanning variable has little construct validity and much work needs to be done 
there to alleviate this situation.  There is a rather large but admittedly equivocal empirical 
literature suggesting that large boards are ineffectual boards due to the diffusion of 
responsibility and difficulty of any meaningful debate in relatively large groups of 
people.  Furthermore, there is a literature suggesting that insider-dominated boards are 
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more knowledgeable about the firm and its industry than outsiders are.  As such this 
variable requires further work. 
The Connor database was not reproducible within the time constraints involved and as 
such caution must be exercised to view it as a population although it has been 
successfully used in peer reviewed research before. 
It must be recognized that I interviewed only 10 attorneys and although they have 
experiences in over 100 international cartel cases, a greater sample would have been 
preferred. 
Furthermore, I have made the assumption that illegal cartel activity is and is held to be 
not in the best interests of the corporation.  I have assumed that likewise, boards would 
view this activity as not to be encouraged.  I have not empirically tested this assertion and 
as such it resides in this thesis as an assumption.  The CEO control variable could be 
further tested by finding alternate data sources to confirm whether the variance in the 
control variable matches up with the salary, bonus, stock option structure of the CEO’s in 
question.  While this was tried with the current data source, it was found that a random 
sample over the 40 years in question was not possible as the data were quite naturally 
more granular as it became more current.  This is due to legislative and reporting reasons.  
I view this as both a limitation and a challenge for increasing the validity of the CEO 
control variable. 
Finally, my argument is limited in that it does not address all the possible reasons for an 
organization to engage in illegal activity.  There are many environmental elements that 
may influence an organization’s decision to engage in corporate deviance.  In addition, 
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the behaviour of an organization is a necessarily complex phenomena and I have 
addressed only one motive for this type of negative innovative behaviour.  For example, 
the choice between positive or negative innovation to achieve organizational goals may 
be culturally dependent.  
8.7 Future Research 
The direction of future research is to first extend the generalizability of the research, 
improve on the validity of the board scanning and board and CEO control variables and 
follow the suggestions of some of the attorneys as to how to further explore the 
relationship between the board and illegal activity. 
Improving the generalizability of the results is centred on the limitations of the data as 
has been set out above.  Different types of illegal activity can be used; indeed, there is no 
dearth of illegal activity that one can draw upon to develop further datasets to be tested.  
It would also be advantageous to understand how the various corporate governance 
regimes (such as CEO compensation reporting and Sarbanes-Oxley) have had an impact 
on this model. 
The scanning variable requires additional testing to increase its validity; it is recently 
developed and only tested using a narrow dataset.  It may be that other elements of board 
organization can or should be incorporated such as committee structure and complexity.  
This may help in understanding the nuances of how boards scan the external environment 
to recognize and handle environmental uncertainties that may affect the organization. 
The board and CEO control variables can be further validated by qualitative interviews 
with compensation experts, board members and executives to see how to quantify means 
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based or ends based compensation structural elements. This could include exploratory, 
inductive work. 
Complementary avenues for research have suggested themselves through the interviews 
with the attorneys.  The first is that the board’s real impact on illegal activity may be in 
the area of general compliance to all statutes, regulations and company policies.  This 
compliance is seen by the attorneys as something that the board publically endorses and 
emphasizes through company websites, annual reports, etc.  It is therefore possible to 
develop methodologies to address the board’s degree of interest in compliance and 
measure it against the actual degree of compliance of the firm.  This area of exploration 
was highly recommended by many of the attorneys as set out in the following example: 
“Management really comes down to control systems and diligence at the 
board is to legal compliance, legal risk exclusively managed.” 
 
The attorneys also felt that culture, in the international sense, played a large role in the 
incidence of illegal activity.  They suggested that national culture is of prime importance 
to the tolerance and legitimacy of price fixing cartels.  An attorney from Los Angeles 
noted that “in some cultures, a legitimate strategy is to get together and conspire to keep 
the prices up.”  This concept of potential differences based on country culture was echoed 
by an attorney from Washington, D.C.: 
“In the United States we have this idea that you have to make money every 
year and if you lose it you are out of your job as the CEO.  Other 
countries have a much different view of it - they have a long term view of 
it.  I can run this company for a certain amount of time at a loss put 
everybody out of business in ten years and then I can reach the benefits of 
that for another 20 years.  They think long term. It is profit driven but, not 
immediate profits but, it’s always profit driven.”   
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This concept of foreignness and cultural differences arose as a new area not hypothesized 
in this study and thus could provide an attractive angle for future research. 
The attorneys also felt that there was merit in understanding how boards reacted to being 
publicly charged and that the independence of the board would be a differentiating factor 
in their reaction to illegal activity.  The attorneys felt there was some degree of variability 
as to how boards reacted to subpoenas and charges of illegal activity; the reaction in itself 
could have an impact on further occurrences of illegal activity.  Recidivism is an 
interesting topic as it addresses the matter of systemic organization issues that lead to 
illegal activity versus one-offs or rogue employees that may be the proffered explanation 
as to why illegal activity was conducted.  The concept of board makeup impacting their 
reaction to legal sanctions and recidivism could be addressed in future research. 
Another avenue of related study could examine the differences in action undertaken by 
different levels of independent boards once the illegal activity is uncovered.  A number of 
attorneys commented that boards were more effective once the illegal activity was 
brought to their attention rather than as a preventative force, and the action they 
undertake make be different as suggested by a New York attorney: 
“I don’t know that having independent boards will have any effect on 
whether or not a company engages a price fixing. It may have an effect on 
how a company reacts once a price fixing scheme is discovered. For 
example, if you have an independent board, that board may be more 
motivated to want to figure out what happened and clean it up and get the 
bad actors out.”  
 
I would find it also helpful if the assumption about what various actors feel is in the best 
interests of the firm, including illegal activities, was empirically explored to determine its 
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veracity.  Furthermore, the assumption that outside directors are less tolerant of risk that 
inside directors needs to be substantiated. 
In applying strain theory to this research it is noted that I have only applied it to the 
control section of this research.  Strain theory may equally be influenced by the 
environmental variables as set out in the first part of my model as possible sources of 
strain and as such should be studied.  The industry profit and munificence variables 
would be seen as contributors to the strain that was felt and as such would be supportive 
of strain theory in a direct relationship with illegal activity.  Having chosen not to 
theorize the use of strain theory in the environmental portion of my thesis, some work 
will be required to develop the theoretical portion of this study to the environmental 
variables I have used.  I already have the data and intend to pursue how these 
environmental variables may be seen as sources of strain in organizations. 
Additionally, there is a need to explore these types of cartels in the context of 
international business arrangements.  Dunning has explained how cartels fit into the OLI 
paradigm and that they can be viewed as just another form of international business 
arrangement.  There is possibly some very fruitful ideas and comparisons that can be 
made between these arrangements and legal modalities of operations (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). 
Finally, in exploring this phenomenon I have gone far afield to find and apply theories to 
build and test this model.  There seems to be room for theory development in the 
corporate governance realm to be able to tie structure and behaviour together in the 
running of organizations.  While this theory development would necessarily be broader 
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than the model developed within this thesis, I found in the process of building this model 
a deficiency in the corporate governance theories available for use.  I would recommend 
extensive inductive research to better understand the mechanics and machinations of all 
of the corporate governance actors from shareholders to senior executives. 
8.8 Conclusion 
I have developed a theoretical model of the external and internal causes of illegal activity 
and tested this model with a proprietary dataset.  Although I believe I have advanced both 
theory and practice, the results were mixed.  However, I feel that this work will further 
our understanding of organizational deviance which is critical given its impact on 
organizations, individuals, regulators, law enforcement, and the general public.  I hope 
that this research has provided some benefit on this account and will be used to better 
inform boards of directors in their duties and responsibilities.  Ultimately, my goal is that 
it assists in the detection and prevention of illegal corporate activity.   
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Appendix A:  Guiding Interview Questions for Study 1 
 
1. How do board members determine what emerging external issues may affect the 
organization? 
2. Does the size of the board affect the board’s effectiveness in understanding external 
issues that may impact the organization? 
3. Does the percentage of outside directors (those not directly employed by the 
organization) affect the board’s effectiveness in understanding external issues that 
may impact the organization? 
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Appendix B:  Ethics Approval
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Appendix C:  Guiding Interview Questions for Study 2 
 
 
1. Background information and experience of interviewee 
2. Specific experience of the interviewee in their relationship to cartels i.e. Regulator 
role, class action lawyer cartel, number and type of cases 
3. Experience as to the causes of cartel behavior along with qualifications and specific 
examples: 
a. Comments on each specific antecedent along with examples 
b. Comments on how the interviewee has synthesized or otherwise collated the 
antecedents to arrive at what in their mind, is a classification system for these 
antecedents 
c. Comments on the mechanism that these antecedents utilize in order to enable 
the illegal cartel activity 
4. Comments on the proposed model and the relevance and relationship of each 
construct within the model and the construct validity of each construct 
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Appendix D:  Additional Quotations Concerning the Environmental Variables 
 
Industry Concentration “I would say generally the fewer players there are and the 
easier it is to collude because it’s easier to keep three people 
on board and the pricing is more transparent when there are 
only three suppliers than say when there is ten.” (Attorney, 
San Francisco) 
Industry Profits “Bad economic times, the industry most probably in the 
United States is going down the hole.  Most competitors are 
killing them and the three or four companies who actually 
covered most of the North American markets got together and 
fixed prices. They did so to try and preserve the economic 
viability of their industries against foreign competition.” 
(Attorney, Los Angeles) 
 
“In the chemical industry, there are high fixed costs and then 
demand drops. There is therefore, a lot of surplus capacity, 
and you know, the price will be down or there may be a little 
bit of price manipulation where we might help each other out. 
This helps get back to a sort of environment of profit price 
margins that they consider to be more reasonable than what 
might prevail in an environment of over capacity.”(Attorney, 
Washington, D.C.) 
Firm Profits “Frankly, as a lawyer or a former practitioner you 
understand the cyclical nature of the business. I just find it a 
fascinating observation that contributes the worst times or 
bad to conspire.  They are basically trying to deliver returns 
any way they can” 
(Attorney, New York)  
 
“I’ve been doing antitrust work on and off for 40 years and a 
company’s profitability does impact the decision to engage in 
crime or not.” (Attorney, New York) 
 
Munificence “I feel that if companies and I suppose industries have more 
access to resources and stuff they need to operate, then they 
will perform better, or at least have cheaper inputs, so will be 
more profitable.  That brings me back to the fact that industry 
or company profitability is a driver.” (Attorney, Toronto) 
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Dynamism “People thought that the tech industry was unsusceptible to 
collusion because it was a very dynamic and innovative 
market.  What happened was that the participants sort of just 
gauged their conduct to account for that kind of volatility and 
they just got a little bit more sophisticated and complex. 
Salesmen are very smart and it doesn’t matter what the 
market requirement is they will try to adjust it in a way if they 
want to collude.” (Attorney, San Francisco) 
 
Scanning “The board should be setting the rules.  They can act as the 
ultimate punishment for the CEO so they in effect are 
threatening others that if they do not behave they will be 
fired.”(Attorney, Canada) 
 
“So I think that is probably the area [illegal activity] of high 
sensitivity now, but probably still at most company’s 
directors would be a little, you know, sort of removed from 
this other than perhaps now starting to ask more generally, 
you know, how are you dealing legal and ethical compliance 
issues in a way that it gives the company risks in various 
areas. Outside board members seem to be better at this than 
others.”  (Attorney, Toronto) 
 
“As to the number of board members leading to better 
compliance I agree in principle that this is the case.”  
(Attorney, United States) 
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Appendix E:  Additional Quotations Regarding CEO and Board Output Controls 
 
Board Control “If there is going to be compliance it has to come from the top as 
well. They really have to set a tone from the top but even well 
counselled companies can find their companies with a risk of 
collusion for a whole host of different reasons.  A company can 
buy another company with not too sufficient due diligence and 
then they find that the new company they bought is involved in 
price fixing.  That happens quite frequently. Or they can have 
subsidiaries overseas in countries that don’t have a compliance 
culture. There may be great compliance training in the U.S. but 
there isn’t in say Brazil.  That just happened to Whirlpool, in 
their Brazilian subsidiary that was involved in price fixing on 
compressors and pled guilty last year so you really have to look 
to little gaps in compliance programs which is directed by the 
board and the CEO.” (Attorney, Los Angeles)   
 
“These are people who work together more or less for several 
years and they do not want to rock the boat so when the board 
votes itself a raise it quite naturally will lead to a discussion as to 
whether the CEO needs a raise to keep pace even though he may 
not deserve it.  So I think it is a group of golfing buddies who all 
want to get along well together – so I can see how this can 
happen.” (Attorney, Ottawa) 
 
“The point is if you focus excessively on financial performance, 
then the short cut to financial performance is noncompetition.” 
(Attorney, New York) 
 
CEO Control “I have never seen anything that is really tied to compensation. 
Maybe more job security might be one but, I have never seen it so 
closely. I have not seen that where someone says that I want to 
fix prices because I want a bigger commission next year.  I have 
seen it more as like I want to preserve our existing sort of status 
quo.”  (Attorney, New York) 
 
 “It definitely gets the attention of the CEO as it’s such a credible 
part of the whole businesses, who determines price, what the 
price is, what the price will be going forward.  After all his 
performance comes from profits.”(Attorney, Washington, DC) 
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Cascading Effect “Everything is talked about now in companies and I would say 
this idea that there was some rogue employee at the bottom who 
was doing this and no one else knows about it is not accurate.  I 
mean if this is going on, it’s going on at all levels of the 
company, extending to ones to the top.  It’s just pricing and price 
positions were so critical to a company that they tend to involve 
people from highest level of the company.” (Attorney, Los 
Angeles) 
 
% Outside Directors “I find that the most open to this [compliance] approach are 
those board members that are from outside of the firm without 
any previous affiliation.  They are more by the book sometimes 
than those from within the firm who may be more apt to rely on 
excuses because of extenuating circumstances as to why 
compliance is not 100% necessary, outside board members are a 
little more black and white.” (Attorney, United States) 
 
“Having more members and more outside members is better for 
compliance in general as there are more people to ask questions. 
I feel independent board members have more of a jaundiced eye 
regarding information presented to them by management.” 
(Attorney, United States) 
 
“And boards are kind of giving continuous instruction to kind of 
run these compliance programs and the management are doing 
them in order to substantiate to their boards. Perhaps that they 
are taking measures to guard against these possible risks, but 
you never know the extent to which it has an actual 
effect.”(Attorney, Toronto) 
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